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Chapter 1
Distributed Model Predictive
Control and Game Theory
Traditionally, control theory has coped with information and timing constraints in a central-
ized fashion. The design of control architectures is made assuming that all the information
is available at a single point at the right time. There is no doubt that, if this assumption
holds, the best possible control performance can be achieved. Unfortunately, centralized ar-
chitectures can not always be used in practice. There are different factors that hinder the
application of these schemes. In first place, real systems may not have a model that capture
correctly their dynamics. Moreover, even if a model can be obtained, it may be too complex
to be useful to design a controller. Likewise, there are other important limitations that may
make impossible the use of a centralized architecture. For example, the system may be geo-
graphically disperse, being impossible to gather all the information at a single point at the
right time. Other times it is a matter of privacy: the subsystems that compose the overall
system may be independent and may have incentives to keep some information secret. This
could be, for example, the case of a supply chain.
When one of the referred situations appears, it is not possible to use a centralized con-
troller. It is at this point where decentralized and distributed controllers come into play. The
idea behind these schemes is simple: the centralized problem is divided in several different
parts whose control is assigned to a certain number of local controllers or agents. There-
fore, each agent does not have a global vision of the problem. This is probably the main
feature that characterizes decentralized and distributed systems. Depending on the degree of
interaction that exists between the local subsystems, the agents may need to communicate
so that they can coordinate themselves. If communication is needed, we speak of distributed
systems. By contrast, when the degree of interaction is low enough and agents can afford
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their control tasks with no communication between them, we speak of decentralized control
systems.
Decentralized and distributed schemes have important advantages that justify their use.
The first advantage is that in general these schemes are easier to implement. Their compu-
tational requirements are lower because a difficult problem is substituted by several smaller
problems. In addition, these schemes are scalable. Their inherent modularity simplifies the
system maintenance and the possible expansions in the control system. Moreover, the modu-
larity provides robustness in comparison with a centralized controller. A possible failure does
not have to affect the overall system. For this reason, decentralized and distributed systems
have a greater tolerance to failures. Nevertheless, these systems have also several drawbacks
that have to be taken into account, being the main one the loss of performance in comparison
with a centralized controller. This loss depends on the degree of interaction between the local
subsystems and the coordination mechanisms between the agents.
This thesis focuses on the development of distributed control and estimation techniques
with low communicational burden and on the analysis of the properties of a given distributed
scheme. These objectives are developed in a distributed model predictive control framework
using tools from game theory. In distributed applications, the closed-loop performance is the
result of a trade-off between the number of communications made by the agents and the costs
of the communication itself. It is frequent to see in the literature that costless communication
is assumed, which is a dangerous assumption. Actually, yet in 1992 Peter Deutsch pointed out
the risks of assuming costless communication in his list of fallacies of distributed computing
[21]. Communication is costly in several dimensions, specially in terms of time and energy
consumption, which may be critical factors for may applications.
In this chapter we present some background for the research addressed in this thesis
and review the most relevant results that can be found in this field. Section 1.1 presents
an introduction to sensor and actuator networks. Next, section 1.2 provides some basic
concepts and taxonomies of distributed control. In section 1.3 we describe the basics of model
predictive control. Section 1.4 deals with the distribution of the centralized control problem
among a set of agents. Section 1.6 introduces some useful taxonomies for the distributed
control problem. Finally, section 1.6 surveys the most important DMPC algorithms that can
be found in the literature.
1.1 Sensors and actuators networks
Decentralized and distributed systems have been a subject of study for a long time, but it has
not been until the last decade when they have been at their very peak. The renewed interest
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in distributed and decentralized schemes has been mainly motivated by the proliferation of
low cost wireless transceivers and their wide range of applications. Wireless autonomous
networks provide a mean to measure or actuate much cheaper than the traditional wired
solutions. While the first wireless solutions were expensive and had a small autonomy, the
new developments have brought devices with years of battery life at a low price.
Probably, the most relevant technologies in this sense are related with the IEEE 802.15.4
standard, a protocol designed for wireless personal area networks (WPAN). In contrast with
other technologies such as Wifi or Bluetooth, which are oriented to high bandwidth appli-
cations, 802.15.4 solutions aim to optimize the battery lifetime. For this reason, it offers a
relatively small bandwidth, enough to satisfy the communicational needs of many control
applications. This factor, together with the ease of deployment of wireless networks, explains
the great proliferation of distributed applications.
Without any doubt, these networks will change the world as we know it at industrial and
home level. For example, paradigms such as pervasive computing were just an utopia a few
years ago and now seem to be perfectly possible. However, there are may questions that have
to be addressed in order to optimize the use of these new technologies such as the analysis
and synthesis of distributed systems, the integration of heterogeneous technologies in a same
network or the optimization of the information transmitted through the network, to name a
few.
1.2 Distributed control
In this section we present some fundamental taxonomies that allow to classify the schemes
that have been presented in the literature. Some of this classifications are not new and can
be found in [13] and [71].
1.2.1 Types of control
The controllers can be classified as a function of how many agents participate in the solution
of the control problem and the relative importance between them. We say that a control
system is centralized if there is a single controller that solves the plantwide problem. The
control is decentralized when there are local controllers in charge of the local subsystems of the
plant that require no communication among them. When the local controllers communicate
in order to find a cooperative solution for the overall control problem the control system is
distributed. Finally, if there are different control layers coordinated to take care of the process
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the control system is hierarchical. In this case, upper layers manage the global objectives of
the process and provide references for the lower layers, which control directly the plant.
In this thesis we will focus mainly, but not exclusively, on distributed controllers. Note
that, as we stated before, the performance of the closed-loop system depends on the decisions
that all the agents take, so cooperation and communication policies become very important
issues.
At this point it is convenient to remark that the models used to design the control system
have to be coherent with the type of control adopted. For this reason, models can also be
classified in a similar way.
1.2.2 Types of neighborhood
In a distributed control system, the state and control actions of a given subsystem may
affect other subsystems. Different types of interaction between subsystems can be defined
based on the relative degree of interaction between the inputs and states of each subsystem.
We speak of an interaction of type zero when two different agents share a state variable or
control directly the same manipulated variable. Interaction of type one is referred to the
case in which the coupling between the variables controlled by two different agents is strong
enough to require communication and coordination between them. In other words, it is not
possible to consider the interaction as a mere disturbance. This is the most frequent type of
neighborhood in distributed systems. This classification can be extended to a general case.
For example, a type two would correspond to the case in which the interaction of a given
agent i over an agent j is strong enough to induce a considerable disturbance on a third agent
k, which in general will by a type 1 neighbor of agent j.
Note that interactions and neighborhood may depend on the way the centralized control
problem is distributed between the agents. It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a
mechanism to break the centralized models into subsystems. Nevertheless there are works on
the literature that deal with this problem, see for example [67, 32].
In this thesis we will deal with the types of neighborhood zero and one. We will assume
that the disturbances due to other types of interactions are neglectful.
1.2. DISTRIBUTED CONTROL 5
1.2.3 Types of communication
Communication plays an essential role in distributed control. It can be classified in sev-
eral classes according to different factors related with the protocol that is followed during
the communication. In first place, it is possible to distinguish between synchronous and
asynchronous communication depending whether there is or not a strict timing in the com-
munication process that determines when an agent can communicate. Second, we can classify
the communication as serial or parallel depending on whether one or more than one agent is
allowed to communicate at the same time. Finally, we can classify the communication taking
into account the number of communications employed. This is an important factor for some
systems. It is needless to say that decentralized algorithms have no communication steps.
With one communication step it is possible to establish a distributed control scheme in which
the agents can inform their neighbors about their plans so that this information considered
in the optimization procedure. A consensus or agreement between the agents is only possi-
ble if two or more communication steps are used. The number of communications is finite
only if the negotiation process converge. However note that it is possible that the number
of iterations required to converge is greater than the maximum number of communications
allowed.
The algorithms that we have developed in this work are designed to be implemented
in parallel. Naturally, these algorithms also admit a serial implementation. In general we
require synchronous communication although asynchronous communication can be used in
our multiple agent distributed control scheme. Finally, the number of communications that
is used by the agents is low taking into account that all the decisions are cooperative. For two
agents we have developed an scheme with two communication steps and for multiple agents
we have proposed an algorithm that offers a good performance with an average number of
five communications per agent.
1.2.4 Types of variable update
Agents may update their manipulated variables in several ways. It is possible to establish
a classification as a function of the way in which the agents update their variables from a
social point of view. According to this, we can classify the variable update as exclusive,
if each agent update its variables autonomously, shared, if an agent allows other agents to
manipulate its variables, or democratical, if an agent takes into account the suggestions of
other agents when he calculates the new values of its manipulated variables.
The type of variable update that we have considered in this thesis is the democratical
one. The decisions are taken in a social way whenever it is possible.
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1.2.5 Types of agent
The agents are the essence of distributed control systems. There are important features that
allow us to classify them according to different parameters. In first place, we can classify
them according to the amount of information each agent has about the whole system. This
information has a great impact in the distributed control algorithm used. We say an agent
is blind if the agent has only information about its corresponding local subsystem. In other
words, the agent ignores the rest of subsystems and their influence is modeled as a disturbance.
This is the case, for example, of decentralized control systems. An agent is said to be a
standard agent if it knows his own dynamics and also how other agents affect him. This
knowledge is the base of a possible negotiation procedure with other agents. An agent is
samaritan if it is an standard agent that in addition knows how it affects the other agents as
well. This information allows the agent to choose his control actions minimizing the possible
negative effects on its neighbors. Finally, an agent is omniscient if it has full centralized
information or at least it knows all the information it needs about the system. In second
place we can classify the agents according with their attitude, which is another important
factor. In this context, attitude is related with the will of collaboration between the agents.
In this sense the agent’s attitude is noncooperative if the agent behaves selfishly, that is, it
only tries to maximize its own utility function (i.e., to minimize its cost function). On the
other hand, the agent’s attitude is cooperative when the agent tries to minimize not only its
cost but the cost of its neighbors. Thus, the agent can make a sacrifice in terms of his own
welfare to help the system reach a better global situation.
One of the main assumptions in our control schemes is to consider standard agents from
the informational point of view. In addition, the agents are considered to have a cooperative
attitude.
1.3 Model predictive control
Although there are numerous different control techniques, in this thesis we will focus on Model
Predictive Control (MPC). MPC, also known as receding horizon control (RHC), is a popular
control strategy for the design of high performance model-based process control systems be-
cause of its ability to handle multi-variable interactions, constraints on control (manipulated)
inputs and system states, and optimization requirements in a systematic manner. MPC takes
advantage of a system model to predict its future evolution starting from the current system
state along a given prediction horizon. Nominal MPC controllers consider discrete models of
the following form:
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x(t+ 1) = f(x(t), u(t))
y(t) = g(x(t), u(t))
where t represents the sample time and x(t) ∈ Rn, u(t) ∈ Rm and y(t) ∈ Rq are the state
and input vectors of the system respectively. The model is used recursively at time t to
predict the state or outputs in a finite horizon of length N when a given input trajectory
U(t) = {u(t | t), u(t + 1 | t), . . . , u(t + N − 1 | t)} is applied. The resulting state at the
end of the horizon, x(t + N | t), is called terminal state. The mathematical properties of
the functions f and g depend on the type of dynamics that are modeled (for example linear,
hybrid, nonlinear...). The class of models considered by a given MPC defines the properties
of the controller as well as the complexity of the resulting optimization problem. In this
thesis we will focus on linear models, although some of the results can be extended to more
general classes of systems.
One of the most appealing features of MPC is its ability to handle the constraints on the
values of the states and inputs in an explicit way. Real processes have limits in the values of
all their variables. For example, a valve cannot be opened negatively. Mathematically, this
is modeled by defining a set of admitted values for the state, output and input variables, for
example:
x(t) ∈ X
u(t) ∈ U (1.1)
where X and U are the sets that define the admissible values for the state and input variables.
The objective of model predictive control is to minimize a given performance index that
depends on the future predictions of the state, output and input variables. The performance
index is a cost function which defines an optimization criterium that is used to determine
which control action sequence offers a better performance. Mathematically it is function
that expresses the cost associated to a certain evolution of the system in the horizon interval
considered. A typical form of the cost function is
J(x(t), U(t) =
N−1∑
j=0
L(x(t+ j | t), u(t+ j | t)) + V (x(t+N | t)) (1.2)
where L(·, ·) represents the stage cost of the system at time t+j and V (·) is the terminal cost.
Note that the cost function depends on the current state x(t) of the system and the sequence of
possible control actions U(t). Therefore, it can be used as a minimization criterium to choose
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the best possible control sequence for the system. Moreover, the minimization procedure
has to include the constraints. This can be seen as if cost function punished those control
sequences that result in a violation of any of the constraints. When using continuous time
models MPC optimizes over a family of piecewise constant trajectories with a fixed sampling
time and a finite prediction horizon so that a finite dimensional optimization problem is
obtained.
At each sampling time, the function (1.2) is minimized in order to find the optimal control
sequence U∗(t). Once the optimization problem is solved, only the first manipulated input
value is implemented and the rest of the trajectory is discarded; this optimization procedure
is then repeated in the next sampling step. This is the so-called sliding or receding horizon
scheme.
Once the elements that characterize an MPC controller have been defined, it is possible
to summarize the control algorithm followed by this technique:
1. Measure the current state of the system x(t).
2. Calculate which actions provide the best performance over the horizon by solving the
following optimization problem:
min
U(t)
J(x(t), U(t))
s.t.
x(t+ j | t) ∈ X , ∀j ∈ [1, N ]
u(t+ j | t) ∈ U , ∀j ∈ [0, N − 1]
(1.3)
3. Apply the optimal inputs calculated for the first time sample of the prediction horizon,
that is, u(t | t) and return to step 1.
The success of MPC in industrial applications [12] has motivated an important amount
of research on the stability, robustness and optimality of model predictive controllers. This
success is logical given the advantages of MPC in comparison with its drawbacks. In the
positive side we have that MPC is easy to tune if an appropriate model is available. MPC
also works very well with control problems that are difficult to solve with other control tech-
niques. For example, it deals naturally with multiple inputs and multiple outputs systems,
constraints, delays and disturbances. On the other hand, there are disadvantages that make
the implementation of MPC difficult on some systems. Possibly, the main drawback of MPC
has to do with its strong computational requirements. Factor as nonlinearities or constraints
may make MPC unsuitable for systems with fast dynamics. In particular, nonlinearities lead
to non convex optimization problems, which in general are very hard to solve . Likewise, the
1.4. DISTRIBUTED MODEL PREDICTIVE CONTROL 9
performance of MPC heavily depends on the quality of the model used. The worse the model
is in comparison with the real system, the poorer results are obtained.
As it has been seen, the cost function and the system model have a great impact in
the difficulty of the MPC optimization problem. In this thesis we use linear models and
quadratic functionals, which allow to solve the optimization problem using quadratic pro-
gramming (QP). The existing methods for QP problems are very efficient and allow us to
solve the optimization problem on line. Moreover, in the case that there is no constraints,
the optimization problem can be solved explicitly.
1.4 Distributed model predictive control
The drawbacks of MPC hinder its application to large-scale systems. Typical examples of
large scale systems are transportation systems such us traffic, water or power networks [78]. In
these systems, the computational requirements or the impossibility of obtaining a centralized
model are major problems that MPC cannot avoid. Besides large-scale systems, it is also
difficult to apply centralized MPC to networked systems; the distributed nature of these
systems require control schemes that do not depend on any centralized element. During the
last years, we have assisted to the proliferation of networked control systems (NCS) which
have emerged from the augmentation of the dedicated local control networks with additional
networked (wired and/or wireless) actuator/sensor devices, which have become cheap and
easy-to-install [101] [73].
In practice, most large scale and networked control systems are based on a decentral-
ized architecture; that is, the system is divided into several subsystems, each controlled by
a different agent which may or may not share information with the rest. Each of the agents
implements a controller based on a reduced model of the system and on partial state in-
formation, which in general results in an optimization problem with a lower computational
burden. As it was shown in the list of taxonomies of section 1.2, different possibilities arise at
this point depending on several factors. In first place, the degree of centralized information
shared by the agents is important. In general, the more information the agents have, the
better control performance can be obtained. However, the amount of information shared by
the different agents may have a cost that sometimes outweighs the improvement in the per-
formance. Other issues such as scalability also have to be taken into account when defining
access to the model and the state of the system. In second place, the way the centralized cost
function is separated between the agents, that is, the way the local cost functions are formed,
has relevance too. This factor is related too with the agent’s attitude, which is another
important factor that defines the distributed control scheme. Agents can be cooperative or
selfish. Local controllers may not be willing to cooperate if cooperation implies that they
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have to sacrifice their local performance. Finally, the number of communications that the
agents can make in order to take a decision is also a relevant factor. Communication requires
time and energy, which may be design limiting factors.
These factors generate a family of different distributed MPC problems which demand
different solutions adapted to the particularities of each concrete problem. For these reason,
different DMPC algorithms have emerged in the literature. Later in the chapter the most
important ones will be surveyed. Now it is preferable to see the role that game theory plays
in DMPC.
1.5 Game theory
Game theory is a mathematical field that studies the process of interactive decision making,
that is, situations in which there are several entities, namely players or agents, whose indi-
vidual decisions determine jointly the final outcome. In other words, game theory translates
into mathematical models situations of conflict and/or cooperation between rational and in-
telligent agents. Given that conflict is present everywhere in the world, its results have been
applied to a great variety of fields such as biology, sociology, politics, engineering or economy,
to cite just a few examples. The origins of this mathematical field date back to 1921, with
the publication of several papers about “la the´orie du jeu” by the French mathematician
E´mile Borel. Some years later, in 1928, John Von Neumann published the article “Theory
of Parlor Games”, with important contributions that gave the emerging field mathematical
respectability [77]. Finally, it is worthy to mention that in 1944 Von Neumann published
together with the economist O. Morgenstern the book Theory of Games and Economic Be-
havior [100], an influential and pioneering work that showed the potential contribution of
game theory to economics.
The need of game theory tools depends of the degree of interaction between the agents.
Interaction is actually a key concept in this context. It is hard to find a situation in which
there is no interaction with other entities that induce at least a degree of uncertainty in
the decision making process. If this uncertainty is small enough then individual decision
making techniques such as classical optimization can be used. For example, the problem of
how many goods has to produce a firm in order to maximize its own profit may be seen as
an individual decision making problem, but this is just a mere simplification because there
are other factors that have more or less influence in the firm’s profit: price of competence
products, substitutive goods, or just the general situation of the economy.
In the context of game theory, some common words acquire a special meaning; they are
still close to their ordinary meaning in most cases but there are some subtleties that cannot
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be ignored. Next, some of these terms will be introduced and defined:
• Game. Situation whose outcome depends on the individual decision of several entities
or players.
• Players. Each of the two or more entities whose decisions determine the outcome of
the game. In this text players will be called indistinctively agents. A player will be
said to be rational if he takes his decisions consistently to his objectives, that will be
expressed as the optimization of a certain utility function. A player will be said to be
intelligent if he knows everything that can be known about the game and can make
inferences from that information. For example, in economics agents are assumed to be
rational, but not intelligent because a complete understanding of the whole economic
model from players is not expected.
• Actions. Possible choices a player can make when is his turn to decide.
• Strategies. Complete plan of actions of a player for the game, that is, a strategy
determines which action must be chosen for a player at any time he has to decide. A
profile of strategies is a set of possible strategies for a given player.
• Outcome. One of the possible endings or results for the game. Each outcome implies
consequences for the players.
• Payoff. What is given to a player at the ending of the game, that is, the utility the
player attributes to that particular ending.
Games can be classified in different categories. The most meaningful one classifies games
as cooperative or non-cooperative. Again, the term cooperative has a special meaning in this
context. A game is said to be cooperative if agents can negotiate among them and commit
themselves to follow common binding strategies. If the agents cannot negotiate, the game is
said to be non-cooperative because the agents have no guarantees about the behavior that the
rest of the agents will have in the present and the future. The most important and famous
results of game theory emerged in non-cooperative game theory. Nevertheless, cooperative
game theory provides mathematical tools that suit very well for distributed control problems.
For this reason we will review briefly these two subfields.
1.5.1 Non-cooperative game theory
Von Neumann and Morgenstern only studied two person non-cooperative games, which are
trivial since it is impossible to talk about coalitions in this case. In the case of games with
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more than two agents, they focused on the possible coalitions that players would establish.
N-person games were not studied from a non-cooperative perspective until the 1940s and
1950s, when the mathematician John F. Nash extended game theory in that direction [68].
In this subsection we will introduce some of the results of noncooperative game theory that
have been used in this thesis. The reader interested in a deeper insight on the topic is
recommended to see some of the classical references in the literature such as [9, 66].
The most common way to represent a game is the strategic or normal form. This rep-
resentation is static in the sense that the time instants in which the decisions are taken are
not important an it can be assumed that all the agents make their decisions simultaneously.
Mathematically, a game Γ in strategic form is given by:
Γ = (M, (Ui)i∈M , (Ji)i∈M ) (1.4)
where M is a nonempty set of agents, Ui is a nonempty set of strategies for agent i and
(Ji)i∈M is a payoff function that maps the set of possible strategies chosen by the players in
the set of reals, specifying the payoff for every agent.
For simplicity we will use a 2-person game to introduce the most relevant concepts of
noncooperative game theory. In this case, it is possible to pose the strategic form of the
game as a table. A well known example that can be found in the literature example is the
prisoner’s dilemma, which is presented next [77]:
Two members of a criminal gang are arrested and imprisoned. Each prisoner is in soli-
tary confinement with no means of speaking to or exchanging messages with the other. The
police admit they don’t have enough evidence to convict the pair on the principal charge. They
plan to sentence both to a year in prison on a lesser charge. Simultaneously, the police offer
each prisoner a Faustian bargain. If he testifies against hist partner, he will go free while the
partner will get three years in prison on the main charge. Oh, yes, there is a catch... If both
prisoners testify against each other, both will be sentenced to two years in jail.
B refuses deal B turns state’s evidence
A refuses deal 1 year, 1 year 3 years, 0 years
A turns state’s evidence 0 years, 3 years 2 years, 2 years
As it can be seen in the table, there are four possible outcomes for this game. Each
player has two possible strategies, accept or refuse the deal. However, given that the game is
symmetric, if both players are intelligent and rational, only one of the two outcomes in the
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diagonal will be the final outcome of the game. Each of this solutions has an special meaning
in game theory.
The first possible outcome that we will analyze is the case in which both player turn
state’s evidence. This situation corresponds to the famous Nash equilibrium, which roughly
speaking can be defined as the no-regrets outcome, that is, none of the players is unhappy with
his decisions during the game once the game has ended. Mathematically a Nash equilibrium
is defined as a strategy profile U∗ in which no unilateral deviation in strategy by any single
player i is profitable for that player, that is,
∀i, ui ∈ Ui, ui 6= u∗i : Ji(u∗i , u∗−i) ≥ Ji(ui, u∗−i)
where ui and u
∗
i are different strategies carried out by the player i and u
∗
−i stands for the
strategy implemented by the rest of agents in the Nash equilibrium. As it can be seen, in this
outcome none of the players regrets his choice. For example, let us suppose that A would
have choice to refuse the deal, then A would have got the worst possible outcome for his
interests. The same analysis can be made by player B. For this reason, both are equally
happy with the decisions they made, although, paradoxically, they would have been better if
both of them have refused the deal.
The other possible logical outcome of the game is the social optimum, which happens when
the two players cooperate and refuse the deal. This is related with the concept of Pareto
efficiency. Roughly speaking, Pareto optimality has to do with an outcome in which no agent
can be made better off without making worse off at least other agent. Mathematically, a
payoff vector v = (vi)i∈M ) is weakly efficient in the sense of Pareto if there is no other payoff
vector w = (wi)i∈M ) such that wi ≥ vi∀i ∈ M . In addition, if the inequality holds strictly,
that is wi > vi∀i ∈M , then v is strongly efficient in the sense of Pareto. It can be seen that
the payoffs that are Pareto efficient are maximals of the set of possible outcomes.
It is important to remark one of the most important features of noncooperative games:
the logical outcome of a prisoner’s dilemma played by selfish players is its Nash equilibrium,
which paradoxically is worse than the Pareto efficient outcome. To avoid this paradox, it is
necessary to introduce some kind of social concern in the payoffs of the players, so that they
are not only interested in their own welfare.
A distributed control problem can be usually posed as a game of the form 1.4. The
process is not straight-forward, though. There is a set of agents whose strategies or control
actions have side effects in the costs of the rest of the agents. Nevertheless, defining the cost
functions of the agents may not be an easy task. This basic situation may be enhanced by,
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for example, letting the players iterate so that they react to each other’s control actions until
convergence to a Nash equilibrium has been obtained (in case that the interactions converge,
which may not be possible). Anyway the concepts that we have seen in this section still
prevail in these more sophisticated scenarios. As it can be seen, Pareto efficiency and Nash
equilibria are important in the analysis and design of distributed control systems. In fact,
all these concepts have become popular in the study of distributed control schemes and they
can be found frequently in the literature, see for example [9, 43, 98, 27].
1.5.2 Cooperative game theory
Cooperative game theory studies situations of mutual interaction between a set of agents
which can negotiate among them and commit themselves to follow common binding strate-
gies. As a result of the bargaining process, the set of agents might be divided into several
subsets that are called coalitions. The role of game theory in this field is to study which
coalitions of agents should be formed and to analyze how the cost or benefits from cooper-
ation should be distributed between the members of a coalition. Note that the existence of
a communication channel is implicit in this branch of game theory. In this subsection some
concepts of cooperative game theory that have been used in this thesis will be introduced.
The reader interested in a deeper insight on the topic is recommended to see [47].
In its most basic form, a cooperative game is defined only with two elements, a set of
different players and a function that assigns a value to each of the possible coalitions of
players. In this point we have to remark that the value of the coalition represents the cost
to reach the common goal without the assistance of the agents that are not present in the
coalition. Nevertheless, there are other elements that define the class of cooperative games
in which we are interested, for example the network. The study of the influence of the
network in cooperative game theory began decades ago with the work of Myerson [65]. The
necessary and sufficient condition for any two agents to communicate, and hence cooperate,
is that they are at least indirectly connected by the network, that is, there exists a path of
active links that connect them. In addition, a cooperative game can also take into account
the costs of communication. Therefore, it can be considered that the existence of each link
has a fixed cost associated to its use. With all these ingredients, we can define a cost-
extended communication situation. Cost-extended communication situations allows one to
study several inherent properties of the agents and the network [47] and are applied in this
thesis as an analytical tool for networked control systems .
In general, given a game there are several possible rules to determine a payoff vector as a
solution for the players in the game. The most popular rule is the Shapley value [66], which
is the only allocation rule γ(N, v) that verifies the following axioms: efficiency, additivity,
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symmetry and passive player property. The Shapley value can be interpreted as the payoff
vector that gives to each player his expected marginal contribution to a random coalition.
Note that despite the solutions in cooperative games are focused in the obtention of payoff
vectors to estimate the distribution of costs or benefits between the players, in this thesis it
will be shown that it is possible to use these values as tools for the analysis of relevance of
the agents and the links in a distributed control problem.
1.6 Literature review
During the last few years there has been a great interest in the research of distributed control
systems. In particular, several distributed MPC schemes have been proposed in the literature
that deal with the coordination of separate MPC controllers that strive to obtain optimal
input trajectories in a distributed manner. In this section we provide a review of the most
important contributions that can be found in the literature in this area. Other reviews of
this topic can be found in [84] or [88]. In addition, in [13] basic collaboration algorithms are
provided with an extensive list of conditions to ensure convergence and stability.
The main goal of decentralized and distributed algorithms is the same: obtaining the best
possible solution for the problem 1.3 in a distributed fashion. Nevertheless, the variety of
distributed control problems demands different solutions able to adapt to the particularities of
each problem. In order to simplify the mathematical presentation of the different algorithms,
we will adopt a simplified notation. In particular we will group in a single vector S all
the variables involved in the optimization problem and we will omit the dependance of the
optimization problem with respect to the state. Thus, we can rewrite the problem 1.3 as
min
S
J(S)
s.t.
S ∈ S
(1.5)
In addition we will assume without of loss of generality that the centralized system is con-
trolled only by two agents. The distribution of the centralized problem between the agents
is not easy. In first place, the centralized cost function J(S) gives raise to two different cost
functions, J1(S) and J2(S), which are the objective functions of the agents. In this thesis we
will assume that J(S) is simply the sum of the sum of the cost functions of the agents, that
is, J(S) = J1(S) + J2(S). Likewise, the set of centralized variables S has to be decomposed
in three different sets: S1, S2 and S12, where S1 and S2 stand respectively for the decoupled
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variables of agents 1 and 2 and S12 represent the set of coupling variables, that is, those
variables that directly affect both J1 and J2. Unless the set S12 is empty, it is clear that the
agents have to communicate somehow in order to find a coordinated solution for the problem
1.5. Finally, the difficulties imposed by the constraints will be relaxed and it will be assumed
that there is no coupling, that is, S = S1 × S2 × S12.
Next, we introduce the main approaches that can be found in the literature. It is impor-
tant to remark that the fact of presenting the algorithms in an unified manner allows only
to capture the essence of each scheme but may miss some important details. Therefore we
encourage the reader to see the references that are given for each scheme.
1.6.1 Decentralized schemes
This solution is based on the following assumption: the set of variables S can be decomposed
in two different sets S1 and S2 so that the optimization problem 1.5 is trivially parallelizable
as follows
min
S
J(S) min
S1
J1(S1) + min
S2
J2(S2)
s.t. ≡ s.t. s.t.
S ∈ S S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
(1.6)
The decentralization of the control problem is possible when the system is composed of
subsystems whose dynamics and constraints are decoupled or the coupling is negligible. In
this case it is not necessary to establish any mean of communication between the agents.
Alternatively, some authors duplicate variables in order to separate the problem [2].
Decentralized MPC schemes can be easily found in the literature. For example, in [60],
an MPC algorithm was proposed under the main assumptions that the system is nonlinear,
discrete-time and no information is exchanged between local controllers. The stability of
this class of systems, from an input-to-state stability point of view, was studied in [79]. In
[2] the centralized MPC problem is decentralized considering only a one step horizon, which
guarantees small deviations in the values of the variables the agent share. In addition, a
sufficient criterion for analyzing a posteriori the asymptotic stability of the process model in
closed-loop with the set of decentralized MPC controllers is given. This work is enhanced in
[3] for the case of packet loss. Finally, in [45] a decentralized control architecture for nonlinear
systems with continuous and asynchronous measurements was presented.
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1.6.2 DMPC based on information broadcast
In this category we include those DMPC schemes in which the agents communicate with the
goal of providing useful information for the decisions of the rest of their neighbors. Thus, no
negotiation procedure takes place between the agents. Under this approach we can consider
that the set of shared variables S12 is empty but the cost function of each agent depends on
both S1 and S2. For this reason agent 1 transmits to agent 2 information about his variables
(Sc1) and agent 2 sends to agent 1 information about his variables (S
c
2). The nature of this
information depend on the particular algorithm; it can be a prediction of the future value of
some variables, a set of future possible values, etc. One way to address this class of problems
is to follow a worst case approach, that is, each agent tries to optimize its outcome for the
worst possible decision of its neighbor solving a minimax optimization problem
min
S
J(S) min
S1
max
S2
J1(S1, S2) + min
S2
max
S1
J2(S1, S2)
s.t. ∼= s.t. s.t.
S ∈ S S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
S2 ∈ Sc2 S1 ∈ Sc1
(1.7)
In [33] a DMPC scheme for linear systems coupled only through the state is considered.
In this scheme the agents exchange the predictions about their state at the end of each
sample step. In [34] the DMPC controllers exchange bounds of their state trajectories and
incorporate this information into their local problems. The main drawback of this approach
is that each agent solves a local min-max problem similar to (1.7) on each iteration with
respect to the worst-case disturbances, which is a very conservative solution. A similar
approach is followed by [86] in which subsystems with independent dynamics but coupled
constraints are considered. In this work each agent optimizes its local cost function knowing
the predicted plans for the other subsystems using a robust MPC approach. An extension
of this work [94] proposes the use of tubes for DMPC. In this scheme, the agents exchange
the region of the state space in which their future state trajectories will lie along a given
prediction horizon. The agents only have to communicate when these predicted regions
change. Otherwise each subsystem can remain into its tube without communicating with
the rest of the agents. In [15], MPC scheme based on contractive constraints is applied
for the distributed control of a power system. In this case the agents exchange their state
predictions once at the beginning of the each control cycle. The stability of the scheme
is assured by mean of a contractive constraint imposed on the first state in the prediction
horizon. In [38] decentralized MPC of dynamically decoupled systems where the cost function
and constraints couple the dynamical behavior of the systems was studied. It is remarkable
that although the agents do not communicate, they can access to the state measurements
of their neighbors. In [24], the problem of distributed control of dynamically decoupled
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nonlinear systems coupled by their cost function is considered. This method is extended to
the case of dynamically coupled nonlinear systems in [22] and applied as a distributed control
strategy for supply chains in [23]. In this implementation, the agents optimize locally their
own policy, which is communicated to their neighbors. The stability is assured through a
compatibility constraint: the agents commit themselves not to deviate too far in their state
and input trajectories from what their neighbors believe they plan to do. Another interesting
work is [46], which is an evolution of [45]. In this paper a distributed model predictive
control method for the design of networked control systems based on Lyapunov-based model
predictive control was presented. In both cases, each agent had access to the full system
model.
Other algorithms in the literature are based on an iterative procedure of information
broadcast. In each sample time the agents exchange information and solve their local problem
shown in equation (1.7). For example, in [98] this procedure is presented as communication-
based control. In [62] another iterative implementation of a similar DMPC scheme was
applied together with a distributed Kalman filter to a quadruple tank system. Finally, in [43]
the Shell benchmark is used to test a similar algorithm. Note that all these methods lead in
general to Nash equilibria as long as the cost functions of the agents are selfish.
1.6.3 DMPC based on agent collaboration
In this category we include those DMPC schemes in which the agents exchange information
trying to obtain a consensus on the values of the shared variables. It has to be remarked that
this category includes algorithms very different in their nature. In particular, two different
approaches can be found in the literature. The first one consists on the distribution of
the centralized optimization problem between the agents. Methods such as primal or dual
decomposition are based on this idea. An extensive review of this kind of algorithms can be
found in [11]. The second approach distributes the problem formulation between agents and
establishes ways of negotiation between them so that joint decisions can be taken.
Primal decomposition
Primal decomposition algorithms are based on the following idea:
1. Each agent solves its optimization problem assuming that the coupling variable is fixed,
that is,
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φ1(S12) = min
S1
J1(S1, S12) φ2(S12) = min
S2
J2(S2, S12)
s.t. s.t.
S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
(1.8)
2. The distributed problem is reduced to a master problem of the complicating variable
S12. From a centralized point of view the problem is
min
S12
φ1(S12) + φ2(S12)
s.t.
S12 ∈ S12
(1.9)
which can be solved in a distributed fashion. To this end, agent i calculates gi, which
is the subgradient (subderivative) of φi(S12) with respect to the complicating variable,
that is, gi ∈ φi(S12).
3. The complicating variable is updated
S12 = S12 − α(g1 + g2)
where α is the step size.
4. Return to step 1 until the difference between the complicating variable between two
consecutive steps is below a given threshold.
Dual decomposition
This approach consists of creating local versions of the complicating variable with additional
consistency constraints that enforce them to have the same value. In the case of two agents,
we can decompose the the complicating variable S12 in two local versions, S
1
12 and S
2
12, one
for each agent. The resulting optimization problem, also called primal problem, is
min
S
J(S) min
S1,S112
J1(S1, S
1
12) + min
S2,S212
J2(S2, S
2
12)
s.t. ∼= s.t. s.t.
S ∈ S S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
S112 = S
2
12 S
1
12 = S
2
12
(1.10)
As it can be seen, the problem (1.10) changes the coupling from the optimization variables
to the constraints. However, this difficulty can be solved with the aid of the Lagrange
multipliers. The lagrangian or dual function of the centralized cost function is
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L(S1, S
1
12, S2, S
2
12) = J1(S1, S
1
12) + J2(S2, S
2
12) + λ
T (S112 − S212), (1.11)
which can be split in two different functions of the local variables of the agents. Dual decom-
position algorithms can be summarized in these steps:
1. Each agent i finds the values of (Si, S
i
12) that minimizes its dual function with a fixed
value of the lagrange multiplier λ.
φ1(λ) = min
S1,S112
J1(S1, S
1
12) + λS
1
12 φ2(λ) = min
S2,S212
J2(S2, S
2
12)− λS212
s.t. s.t.
S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
(1.12)
2. The distributed problem is reduced to a problem of the complicating variable. The
minimum of the primal problem (1.10) is attained at the maximum of the lagrangrian
(1.11) with respect λ. The problem
max
λ
φ1(λ) + φ2(λ) (1.13)
can be solved in a distributed fashion.
3. It can be proved that when λ is maximum, the variables S112 and S
2
12 have the same
value. That means that the minimum of (1.10) will be attained when the gradient of λ
is zero. In order to obtain the maximum on λ, we can use a distributed gradient search
λ = λ− α(S212 − S112)
where α is the step size.
4. Return to step 1 until the enough precision has been obtained, that is, when the update
of the variable λ is below a given threshold.
Note that if the algorithm is stopped before the convergence, it is likely that the solution
obtained is not feasible, that is, S112 6= S212. Nevertheless, this can be solved in part by taking
S12 = (S
1
12 + S
2
12)/2.
Dual decomposition has been used for DMPC in [82]. An augmented lagrangian formu-
lation is proposed in [71] and applied to the control of irrigation canals in [70]. The problem
of dual decomposition is, in general, the same that primal decomposition has: it requires a
great number of iterations to obtain a solution.
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Jacobi algorithm
This algorithm is an iterative method for the parallel optimization of nonlinear problems
and its description can be found in [11] (see pages 219-223). This algorithm is the core idea
of one of Venkat’s feasible cooperation-based MPC [99, 93, 83], which is one of the most
popular approaches to solve the DMPC problem. Cooperation-based DMPC assumes that
the set of coupling variables S12 is empty. The coupling comes in the cost functions of both
agents, which depend both on S1 and S2. At each sample time, the agents begin an iterative
procedure in order to reach a joint solution which can be described as follows:
1. Step 1. Begin the iteration procedure with p = 0.
2. Step 2. At iteration p each agent solves a centralized optimization problem assuming
that the neighboring variables have the value of the previous iteration:
Sp1 = argmin
S1
J(S1, S
p
2) S
p
2 = argmin
S2
J(Sp1 , S2)
s.t. s.t.
S1 ∈ S1 S2 ∈ S2
Sp2 = S
p−1
2 S
p
1 = S
p−1
1
(1.14)
3. If the algorithm converges, that is, Spi = S
p+1
i , or a maximum number of iterations has
been exceeded, then the iteration procedure stops. Otherwise, increase the iteration
index p and go to step 2.
Under certain assumptions it can be proved that this procedure is convergent. The
sequence of iterates converges to an optimal limit point which coincides with the centralized
MPC solution. This solution also holds the condition of Pareto optimality.
Note that the algorithm is somehow similar to the primal decomposition one. The dif-
ference between them is in the amount of centralized information the agents have. In this
case all the agents optimize the centralized cost function with respect their input variables
instead of only their particular cost functions. This difference allows the agents not to have
to exchange the subgradient of the complicating variables. The price to pay is the extra
centralized information that all the agent in the system must have.
Descent direction algorithm
This algorithm is another iterative method and it is a distributed version of the method of
the feasible directions given in [74]. Again it is assumed that the set of coupling variables
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S12 is empty. The coupling comes in the cost functions of both agents, which depend both
on S1 and S2. In addition, it is assumed that the local cost functions include the effect of
each agent control actions in the other agent objectives. Thus, the local cost functions are
cooperative in their nature. In each time sample the agents begin an iterative procedure in
order to reach a joint solution which can be described as follows:
1. Step1. Begin the iteration procedure with p = 0.
2. Step 2. At iteration p, agent one solves the following optimization problem
Sp+11 = argmin
S1
∇S1J1(Sp1 , Sp2 )T (S1 − Sp1)
s.t.
S1 ∈ S1
(1.15)
while agent two solves
Sp+12 = argmin
S2
∇S2J2(Sp1 , S2)T (S2 − Sp2)
s.t.
S2 ∈ S2
(1.16)
3. If the algorithm converges, that is, Spi = S
p+1
i , or a maximum number of iterations has
been exceeded, then the iteration procedure stops. Otherwise, increase the iteration
index p and go to step 2.
As it can be seen, this algorithm follows a gradient search to find the solution for the
problem. This method has been applied in [14] to an urban traffic network. A different
gradient-based distributed dynamic optimization method is proposed in [89] and applied to
an experimental four tanks plant in [5]. The method of [89] is based on the exchange of
sensitivities. This information is used to modify the local cost function of each agent adding
a linear term which partially allow to consider the other agents’ objectives.
1.7 Objectives of the thesis
As it has been seen in the literature review, there is a good number of distributed MPC
techniques. Some of them, provide the same performance as centralized MPC, at least the-
oretically [71, 99]. However, obtaining optimal results is not an easy task and requires in
general an intensive use of the communication network. The main objective of this thesis is
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to provide a good control performance while minimizing the number of communications be-
tween the agents and guaranteeing properties such as the stability of the closed-loop system.
Likewise, we have tried to minimize the amount of centralized information the agents need.
Some sacrifices have to be done in order to reduce the communicational burden of the
control schemes developed in this work. The first one is to reduce the number of possible
actions that can be implemented by the agents. This reduction aims to limit the disturbances
that the agents induce to their neighbors and simplifies the search of a joint solution for
the control problem. It is important to stand out that the decisions are taken collectively.
Collective decision making proves to be a good strategy even in scenarios in which players are
selfish [8]. In addition, we provide design methods that guarantee the stability of the closed-
loop system for the distributed control strategies that are proposed in this thesis. Moreover,
we have developed algorithms to obtain a particular type of invariant set for distributed
systems which can be used to analyze decentralized and distributed control schemes. A
second goal of the thesis has been to transpose results of distributed control to distributed
estimation, which is natural since distributed estimation is needed in distributed applications
and because the estimation problem is the dual of the control problem. Finally, our last
objective has been to develope techniques based on the dynamical switching of the links of
the network, so that links which provide small gains in the control performance are disabled.
Based on this work, we have also proposed a method to determine what agents and links are
more important in a distributed system.
1.8 Thesis outline
The outline of the thesis is the following:
• Chapter 2: Distributed Model Predictive Control Based on Game Theory
for Two Agents. The interaction between two agents is simplified using an strategic
game in which the number of possible control actions is reduced to three for each agent.
The three possible choices are to cooperate with the other agent, to behave selfishly or
to implement a stabilizing option. Agents choose the best decision of the possible nine
combinations trying to optimize the global cost. The stability of the closed-loop system
is guaranteed by the controller design method that we propose in the chapter. This
control scheme is applied to a supply chain simulation example and a benchmark of the
project HD-MPC, the four tank plant. In addition, the robustness of the algorithm is
tested against data losses in a stirred tank reactor simulation example.
• Chapter 3: Distributed Model Predictive Control Based on Game Theory
for N Agents. The combinatorial explosion of the distributed problem hinder the
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extension of the previous scheme to a general case. For this reason, a simplified scheme
is developed in which each agent sends proposal for the control actions to his neighbors.
Neighbors answer quantifying the positive or negative impact of the proposal. Only
those proposals that reduce the global cost are accepted. In case that no proposal is
accepted a stabilizing control action is applied. The stability of the closed-loop system
is guaranteed by the controller design method that we propose in the chapter. Likewise,
we define the concept of jointly invariant set and propose a method for its obtention.
This control scheme is applied to a supply chain and an irrigation canal simulation
examples.
• Chapter 4: Distributed Receding Horizon Kalman Filter. Given that estima-
tion is the dual problem of control, it is natural to apply distributed control techniques
to the estimation problem In this chapter the estimation problem is reduced to a dy-
namic programming problem which is distributed between the agents by means of dual
decomposition.
• Chapter 5: Applications of Cooperative Game Theory to the Control and
Estimation of Distributed Systems. Cooperative game theory provides mathe-
matical tools very appropriated for the analysis of situations of conflict in which the
agents may establish binding agreements. In this chapter of the thesis some results of
coalitional game theory are transposed to distributed control. Based on these results, a
control scheme to manage dynamically the links of a network is developed. In addition,
a method to analyze the relative importance of links and agents in a distributed system
is proposed.
• Chapter 6: Conclusions. The thesis ends with a chapter that analyzes the most
relevant contributions and, additionally, points out future research lines in the field of
distributed systems.
1.9 Contributions
As it has been seen in this section, this thesis can be located at the intersection between the
fields of distributed control and game theory. In this subsection we will enumerate the major
contributions made in this work and the results from the thesis that have been published or
submitted to conferences and journals.
Given the difficulty of the distributed control problem, it was natural to face a simplified
case in the first years of work of the thesis. For this reason, we focused initially in the
case of two agents. As a result of this we developed a distributed control scheme with low
communications step. This scheme was put to test with a MIMO system described by its
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transfer function in [51] and applied to systems described in state space in [53, 52]. The
proposed control scheme provides a good performance and guarantees the stability of the
closed-loop system under certain assumptions. Besides these three conference papers, this
work has been published in an international journal in [54] is compared to other distributed
schemes with a real benchmark in a paper submitted to a journal [5].
Once the problem of two agents was solved, we extended our methodology to the general
case of systems with N agents. In order to overcome the difficulties of the combinatorial
explosion, a simplified version of the scheme was developed and as a result of this a negotiation
algorithm was proposed. As our experiments show, the control scheme provides a good
performance in a low number of communication steps. Again, a controller design method
that guarantees the stability of the closed-loop system is provided. Additionally, a method
to compute the jointly distributed invariant set of the system is presented. This work has
been submitted for publication to an international journal [57, 102] and to an international
conference [58].
Contributions have also been made to the distribution of the state estimation problem.
Concretely, a technique based on the dual decomposition of the state estimation problem was
developed together with professor Anders Rantzer, from the LTH in Lund (Sweden). This
work has been accepted for publication in [50].
Besides these algorithms, other meaningful contributions to the state of the art have
been made. In particular, it is remarkable the novel application of coalitional game theory
to distributed control in order to dynamically decompose the agents in coalitions with low
interaction. As a result of this we have proposed a distributed control scheme in which the
decomposition of the centralized system is done dynamically. Additionally, the cooperative
game theory tools provide an interesting method to analyze the relative relevance of agents
and links in a network. This work has been presented in [48] and submitted to an international
conference [55] and a journal [56].
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Chapter 2
Distributed Model Predictive
Control Based on Game Theory for
Two Agents
As it was stated in the introduction, one of the goals of this thesis is to design distributed
cooperative controllers with low communicational burden. In this chapter we focus on the
particular case in which the system is divided in two subsystems. In particular, we propose
a distributed model predictive control scheme based on a cooperative game in which two
different agents communicate in order to find a solution to the problem of controlling two
constrained linear systems coupled through the inputs. We assume that each agent only
has partial information of the model and the state of the system. In the proposed scheme,
the coordination problem between the agents is reduced to a team game where they have to
choose one out of three options. To this end, the agents communicate twice each sampling
time in order to share enough information to take a cooperative decision. Concretely, we
provide sufficient conditions that guarantee practical stability of the closed-loop system as
well as an optimization based procedure to design the controller so that these conditions
are satisfied. In addition, we study the robustness of the distributed scheme against data
losses due to failures in the communication channel. The theoretical results and the design
procedure are illustrated using different simulation examples. Finally, we show the results
that the control scheme has got in a benchmark of the european project “Hierarchical and
distributed model predictive control” (HD-MPC)1.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 2.1 the proposed DMPC scheme for
two agents is presented. Section 2.2 shows the stability properties of the proposed scheme.
1HD-MPC project, contract number INFSO-ICT-223854.
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Figure 2.1: Centralized MPC scheme.
The next section shows different simulation examples to illustrate different features of the
algorithm. A supply chain and two double integrators coupled through the inputs are used
as examples. Section 2.4 tests the robustness of the scheme against communicational failures
using a stirred tank reactor. In section 2.5 a real application of the control scheme to a four
tank plant is shown. In addition, the controller is compared to other distributed algorithms
in this section. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 2.6.
This chapter is based on the results and ideas published in [51, 53, 52, 54, 64].
2.1 Problem formulation
Consider the following class of distributed linear systems in which two subsystems coupled
with the neighbor subsystem through the inputs are defined
x1(t+ 1) = A1x1(t) +B11u1(t) +B12u2(t)
x2(t+ 1) = A2x2(t) +B21u1(t) +B22u2(t)
(2.1)
where xi ∈ Rni , i = 1, 2 are the states of each subsystem and ui ∈ Rmi , i = 1, 2 are the
different inputs. This class of systems are of relevance when identifications techniques are
used to obtain the transfer function of a process. We consider the following linear constraints
in the state and the inputs
xi ∈ Xi, ui ∈ Ui, i = 1, 2
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Figure 2.2: Decentralized MPC scheme.
where Xi and Ui with i = 1, 2 are defined by a set of linear inequalities.
The control objective is to regulate the system to the origin while guaranteeing that the
constraints are satisfied. Centralized MPC solves a single optimization problem to decide the
optimal sequences of the inputs u1 and u2 with respect to a given performance index based
on the full model of the system and on measurements from all the sensors, see figure 2.1. In
distributed and decentralized schemes two independent controllers (hereby denoted agents)
are defined. Agent 1 has access to the model of subsystem 1, its state x1 and decides the
value of u1. On the other hand, agent 2 has access to the model of subsystem 2, its state x2
and decides the value of u2. This implies that neither agent has access to the full model or
state information and that in order to find a cooperative solution, they must communicate.
A control system is decentralized if there is no communication among the agents, see
figure 2.2. This is the worst scenario from the performance point of view because each agent
has to cope alone with its control problem with the risk that the absence of coordination in the
agents decisions may lead to the instability of the system. The control system is distributed if
there is communication between agents, see figure 2.3. The degree of communication depends
on the control problem and the communication constraints. In this section we present a
distributed MPC controller based on a cooperative game scheme between two different agents.
The objective of the proposed DMPC scheme is to minimize a performance index that
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Figure 2.3: Distributed MPC scheme.
depends on the future evolution of both states and inputs. At each sampling time, each
agent solves a sequence of reduced dimension optimization problems based on the model
of its subsystem and assuming a given fixed input trajectory for its neighbor. In order to
describe the algorithm, we need to introduce the following definitions:
• Ui: Future input sequence of agent i. These are the decision variables of the optimiza-
tion problems solved by both agents.
U1 =


u1,0
u1,1
...
u1,N−1

 , U2 =


u2,0
u2,1
...
u2,N−1


• ni: Neighboring agent of agent i; that is, Un1 = U2 and Un2 = U1.
• Ji: Local cost function of agent i based on the predicted trajectories of its state defined
as follows:
J1(x1, U1, U2) =
N−1∑
k=0
L1(x1,k, u1,k) + F1(x1,N )
J2(x2, U2, U1) =
N−1∑
k=0
L2(x2,k, u2,k) + F2(x2,N )
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where Li(·) and Fi(·) with i = 1, 2 are the stage and terminal cost functions respectively
defined as:
Li(x, u) = x
TQix+ u
TRiu
Fi(x) = x
TPix
with Qi, Pi > 0, Ri ≥ 0. The prediction horizon is N . We use the notation xi,k
to denote the k-steps ahead future predicted state obtained from the initial state xi
applying the input trajectories defined by and U1 and U2. Note that the second and
third parameters of functions J1 and J2 are switched. This will allow us to simplify the
algorithm definition.
• Udi (t): Optimal input sequence of agent i at time t, denoted Udi (t), defined as:
Ud1 (t) =


ud1,0
ud1,1
...
ud1,N−1

 , Ud2 (t) =


ud2,0
ud2,1
...
ud2,N−1


• U si (t): Shifted optimal input sequence of agent i obtained from the optimal input
sequence of agent i at time t− 1, denoted Udi (t− 1), as follows:
U s1 (t) =


ud1,1
ud1,2
...
ud1,N−1
K1x1,N

 , U
s
2 (t) =


ud2,1
ud2,2
...
ud2,N−1
K2x2,N


where x1,N , x2,N are the N -steps ahead predicted state obtained from x1(t−1), x2(t−1)
respectively applying the input trajectories Ud1 (t − 1), Ud2 (t − 1) and K1, K2 are two
known feedback gains.
The proposed DMPC algorithm is the following:
1. At time step t, each agent i receives its corresponding partial state measurement xi(t).
2. Each agent i minimizes Ji assuming that the neighbor keeps applying the optimal
trajectory evaluated at the previous time step; that is, Uni = U
s
ni(t). Agent 1 solves
the following optimization problem:
U∗1 (t) = argmin
U1
J1(x1(t), U1, U
s
2 (t))
x1,k+1 = A1x1,k +B11u1,k +B12u2,k
x1,0 = x1(t)
x1,k ∈ X1, k = 0, . . . N
u1,k ∈ U1, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x1,N ∈ Ω1
(2.2)
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Agent 2 solves the following optimization problem:
U∗2 (t) = argmin
U2
J2(x2(t), U2, U
s
1 (t))
x2,k+1 = A2x2,k +B22u2,k +B21u1,k
x2,0 = x2(t)
x2,k ∈ X2, k = 0, . . . N
u2,k ∈ U2, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x2,N ∈ Ω2
(2.3)
The sets Ω1 and Ω2 define the terminal region constraints that are necessary to prove
closed-loop practical stability following a terminal region/terminal cost approach. Note
that in both optimization problems the free variable is Ui while the neighbor input
trajectory Uni is fixed.
3. Each agent i minimizes Ji optimizing the neighbor input assuming that it applies the
input trajectory computed in the previous optimization problem U∗i . Agent 1 solves
the following optimization problem:
Uw2 (t) = argmin
U2
J1(x1(t), U
∗
1 (t), U2)
x1,k+1 = A1x1,k +B11u1,k +B12u2,k
x1,0 = x1(t)
x1,k ∈ X1, k = 0, . . . N
u2,k ∈ U2, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x1,N ∈ Ω1
(2.4)
Agent 2 solves the following optimization problem:
Uw1 (t) = argmin
U1
J2(x2(t), U
∗
2 (t), U1)
x2,k+1 = A2x2,k +B22u2,k +B21u1,k
x2,0 = x2(t)
x2,k ∈ X2, k = 0, . . . N
u1,k ∈ U1, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x2,N ∈ Ω2
(2.5)
In this optimization problem the free variable is Uni (the input trajectory Ui is fixed).
Solving this optimization problem, agent i defines an input trajectory for its neighbor
that optimizes its local cost function Ji.
4. Both agents communicate. Agent 1 sends U∗1 (t) and U
w
2 (t) to agent 2 and receives U
∗
2 (t)
and Uw1 (t).
5. Each agent evaluates the local cost function Ji for each the nine different possible combi-
nation of input trajectories; that is U1 ∈ {U s1 (t), Uw1 (t), U∗1 (t)} and U2 ∈ {U s2 (t), Uw2 (t), U∗2 (t)}.
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Table 2.1: Cost function table used for the decision making.
Us
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s
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6. Both agents communicate and share the information of the value of local cost function
for each possible combination of input trajectories. In this step, both agents receive
enough information to take a cooperative decision.
7. Each agent applies the input trajectory that minimizes J = J1+J2. Because both agents
have access to the same information after the second communication cycle, both agents
choose the same optimal input sets. We denote the chosen set of input trajectories as
Ud1 (t), U
d
2 (t).
8. The first input of each optimal sequence is applied and the procedure is repeated the
next sampling time.
From a game theory point of view, at each time step both agents are playing a cooperative
game. This game can be synthesized in strategic form by a three by three matrix. Each row
represents one of the three possible decisions of agent 1, and each column represents one of
the three possible decisions of agent 2. The cells contain the sum of the cost functions of
both agents for a particular choice of future inputs. At each time step, the option that yields
a lower global cost is chosen. Note that both agents share this information, so they both
choose the same option. The nine possibilities are shown in table 2.1.
Remark. At each sampling time, the controllers decide among three different options.
The shifted optimal input trajectory U si (t) keeps applying the latest optimal trajectory. The
selfish option U∗i (t) provides the best improvement in Ji if the rest of the systems manipulated
variables stay unchanged. The altruist option Uwi (t) provides the best improvement for the
neighbor agent cost function J2. In this case, the agent i sacrifices its own welfare in order
to improve the overall performance.
Remark. Centralized MPC solves a single large-scale problem based on the model of the
whole system, see figure 2.1. In the example section we will compare the performance of the
proposed approach with a centralized MPC controller based on the following optimization
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problem:
{U c1(t), U c2 (t)} = arg min
U1,U2
J1(x1(t), U1, U2) + J2(x1(t), U2, U1)
x1,k+1 = A1x1,k +B11u1,k +B12u2,k
x1,0 = x1(t)
x1,k ∈ X1, k = 0, . . . N
u1,k ∈ U1, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x1,N ∈ Ω1
x2,k+1 = A2x2,k +B22u2,k +B21u1,k
x2,0 = x2(t)
x2,k ∈ X2, k = 0, . . . N
u2,k ∈ U2, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x2,N ∈ Ω2
(2.6)
The centralized MPC provides in general the best closed-loop performance, but can only be
applied when it is possible to control the system with a single controller that has access to
the full model and state of the same.
Remark. In general, the minimum number of communication steps needed for a cooperat-
ing control scheme is two. In the first step each agent informs of its intentions to its neighbors
and during the second it can confirm if it accepts its neighbors’ intentions. In the best case
an agreement can be achieved in the second step, but in general an iterative procedure will
be needed to reach an agreement.
Remark. The proposed controller scheme is cooperative from a game theory point of view
because each agent chooses the solution that optimizes a cost function that depends on both
subsystems, not only on the future trajectories of its subsystem. If the decision taken does
not depend on a global performance index, the solution is not cooperative. In the simulation
section we will compare the proposed distributed controller with a distributed scheme in
which the two agents communicate, but do not take a cooperative decision. They iterate
until an agreement is obtained. In this case, the solution is a Nash equilibrium [98] of the
multi-objective optimization problem defined by the cost functions of both agents. At each
iteration, agent 1 solves the following optimization problem:
U l+11 = argmin
U1
J1(x1, U1, U
l
2)
x1,k+1 = A1x1,k +B11u1,k +B12u2,k
x1,0 = x1
x1,k ∈ X1, k = 0, . . . N
u1,k ∈ U1, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x1,N ∈ Ω1
(2.7)
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and agent 2 solves the following optimization problem:
U l+12 = argmin
U2
J2(x2, U2, U
l
1)
x2,k+1 = A2x2,k +B22u2,k +B21u1,k
x2,0 = x2
x2,k ∈ X2, k = 0, . . . N
u2,k ∈ U2, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x2,N ∈ Ω2
(2.8)
with U01 = U
s
1 and U
0
2 = U
s
2 ; that is, the initial guess is given by the shifted trajectory. An
agreement is reached when the difference between the proposed control vector by each agent
at one iteration and its value at the previous iteration is below a threshold. This implies, that
they do not share information about the utility of each decision, they reach an agreement
when neither of them can improve, hence reaching a Nash equilibrium. In the example
we will compare the proposed controller with different controllers based on this distributed
scheme, each one carrying out a fixed number of iterations, to demonstrate that the proposed
cooperative scheme provides a better performance with a lower number of iterations.
Remark. Although the option chosen by the algorithm is the Pareto optimum of the game
that both agents are playing, in general it is not a Pareto optimum of the multi-objective
optimization problem defined by the cost functions J1 and J2.
Remark. The proposed scheme can be extended to deal with N agents, however, in order
to build a global cost table to take a cooperative decision, the complexity grows exponentially.
In order to reduce the complexity, the structure of the system may be exploited taking into
account that an input may not affect all the outputs. Also, in general not all the possible
cooperation options are employed with the same frequency, so it is possible to reduce further
the complexity by not taking into account the less frequent options. In the next chapter, we
propose a distributed scheme for the case of N agents following a slightly different approach:
each agent optimizes with respect to all the manipulated variables that affect its dynamics.
After that, the agent may make different proposals for the value of the set (or subsets) of
these variables. In this way, the combinatorial explosion of the general case is avoided.
Remark. The computational burden of the proposed distributed scheme is in general
lower than the one corresponding to the centralized scheme not only because the optimization
problems are of a lower dimension (smaller number of free variables), but also because the
agents can operate in parallel.
Remark. In the proposed algorithm both agents can operate in parallel; that is, the agents
can compute U∗i and U
w
i simultaneously (steps 2 and 3).
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2.2 Stability properties
Controlling a system between two independent agents may lead to an unstable system. The
resulting closed-loop system is a multiprocess system and studying the stability of this class
of systems is in general a difficult task. Following a terminal region/terminal constraint
approach [61, 26], in this section we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee practical
stability of the closed-loop system as well as an optimization based procedure to design the
controller so that these conditions are satisfied. This result is stated in the following theorem:
Theorem 1 Assume that there exist linear feedbacks u1 = K1x1 and u2 = K2x2 such that
the following conditions hold:
F1((A1 +B11K1)x1 +B12K2x2)− F1(x1) + L1(x1,K1x1)− d1 ≤ 0, ∀x2 ∈ Ω2 (2.9a)
F2((A2 +B22K2)x2 +B21K1x1)− F1(x2) + L1(x2,K2x2)− d2 ≤ 0, ∀x1 ∈ Ω1 (2.9b)
x1 ∈ Ω1 → (A1 +B11K1)x1 +B12K2x2 ∈ Ω1, ∀x2 ∈ Ω2 (2.9c)
x2 ∈ Ω2 → (A2 +B22K2)x2 +B21K1x1 ∈ Ω2, ∀x1 ∈ Ω1 (2.9d)
K1x1 ∈ U1, ∀x1 ∈ Ω1 (2.9e)
K2x2 ∈ U2, ∀x2 ∈ Ω2 (2.9f)
Ω1 ∈ X1 (2.9g)
Ω2 ∈ X2 (2.9h)
Then, if at t = 0, U s1 (0), U
s
2 (0) are given such that Problems (2.2) and (2.3) are feasible for
x1,0 = x1(0), x2,0 = x2(0), U1 = U
s
1 (0) and U2 = U
s
2 (0), then the proposed algorithm is feasible
for all time steps t ≥ 0 and system (2.1) in closed-loop with the proposed distributed MPC
controller is ultimately bounded in a region that contains the origin in its interior.
Proof:
The proof consists of two parts. We first prove recursive feasibility of Problems (2.2)
and (2.3) if at time t, U s1 (t), U
s
2 (t) are given such that (2.2) and (2.3) are feasible for x1,0 =
x1(t), x2,0 = x2(t), U1 = U
s
1 (t) and U2 = U
s
2 (t). Then we prove that, under the stated
assumptions,
J(t) = J1(x1(t), U
d
1 (t), U
d
2 (t)) + J2(x2(t), U
d
2 (t), U
d
1 (t))
is a decreasing sequence of values with a lower bound. This implies that system (2.1) in
closed-loop with the proposed distributed MPC controller is ultimately bounded in a region
that contains the origin in its interior.
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Part 1. We will prove this part by recursion. First, we prove that if the state and input
trajectories obtained from x1(t−1) and x2(t−1) applying Ud1 (t−1) and Ud2 (t−1) satisfy all the
constraints of Problems (2.2) and (2.3), then Ud1 (t) and U
d
2 (t) also satisfy all the constraints.
Recalling step 5 of the proposed algorithm, to prove this statement it is sufficient to prove
that there exists at least a pair of input trajectories that satisfy all the constraints. To this
end, we will prove that U s1 (t), U
s
2 (t) provide a feasible solution for x1(t) and x2(t). Note that
in general, it is not possible to guarantee that any of the other options are feasible.
Taking into account that by definition Ud1 (t− 1) and Ud1 (t− 1) satisfy the constraints of
Problems (2.2) and (2.3), the following statements hold
x1,k ∈ X1, k = 0, . . . N
ud1,k ∈ U1, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x1,N ∈ Ω1
x2,k ∈ X2, k = 0, . . . N
ud2,k ∈ U2, k = 0, . . . N − 1
x2,N ∈ Ω2
where x1,k, x2,k are the k-steps ahead predicted state obtained from x1(t − 1), x2(t − 1)
respectively applying the input trajectories Ud1 (t − 1), Ud2 (t − 1) defined by ud1,k, ud2,k with
k = 0, . . . , N − 1.
At time step t−1, the first input of the chosen trajectories Ud1 (t−1), Ud2 (t−1) are applied;
that is, u1(t− 1) = ud1,0 and u2(t− 1) = ud2,0. This implies that
x1(t) = A1x1(t− 1) +B11u1(t− 1) +B12u2(t− 1) = A1x1,0 +B11ud1,0 +B12ud2,0 = x1,1.
Taking into account the definitions of U s1 (t) and U
s
2 (t), it can be proved that the k-steps
ahead predicted state obtained from x1(t), x2(t) respectively applying the input trajectories
U s1 (t), U
s
2 (t) satisfy all the constraints from k = 0 to N − 1. Moreover, as
x1,N ∈ Ω1, x2,N ∈ Ω2
it holds that
(A1 +B11K1)x1,N +B12K2x2,N ∈ Ω1
(A2 +B22K2)x2,N +B21K1x1,N ∈ Ω2
and hence all the constraints of Problems (2.2) and (2.3) are satisfied which implies that
U s1 (t), U
s
2 (t) and hence U
d
1 (t), U
d
2 (t) provide a feasible solution for x1(t) and x2(t). Taking
into account that by assumption, U s1 (0), U
s
2 (0) satisfy all the constraints for x1(0) and x2(0)
and using the above result recursively, the statement of this part is proved.
Part 2. In this part we will prove that
J1(x1(t), U
s
1 (t), U
s
2 (t)) + J2(x2(t), U
s
2 (t), U
s
1 (t)) ≤ J(t− 1) + d1 + d2
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where
J(t− 1) = J1(x1(t− 1), Ud1 (t− 1), Ud2 (t− 1)) + J2(x2(t− 1), Ud2 (t− 1), Ud1 (t− 1)).
Taking into account the definitions of Ud1 (t− 1) and U s1 (t) it follows that
J1(x1(t), U
s
1 (t), U
s
2 (t))− J1(x1(t− 1), Ud1 (t− 1), Ud2 (t− 1))
is equal to
F1((A1 +B11K1)x1,N +B12K2x2,N )− F1(x1,N ) + L1(x1,N ,K1x1,N )− L1(x1,0,K1x1,0)
As L1(x1,0,K1x1,0) ≥ 0 and taking into account (2.9a) and (2.9b), that x1,N ∈ Ω1 and that
x2,N ∈ Ω2 it follows that
J1(x1(t), U
s
1 (t), U
s
2 (t)) − J1(x1(t− 1), Ud1 (t− 1), Ud2 (t− 1)) − d1 ≤ 0
Following the same steps for J2 we obtain that
J2(x2(t), U
s
2 (t), U
s
1 (t)) − J2(x2(t− 1), Ud2 (t− 1), Ud1 (t− 1)) − d2 ≤ 0
and hence
J1(x1(t), U
s
1 (t), U
s
2 (t)) + J2(x2(t), U
s
2 (t), U
s
1 (t)) ≤ J(t− 1) + d1 + d2
As the proposed algorithm chooses Ud1 (t), U
d
2 (t) as the pair of input trajectories that yield
the minimum cost, it is easy to see that
J(t) ≤ J(t− 1) + d1 + d2
Following standard Lyapunov arguments and taking into account that recursive feasibility is
guaranteed (see the first part of the proof), it is proved that system (2.1) in closed-loop with
the MPC controller defined by the proposed controller is ultimately bounded in a region that
contains the origin in its interior.

Remark. Theorem 1 guarantees that the closed-loop system is ultimately bounded in a
closed region that contains the origin. However, it is possible to prove that the proposed
controller provides asymptotic stability if the assumptions 2.9a and 2.9b are modified so that
asymptotic stability of the centralized system is guaranteed. In the next chapter, we will
study this topic in depth.
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2.2.1 Design procedure
In the previous section, we have provided sufficient conditions to guarantee that the closed-
loop system with the proposed distributed MPC scheme is practically stable. In general,
designing the controller parameters so that these conditions are satisfied is a hard problem
because the design constraints are coupled; for example, the constraints that define the
invariant sets Ω1 depend on the set of Ω2 and viceversa. For centralized MPC controllers,
there are various methods described in the literature on how to design a stabilizing local
controller, terminal cost function and terminal region [61, 26, 37] (for example, the local
controller and the terminal cost can be obtained solving a LQR problem). These results
however cannot be applied to the distributed case. In this section we present an optimization
based procedure to find local controllers K1,K2, matrices P1, P2 and regions Ω1,Ω2 such
that (2.9) holds for a given system.
The procedure determines first matrices K1,K2, P1 and P2 such that (2.9a) and (2.9b)
hold for any given sets Ω1 and Ω2 solving a linear matrix inequality (LMI) optimization
problem. Once the local feedbacks K1 and K2 are fixed, the invariant sets Ω1 and Ω2 are
obtained. Note that constants d1 and d2 are determined a posteriori, once the local feedbacks,
terminal costs and terminal regions are fixed.
From the point of view of each agent, its neighbor’s input can be viewed as a disturbance.
This allows us to use well known tools from control of linear uncertain systems in order to
determine a local controller such that a given degree of robustness is guaranteed. In [59, 1, 41]
several methods to solve this class of problems are presented. In particular, constraint (2.9a)
can be transformed into an LMI and solved using standard techniques, moreover, is equivalent
to designing an H-infinity controller for subsystem 1 assuming that u2 is the disturbance [41].
The same technique can be followed to design K2 and P2. The following theorem defines an
LMI constraint that only depends on the system matrices that guarantees that there exist
K1,K2, P1 and P2 such that (2.9a) and (2.9b) hold.
Theorem 2 Consider system (2.1). If there exist matrices Wi, Yi and a constant γi such
that the following inequality holds

γiI 0 B
T
i,ni 0 0
∗ Wi WiATii + Y Ti BTii WiQ
1
2
i Y
T
i R
1
2
i
∗ ∗ Wi 0 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I 0
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ I

 > 0. (2.10)
then (2.9a) (or (2.9b), depending on the agent) is satisfied for Pi =W
−1
i , Ki = YiW
−1
i , and
di = γi max
x∈Ωni
(Knix)
TKnix
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Proof: In [41] it is proved that if (2.10) holds, then the following constraint is satisfied
Fi((Ai +BiiKi)xi +Bi,niv)− Fi(xi) + Li(xi,Kixi)− γivT v ≤ 0, ∀v (2.11)
It follows that (2.9a) (or (2.9b), depending on the agent) holds for
di = γi max
x∈Ωni
(Knix)
TKnix

Once the local controllers and the terminal cost functions are fixed, in order to design a
distributed MPC scheme that satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 1 one needs to find sets
Ω1,Ω2 such that (2.9c) to (2.9g) hold. In general this is a difficult problem because each
of the sets depends on the other. The size of the terminal region for agent 1 is determined
by the magnitude of the disturbances induced by its neighbor agent 2 and viceversa. We
provide next an optimization based procedure to solve this problem. In order to present the
algorithm we need the following definitions
Definition 1 Given the following discrete-time linear system subject to bounded additive
uncertainties
x+ = Ax+Bu+Dw
with w ∈ W, subject to constraints in the state and the input x ∈ X , u ∈ U and a linear
feedback u = Kx; a set Ω is said to be a robust positive invariant set for the system if the
following constraints hold
x ∈ Ω→ (A+BK)x+BKx ∈ Ω, ∀w ∈ W
Kx ∈ U
Ω ∈ X
Given system matrices A,B,D,K and the sets X ,U ,W , there exists several methods to
find a set Ω that satisfies these constraints, see for example [39] for a procedure to find
the maximal robust positive invariant and [80] for a procedure to find an approximation of
the minimal robust positive invariant. We denote Ω(A,B,D,K,X ,U ,W) the corresponding
maximal robust positive invariant set.
Taking into account that the input of the neighbor agent can be considered as an unknown
bounded disturbance, in order to decouple the computation of the sets Ω1 and Ω2, we use
the following result based on finding a robust positive invariant set for each subsystem:
2.3. SIMULATION EXAMPLES 41
Theorem 3 Given constants λ1 ∈ (0, 1] and λ2 ∈ (0, 1], if the sets defined as
Ω1 = Ω(A1, B11, B12,X1,K1, λ1U1, λ2U2)
Ω2 = Ω(A2, B22, B21,X2,K2, λ2U2, λ1U1)
are not empty, then constraints (2.9c) to (2.9g) are satisfied.
Proof: The theorem is proved taking into account the definition of the operator Ω and
that λ1U1 ⊆ U1 and λ2U2 ⊆ U2.

The main idea is that to determine the invariant sets both agents limit its inputs by
a factor λi ∈ (0, 1] with i = 1, 2 so the other agent can find the maximal robust positive
invariant set with respect to a known bounded disturbance. For example, agent 1 finds the
maximal robust positive invariant with respect to a disturbance bounded in λ2U2 assuming
that its input is bounded in λ1U1. Agent 2 does the same. Note that these sets may be
empty depending on the value of λ1 and λ2. If both sets exists, then they satisfy the stability
constraints. In general an infinite number of possible values of λ1 and λ2 such that both
sets are non empty may exist. In order to choose one, we propose to solve the following
optimization problem to maximize the feasibility region of the distributed MPC controller:
max
λ1∈(0,1],λ2∈(0,1]
f(Ω1 × Ω2)
Ω1 = Ω(A1, B11, B12,K1,X1, λ1U1, λ2U2)
Ω2 = Ω(A2, B22, B21,K2,X2, λ2U2, λ1U1)
(2.12)
where f(·) is a measure of the size of a polyhedra (for example, its Chebyshev radius).
Once matrices K1,K2, P1, P2 and the sets Ω1 and Ω2 are determined, constants d1 and d2
can be calculated in order to obtain an estimation of the set in which the closed-loop system
is ultimately bounded.
2.3 Simulation examples
In this section the theoretical results and the design procedure are illustrated using two dif-
ferent examples. The first example is focused on the controller design procedure. The second
controller shows the application of the proposed approach to a supply chain problem. The
simulations presented in this chapter were performed using Matlab in a computer equipped
with a 2.2GHz Core 2 duo processor and 3 GB of RAM memory.
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2.3.1 Two double integrators with coupled inputs
The system considered is composed by two double integrators with coupled inputs. The first
subsystem is defined by the following matrices
A11 =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B11 =
[
0
1
]
, B12 =
[
0
0.4
]
and the second subsystems is defined by
A22 =
[
1 1
0 1
]
, B22 =
[
0
1
]
, B21 =
[
0
1
]
The state and the input must satisfy the following constraints:
‖x1‖∞ ≤ 1, ‖x2‖∞ ≤ 2, |u1| ≤ 1, |u2| ≤ 1
The stage cost functions of each agent are defined by Qi = I and Ri = 1 for i = 1, 2.
In order to determine the local controllers Ki and the corresponding weight matrices Pi
that define the terminal cost function, a LMI problem based on (2.10) that minimizes the
constant γi is solved for each agent. The following matrices are obtained:
Ki =
[
−0.2023 −0.9254
]
, i = 1, 2
P1 =
[
32.6719 −17.5149
−17.5149 54.6366
]
, P2 =
[
38.4509 −5.6447
−5.6447 50.1686
]
The last step necessary to apply the proposed algorithm is to determine an invariant region
for the two agents, Ω1 and Ω2. Different approaches can be used to determine the values
of λi that maximize the size of the terminal regions. In this example the terminal region was
calculated for a grid with different values of λi. The criterion to select the maximum invariant
region was the Chebyshev radius of the maximum ball inside the region. The results were
λ∗1 = 0.3 and λ
∗
2 = 0.5. Figure 2.4 shows a 3D plot of the Chebyshev radius as a function of
λ1 and λ2.
The constants λ1 and λ2 define a trade-off between the degree of freedom that the agents
have in order to stabilize the system, and the size of the terminal region which determines the
size of the disturbance. As λ2 increases, the set defined byK2x ∈ λ2U2 increases. This implies
that the set Ω2 = Ω(A2, B22, B21,K2,X2, λ2U2, λ1U1) becomes larger because the feasibility
region of the input is larger, while the set Ω1 = Ω(A1, B11, B12,K1,X1, λ1U1, λ2U2) has to
take into account bigger disturbances and may even cease to be defined (i.e., is empty). This
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Figure 2.4: Chebyshev radius of the set Ω1 × Ω2 for different values of λ1 and λ2.
happens when the minimum positive robust invariant set for an uncertainty bounded in λ2U2
is not included in the feasibility region defined by X1 and K1x1 ∈ λ1U1. In figure 2.5(a), inner
approximations of the minimum positive invariant sets of subsystem 1 for different values of
λ2 and a fixed value of λ1 are shown. It can be seen that for large values of λ2, the inner
approximation is not contained in the feasibility region of agent 2 (shown in red dashed line),
and hence, it is empty. In figure 2.5(b) the maximum positive invariant set for the same
values of λ1 and a fixed value of λ2 are shown. It can be seen how the size of the set always
increases with λ2.
In the first time step, a feasible solution for the centralized problem is used as the shifted
trajectories. Simulations results are shown in the next figures for the following initial condi-
tions:
x1(0) =
[
0.7
−1
]
, x2(0) =
[
1
0.8
]
Figure 2.6 shows the trajectories of the states of each agent, the inputs and the cost
index. Figures 2.7(b) and 2.7(a) show the state trajectories of each agent along with its
corresponding invariant set.
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Figure 2.5: (a) Minimum robust invariant set for agent 1 as a function of λ2 with λ1 fixed.
(b) Maximum robust invariant set for agent 2 as a function of λ2 with λ1 fixed.
2.3.2 Application to a supply chain problem
In this section, we apply the proposed controller to a reduced version of the MIT beer game
and compare the performance with other control schemes. The MIT beer game was developed
by Jay Forrester in the late 1950’s to show his managements students how oscillations arise in
a supply chain, see for example [92]. A supply chain is the set of structures and processes used
by an organization to provide a service or a good to a consumer. Typically three phenomena
take place in supply chains flows: oscillation, amplification and phase lag. Due to material
or informational delays in the flows of the supply chain, they are prone to oscillation; that
is, production and inventories overshoot and undershoot the optimal levels. The magnitude
of the fluctuations increase as they propagate from the customer to the factory, with each
upstream stage tending to lag behind the downstream one in what is commonly known as
the bullwhip effect.
The original MIT beer game is composed of four agents: retailer, wholesaler, distributor
and factory. Customers demand beer from the first one, who orders beer from the wholesaler,
who orders and receives beer from the distributor, who finally orders and receives orders from
the factory. There are shipping and processing delays at each stage. In [92], the original model
and all the difficulties of the corresponding stock management problem are explained in detail.
This problem has been widely used in the literature. In particular, in [23] it has been used as
application example for a DMPC scheme. The main difference between the proposed scheme
and the DMPC proposed in [23] is that in [23] the agents only communicated once and the
only information shared was the future input trajectories (a strategy similar to Iter 1).
In this example, a reduced version of the problem with two agents is considered: the
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Figure 2.6: State, input and global cost J(t) trajectories of the double integrators in closed-
loop with the proposed controller.
retailer and its supplier. There is no loss of generality since the structure of the game is
regular: there is a cascade of firms, each maintaining and controlling its stock. The continuous
time equations for the supplier are [92]:
s˙S(τ) = oSr (τ − τ2)− oRr (τ − τ1)− bS(τ)/tb
o˙Su(τ) = o
S
r (τ)− oSr (τ − τ2))
b˙S(τ) = oRr (τ)− oRr (τ − τ1)− bS(τ)/tb
(2.13)
The equations for the retailer are:
s˙R(τ) = oRr (τ − τ1 − τ2) + bS(τ − τ2)/tb − dr(τ − τ1)− bR(τ)/tb
o˙Ru (τ) = o
R
r (τ)− oRr (τ − τ1 − τ2)− bS(τ − τ2)/tb
b˙R(τ) = dRr (τ)− dRr (τ − τ1)− bR(τ)/tb
(2.14)
The super-scripts R,S denote variables from the retailer and the supplier respectively. Vari-
able si(τ) is the stock level; that is, the number of items available in that stage for shipment
downstream. The unfulfilled order of stock oiu(τ) stands for the number of ordered items that
the agent is waiting to receive from the upstream stage. The backlog of unfulfilled orders
bi(τ) accounts for the number of committed items that have to be shipped to the downstream
stage. The parameter tb stands for the average backlog clearance time and introduces a first
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Figure 2.7: (a) Agent 1 state evolution. (b) Agent 2 state evolution.
order dynamic in the process. The customer demand dRr (τ) represents how many items are
demanded by the customers. From a control point of view, it can be seen as a measurable
perturbation that has to be rejected in order to maintain the stock and the production at the
desired levels. The information flows are assumed to have no time delays and the material
flows have a delay modeled by τ2. A delay for processing the received orders is introduced
by means of the parameter τ1. The manipulated variable at each stage is the order rate
oir; that is, the number of items demanded upstream. The supplier demands directly to the
factory, which is modeled here as a pure delay. This model is different from other supply
chain models, in which each agent has to decide not only what to order downstream, but
what to send upstream. In this model of the MIT beer game, items sent to the upstream
agent are not a decision variable. They are fixed by the orders received. In particular, items
sent and the orders received are related through a first order system with a delay; that is,
the shipment rate lir(τ) is defined by the following equations
lSr (τ) = o
R
r (τ − τ1) + bS(τ)/tb
lRr (τ) = d
R
r (τ − τ1) + bR(τ)/tb
These relations have already been taken into account in the model.
The model of the system defined by the parameters τ1, τ2 and tb. In the simulations
performed we use τ1 = 2d, τ2 = 1d and tb = 4d. In order to obtain a discrete time model
of the system, the continuous time model of equations (2.14)-(2.13) is discretized with a
sampling time ∆ = 1d. Auxiliary states are introduced to take into account the delays. The
resulting discrete time linear model is the one used in all the simulations carried out in this
section.
In addition, an integrator is added to the controller; that is, the MPC controller decides
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Figure 2.8: Reduced beer game.
the increment on the orders made downstream. This implies that the controller evaluates
∆oSr and ∆o
R
r defined as follows
∆oSr (t) = o
S
r (t)− oSr (t− 1)
∆oRr (t) = o
R
r (t)− oRr (t− 1)
The state of the model of the first subsystem (the retailer) is given by:
x1(t) =


sR(t)
oRu (t)
bR(t)
oRr (t− 1)
oRr (t− 2)
oRr (t− 3)
bS(t)
bS(t− 1)
dr(t− 1)
dr(t− 2)


The state of the model of the second subsystem (the supplier) is given by:
x2(t) =


sS(t)
oSu(t)
bS(t)
oSr (t− 1)
oRr (t− 1)
oRr (t− 2)


It can be seen that both models share some information. In particular, the retailer model
needs to keep track of the unfulfilled orders of the supplier, while the supplier model needs to
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keep track of the orders received of the retailer. The input of the first agent is u1 = ∆o
R
r (t)
and the input of the second agent is u2 = ∆o
S
r (t).
The control objective is to regulate the stock levels and the orders placed by both agents
to a desired value. The orders received by the retailer from the external demand forces
him to send items upstream, and hence to lose stock. These orders can be seen as external
disturbances that have to be rejected. To this end, the retailer sends and order for more
items downstream. These orders can be seen as an external disturbance for the supplier,
which in order to reject this disturbances, generates new items. The retailer’s stock has to
be regulated to a reference value of rRs (t). Analogously the supplier’s stock is regulated to
a value rSs (t). The reference signals for the orders are given by r
R
o (t) for the retailer and by
rSo (t) for the supplier. Note that in general, the orders references signal should be chosen
accordingly with the predicted demand.
To this end, we consider different MPC controllers based on the following cost functions
J1 =
N−1∑
k=0
(rRs,k − sRk )2WRs + (rRo,k − oRk )2WRo + (∆oRk )2WR∆
J2 =
N−1∑
k=0
(rSs,k − sSk )2W Ss + (rSo,k − oSk )2W So + (∆oSk )2W S∆
where N is the prediction horizon, the subindex k denotes the k-steps predicted value of a
signal and WRs ,W
R
o ,W
R
∆ ,W
S
s ,W
S
o ,W
S
∆ are constant weight matrices that define the stage
cost. It is important to remark that no terminal cost function is considered in this example.
Note that in order to obtain predictions for the states of the retailer, an estimation of the
future demand is needed. We denote the estimated demand as dˆRr (t). This signal may be
different from the actual demand dRr (t) in a given simulation.
The following values were used for the controller parameters:
N = 6,WRs = 30,W
R
o = 30,W
R
∆ = 1,W
S
s = 30,W
S
o = 30,W
S
∆ = 1 (2.15)
For these simulations we have considered that the stocks and orders must be non negative.
The objective of this section is to compare the performance of different MPC schemes.
To this end, we have carried out a set of simulations in five different scenarios for each
controller. The first controller considered is the centralized MPC scheme defined by the
optimization problem (2.6). This controller decides both inputs with a single optimization
problem based on the full model of the system and the global cost function J = J1 + J2. In
general the centralized MPC provides the best performance and has the higher computational
burden. The second control scheme considered is the proposed distributed MPC controller in
which two different agents communicate to find a cooperative solution. In addition, we have
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considered several controllers based on the iterative controller defined by the optimization
problems (2.7),(2.8). To avoid the case in which the agents do not reach an agreement, a
maximum number of iterations is fixed. Different controllers with a maximum number of
iterations of 1, 2, 5 and 10 have been considered. We denote these controllers as Iter1, Iter2,
Iter5 and Iter10 respectively. In case of convergence in this bargaining process, the agents
reach a Nash solution from a game theory point of view. None of them consider the cost
function of the other agent. For any given input trajectory proposed by its neighbor, the
agent evaluated the best possible input for his performance index. By definition, in a situation
of equilibrium, this situation constitutes a Nash equilibrium. It is important to remark that
in the controller defined by a single iteration (Iter1), the agents do not reach an agreement.
They just advice each other about their predicted inputs. Each agent uses this information
to estimate the future behavior of the other one. This is not a cooperative scheme because
agents do not have a chance to bargain. From the point of view of each agent the other’s
actions are simply measurable disturbances.
In order to compare the performance of the controllers, four different scenarios have been
taken into account. Each scenario is defined by a different initial state, a different retailer
demand, and a different demand forecast. All the simulations are done with the discrete time
model presented before.
Scenario 1: Both agents begin with 250 items in stock. The demand of the system dRr (t)
is defined the following way: during the first 15 days its value is 70. After that, it is set
to 130 during 10 days and finally it returns to its initial value for 70 days. The estimated
demand dˆRr (t) is equal to the real demand.
Scenario 2: Same initial state and estimated demand of the first scenario. In this case,
the real demand differs from the estimated demand. At each time step, the real demand is
obtained adding a random variable with mean 0 and standard deviation of 15 to the estimated
demand.
Scenario 3: Same initial state and real demand of the first scenario. In this case the
estimated demand is supposed to be constant and equal to the latest demand received; that
is, the instant demand is extended in time as a forecast.
Scenario 4: Same real and estimated demands of the first scenario. The initial state is
below the reference. The retailer has an initial stock of 100 items while the supplier is out of
stock.
The results obtained are shown in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. In these tables, the total ac-
cumulated cost and the total CPU time of each simulation is shown. The total CPU time
includes not only the time of solving the different optimization problems but also all the addi-
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Table 2.2: Results for scenario 1.
J Tsim
Centralized 3.6179e+006 1.4187
DMPC 4.9827e+006 0.8806
Iter1 2.1866e+007 0.5362
Iter2 5.6999e+006 0.7200
Iter5 5.8449e+006 1.7651
Iter10 4.1679e+006 2.2721
Table 2.3: Results for scenario 2.
J Tsim
Centralized 4.3228e+006 1.44
DMPC 5.3558e+006 0.8890
Iter1 2.1921e+007 0.5008
Iter2 6.0941e+006 0.8771
Iter5 6.2743e+006 1.8354
Iter10 4.7223e+006 2.2581
Table 2.4: Results for scenario 3.
J Tsim
Centralized 5.9327e+006 1.427
DMPC 9.6698e+006 0.8265
Iter1 2.2047e+007 0.6887
Iter2 9.0370e+006 0.8287
Iter5 1.0595e+007 1.8209
Iter10 6.2798e+006 1.2073
Table 2.5: Results for scenario 4.
J Tsim
Centralized 7.2608e+006 1.55
DMPC 8.1302e+006 0.9521
Iter1 2.9982e+007 0.6116
Iter2 1.0397e+007 0.8542
Iter5 1.0444e+007 1.8621
Iter10 9.4679e+006 2.4107
tional computations such as evaluating the system model. In the simulations the distributed
schemes have not been implemented in parallel, and hence the centralized and the distributed
controllers have the same computational power. The total simulation time provides an esti-
mate of the computational burden of each of the controllers, in particular, it shows that for
this particular example the centralized problem has a low computational burden and that
the computational burden of the iterative controllers increase as the maximum number of it-
erations increase. In addition, for scenario 1 figures are shown for all the different controllers
considered.
Some conclusions can be obtained from the preceding experiments. In general, the pro-
posed algorithm provides a performance of the same order of magnitude than the one provided
by the centralized MPC which, as expected, has the best results. Regarding the simulation
time, it can be seen that for this particular case, the CPU time needed to solve in parallel
the sequence of low order optimization problems is very similar to the time needed to solve
the large scale problem. With respect to the non-cooperative distributed MPC controllers,
the proposed distributed scheme provides a better performance than Iter1, Iter2 and Iter5.
The controller Iter10 provides a better performance but needs more communication cycles in
order to achieve an agreement. Even in this case, the solution is still a Nash equilibrium, so
there is no guarantee that it will provide a good overall performance. Note that the iterative
controllers results show that increasing the number of iterations of the bargaining process
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Figure 2.9: Centralized MPC closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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Figure 2.10: Proposed DMPC closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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Figure 2.11: Iter1 closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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Figure 2.12: Iter2 closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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Figure 2.13: Iter5 closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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Figure 2.14: Iter10 closed-loop trajectories for scenario 1.
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does not guarantee an improvement in the performance. It can be seen that Iter5 sometimes
is worse than Iter2 from the performance point of view.
The simulations demonstrate that the proposed distributed scheme provides a good per-
formance with only two communication cycles because it obtains a cooperative solution; that
is, the decision is taken in order to optimize a global performance index. The iterative con-
trollers do not take a cooperative decision and this implies, that in general, the solutions
provided are worst. This can be clearly seen in the figures of scenario 1. In this scenario, the
centralized MPC is able to react in advance to the demand peak, maintaining the stocks close
to the references. The trajectories of the proposed distributed MPC scheme show a larger
deviation of the stocks from the references, however, these trajectories do not present oscil-
lations as the trajectories corresponding to Iter1, Iter2 and Iter5. Oscillations are a common
result of non-cooperative bargaining processes. In this scenario, Iter10 however provides a
better response that the proposed DMPC, at the cost of a high computational burden and a
large number of communication steps.
2.4 Robustness of the proposed approach against data losses
In this section we carry out a set of simulations to study the robustness of the proposed ap-
proach when data losses occur in the control of a stirred tank reactor controller by two agents.
The proposed algorithm assumes flawless communications between both agents. In a real dis-
tributed environment, errors in the communications and delays in the packets transmission
should be expected. For simplicity, we will assume that an error in the communication link
will affect the transmissions in both ways, so there is no possibility that only one of the agents
is affected by the error. To test the effect of data losses in the closed-loop system perfor-
mance,, we assume that the probability of flawless communications is given by the parameter
reliability ∈ [0, 1]. This parameter characterizes the quality of the communication network.
The higher it is, the better for the communication. In this section we show the results of
simulations corresponding to different values of the parameter reliability.
In the original algorithm the agents chose among three options for the control signal (U0i ,
U∗i , U
w
i ) with the goal of minimizing J . When data losses occur, the agents do not receive
Uwi or the information needed to build the global cost table. In this case, each agent must
decide whether to keep applying the last optimal input trajectory U0i , or behave selfishly and
try to minimize its local cost function choosing U∗i . In order to test the robustness of the
proposed approach on the worst possible case, we assume that when communication errors
occur each controller operates in a decentralized way, that is, applying U∗i .
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Figure 2.15: Continuously stirred tank reactor (CSTR)
Remark 1 Note that as the parameter reliability tends to zero, the amount of information
shared by the agents decreases, and the controller tends to operate in a decentralized manner.
To demonstrate the robustness of the proposed controller against communication errors,
we use the linearized model of a continuously stirred tank reactor (CSTR) presented in [12].
The linearized process around a given equilibrium point is described in continuous time by
the following transfer matrix2[
y1(s)
y2(s)
]
=
[
1
1+0.7s
5
1+0.3s
1
1+0.5s
2
1+0.5s
][
u1(s)
u2(s)
]
,
where the manipulated variables u1 and u2 are respectively the flow rate and the flow of
coolant in the jacket. The controlled variables y1 and y2 are respectively the eﬄuent con-
centration and the reactor temperature, see figure 2.18. The sampling time is defined as
Ts = 0.03s.
The control objective is to track a given constant reference from a random initial state.
We first design a centralized MPC scheme for comparison purposes. This controller decides
both inputs simultaneously. For this reason, the MPC optimization problem that has been
used for the simulations is based on minimizing the following cost function using the linearized
discrete model of the process
J =
N−1∑
k=0
(ref1(k)− y1(k))TWy,1(ref1(k)− y1(k))
+(ref2(k)− y2(k))TWy,2(ref2(k)− y2(k))
+∆u1(k)
TW∆u,1∆u1(k)
+∆u2(k)
TW∆u,2∆u2(k)
2The notation x(s) refers to the Laplace transform of the signal x.
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where refi(k) is the reference signal for the controlled variables y1 and y2. Note that the
cost function depends on the predicted values of the inputs and outputs. In particular, x(k)
stands for the predicted value of the signal x k steps ahead in the future.
The following values were used for the controller parameters:
N = 5
ref1 = 0
ref2 = 0
Wy,1 =Wy,2 = 1
W∆u,1 =W∆u,2 = 0.05
(2.16)
Note that we have not considered constraints on the input or the outputs in the simulations
we have performed to test the robustness of the distributed scheme with respect to data
losses.
In order to analyze the performance of our distributed scheme, we will make a comparison
with a decentralized and a centralized controller. Note that the centralized controller provides
the optimal solution from point of view of the performance while the decentralized one allows
to determine what to expect in the absence of communication. The comparison will be made
based on the following parameters:
• λ: Convergence rate of the global cost function. This parameter is computed as
the smallest value λ such that the following inequality holds
J(kTs) ≤ J0 · λk, λ > 0 (2.17)
where J(kTs) is the value of the global cost function evaluated at time t = kTs for the
applied input trajectories and J(0) is its initial value, that is, at time t = 0. If λ > 1
the controlled system is unstable.
• tr: Rise time. Number of sample times required in order to get a relative error below
5%, where the relative error is defined as
Eri =
∣∣∣∣refi − yirefi
∣∣∣∣ · 100. (2.18)
In first place, we will focus on the centralized controller. More than twenty simulations of
the closed-loop system with the centralized controller were done, all of them beginning with
different initial states. Half of the simulations were done for a number of kmax = 100 time
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samples and the other half with kmax = 300. The average performance parameters obtained
for the centralized controller were:
λ = 0.77
Jv = 13.
In order to apply decentralized and distributed MPC schemes, we considered that the
CSTR is controlled by two different agents. Agent 1 controls the flow rate u1 based on the
measurements of the y1, while agent 2 controls u2 based on the measurements of y2. Each
agent has an incomplete model of the system; that is, they only know the first row of the
system model (how their measured output is affected by each of the inputs). A decentralized
MPC scheme is based on the idea that each agent tries to control its own subsystem without
communicating with the other agent. Each agent tries to minimize a local cost function. For
agent 1 the local cost function is
J1 =
N−1∑
k=0
(ref1(k)− y1(k))TWy,1(ref1(k)− y1(k)) + ∆u1(k)TW∆u,1∆u1(k)
and for agent 2 the local cost function is:
J2 =
N−1∑
k=0
(ref2(k)− y2(k))TWy,2(ref2(k) − y2(k)) + ∆u2(k)TW∆u,2∆u2(k).
At each time step, agent 1 receives y1 and finds the optimal sequence of inputs such that J1
is minimized assuming that u2 = 0. Agent 2 follows the same protocol. For this particular
system the decentralized controller is not able to stabilize the system. These simulations
demonstrate that even a simple system may become unstable when the control agents are
not coordinated by a proper scheme.
After carrying out the simulations of the centralized and decentralized controllers, we focus
on the proposed DMPC scheme. As in the decentralized scheme, each agent tries to minimize
its corresponding local cost function Ji. In this case, however, agents do communicate and try
to minimize the sum of their optimization functions following the proposed DMPC scheme.
In first place we consider the case in which there are no data losses or delays (reliability = 1).
As it can be seen in figure 2.16 , the proposed controller scheme is able to stabilize the closed-
loop system. We carried out over twenty simulations with different initial states and constant
references. For this set of simulations the performance parameters were tr = 41.1458 and
λ = 0.8858. It can be seen that the performance of the distributed scheme is worst than the
one of the centralized controller (although much better than the decentralized scheme which
is not able to stabilize the system). As mentioned before, the centralized scheme is the best
possible controller from the communication point of view.
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Figure 2.16: Trajectories of the system in closed-loop with the proposed DMPC and
reliability = 1.
Table 2.6: λ and tr for reliability ∈ [0.1, 0.9].
reliability
0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1
λ, kmax = 100 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.93 0.99 1.17 1.39 1.60 1.93
tr, kmax = 100 44.63 48.02 64.13 76.57 84.15 98.86 100 100 100
λ, kmax = 300 0.95 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.98 1.16 1.38 1.60 1.92
tr, kmax = 300 45.37 52.81 71.31 90.93 129.62 291.03 300 300 300
In order to test the robustness of the proposed DMPC with respect to communications errors,
a set of simulations with different reliability values were carried out. for each value reliability
over 20 simulations were done. The results obtained are shown on table 2.4. Note that the
value of kmax affects the value of the comparison parameters. An increment in the value of
λ is found when kmax increases if the system stays stable (λ < 1). This is logical given the
definition of the parameter λ. For example, if the system has reached the reference after k1
sample times, the evolution during the rest of the time steps until the end of the simulation
won’t be significant. Thus, it can be concluded that the time samples after the system has
reached the reference only degrade quantitatively the value of λ. Note too that tr grows with
kmax. Again, this is expected because when the controller is unable to regulate the system to
the reference, the value tr = kmax is taken. Hence, it is obvious that the kmax has influence
over tr. Finally, note how the value of the performance parameters improves as the parameter
reliability grows. In particular, it can be seen how the value tends to the one obtained with
the flawless communication simulations. The simulation results also show that depending on
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Figure 2.17: Trajectories of the system in closed-loop with the proposed DMPC and reliability
= 0.5.
the value of reliability, the DMPC is able to stabilize the closed-loop system or not. For
reliability ≥ 0.5, the performance parameter is λ < 1, which implies that the closed-loop
system is stable. However, if more than 50% of the communications fails, then the DMPC
is not able to stabilize the closed-loop system. These results show that when communication
network becomes faulty, the proposed controller tends to operate in a decentralized manner,
and hence, is not able to stabilize the system.
2.5 The four tank process
In this section we show experimental results of the proposed controller in a four tank process,
which is one of the benchmarks of the european project HD-MPC. The physical plant is
situated in facilities of the University of Seville and was presented in [6]. Different universities
are working in the project as Delf Institute of Technology (Netherlands), Aachen University
(Denmark) and Universidad Nacional de Colombia. In this chapter we present the results of
the benchmark for the different DMPC policies developed by these universities. The results
presented in this section have been submitted for publication in a joint work with the rest of
the benchmark participants [5].
The use of benchmarks is useful for evaluating the capabilities of different approaches to
control systems for real problems. Benchmarks allow to test, evaluate, and compare different
control solutions at real or simulated plants. The research and the industry community
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Figure 2.18: Evolution of the system with reliability = 0.2
benefit from these activities since the design of a good simulation test bed is often time
and resource consuming. Furthermore, good simulation test beds are often subjected to
heavy criticism as they either cover only a narrow part of the problem or they are purposely
designed to get biased rather than objective performance results. The benchmark examples
would effectively overcome these problems by: a) allowing an objective evaluation of control,
b) reducing resources and time spent on developing validation models, c) giving researchers
the possibility to evaluate their proposals on a variety of cases, and d) opening up a forum
to compare the performance of various solutions and to discuss the quality of the results.
The four tank process has proven to be a very interesting system for control education
and research [35]. The main characteristic of this process is that it is a simple multivariable
system with highly coupled nonlinear dynamics that can exhibit transmission zeros dynamics.
The four tank system has been used to illustrate advanced control strategies [19] such as
internal model control and dynamic matrix control [25], multivariable robust control [95] and
distributed MPC [62]. In addition, it has also been utilized as an educational tool in teaching
advanced multivariable control techniques.
2.5.1 The four tank process
The four tank process that we have in the university of Seville is an educational plant designed
to test control techniques using industrial instrumentation and control systems. The plant is
a hydraulic process of four interconnected tanks inspired by the educational quadruple tank
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process proposed by Johansson [35]. The main characteristic of this process is that it is a
simple multivariable system with highly coupled nonlinear dynamics that can exhibit trans-
mission zeros dynamics. The four tank plant retains the structure of Johansson’s process (see
Figure 2.20(a)), but has been modified to enable different configurations and interconnections
of the tanks.
Figure 2.19: A photo of the four tank plant
A photograph of the plant can be seen in figure 2.19 and a schematic plot of the plant
is shown in Figure 2.20(b). The inlet flow of each tank of the plant is measured by an
electro-magnetic flow-meter (Siemens Sitrans FM Flowsensor 711/S and transmitters Inter-
mag/transmag) and regulated by a pneumatic valve (Siemens VC 101 with a positioner Sipart
PS2 PA). This allows the plant to emulate the three-ways valve of Johansson’s quadruple tank
process by providing suitable set-points to the flow controllers. The level of each tank is mea-
sured by means of a pressure sensor (Siemens Sitrans P 7MF4020 and 7MF4032). All the
measurements and commands are 4-20 mA current signals and these are connected to a PLC
(Siemens S7-200). The output flow of each tank can also be adjusted by means of a manual
tuning valve which allows to adjust the speed of the dynamics of the plant. In order to
achieve a safe operation of the plant and to prevent the overflow of tanks, each tank has a
high level switching sensor used as alarm to switch off the pumps.
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(a) Johansson’s quadruple-tank process dia-
gram.
(b) The real plant diagram.
Figure 2.20: The four tank process diagram.
Figure 2.20(a) shows the four tanks (T1, T2, T3 and T4), which are filled by several flows
from a storage tank located at the bottom of the plant. The tanks at the top (T3 and T4)
discharge in the tanks at the bottom (T1 and T2, respectively). The main valves regulate
the flow of the main pipes of the plant. These are industrial control valves with an aperture
controller which allows one to use it as a regulation valve or as a switching valve. The flow of
each valve is continuously measured by a magnetic flow meter, allowing a flow control loop
to manipulate the position of each valve.
The sampling of each sensor as well as the command of each manipulated variable is
carried out by a Siemens PLC. This device stores the data and allows one to develop low level
controllers (PIDs), sequential controllers and plant supervisors. All the data is continuously
available by means of an OPC server installed in a remote PC connected to the PLC (via
RS-232).
There are other several parameters of the plant that can be manually adjusted by the
user (such as the section of the outlet hole ai and the ratio of each three-ways valves).
The discharge constant of each tank can be tuned by manipulating the regulation valve of
its outlet. This regulation valve allows up to 40 different apertures of the valve. These
apertures have been chosen to provide the maximal range of levels considering the maximum
flow constraints of the plant. The three-way valves are emulated by a proper calculation of
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the set-points of the flow control loops according to the considered ratio of the three-ways
valve. Then, the manipulated variables of the plant can be considered the inlet flows of the
three-ways valves qa and qb.
It is important to remark that the inlet flows and the levels of the tanks are physically
limited (the values can be seen in table 2.7 in the following section). These limits must be
taken into account in the controller design.
2.5.2 Four tank plant model
A continuous time state space model of the quadruple tank process system can be derived
from first principles as follows [35]:
dh1
dt
= − a1
A1
√
2gh1 +
a3
A1
√
2gh3 +
γa
A1
qa (2.19)
dh2
dt
= − a2
A2
√
2gh2 +
a4
A2
√
2gh4 +
γb
A2
qb
dh3
dt
= − a3
A3
√
2gh3 +
(1− γb)
A3
qb
dh4
dt
= − a4
A4
√
2gh4 +
(1− γa)
A4
qa
where hi, Ai and ai with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are the level cross section and the discharge constant
of tank i, respectively; qj and γj with j ∈ {a, b} are the flow and the ratio of the three-ways
valve of pump j, respectively; and g is the gravity. Throughout this section, the levels are
measured in meters and the flows in cubic meters per hour.
Along the operation of the plant, it has been demonstrated that this model describes the
plant dynamics very well, once the parameters (mainly the discharge constants of the tanks)
have been identified, whenever the levels of the tanks are over 0.2 m. When the levels of
the tanks are below 0.2 m, eddy effects in the discharge of the tank make the model become
inaccurate. Therefore, when the levels are over 0.2 m, this model can be used to design the
controllers guaranteeing that the derived controller will work similarly when controlling the
real plant. For the control test presented in this section, the parameters of the plant are
shown in table 2.7.
One important property of this plant is that the dynamics present multivariable trans-
mission zeros which can be located in the right-hand side of the complex plane. In this
benchmark, the values of γa and γb have been chosen in order to obtain a system with
non-minimum phase multivariable zeros.
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Value Unit Description
H1max 1.36 m Maximum level of the tank 1
H2max 1.36 m Maximum level of the tank 2
H3max 1.30 m Maximum level of the tank 3
H4max 1.30 m Maximum level of the tank 4
Hmin 0.2 m Minimum level in all cases
Qamax 3.26 m
3/h Maximal flow of pump A
Qbmax 4 m
3/h Maximal flow of pump B
Qmin 0 m
3/h Minimal flow
q0a 1.63 m
3/h Equilibrium flow
q0b 2.0000 m
3/h Equilibrium flow
a1 1.310e-4 m
2 Discharge constant of tank 1
a2 1.507e-4 m
2 Discharge constant of tank 2
a3 9.267e-5 m
2 Discharge constant of tank 3
a4 8.816e-5 m
2 Discharge constant of tank 4
A 0.06 m2 Cross-section of all tanks
γa 0.3 Parameter of the 3-ways valve
γb 0.4 Parameter of the 3-ways valve
h01 0.6487 m Equilibrium level of tank 1
h02 0.6639 m Equilibrium level of tank 2
h03 0.6498 m Equilibrium level of tank 3
h04 0.6592 m Equilibrium level of tank 4
Table 2.7: Parameters of the plant
Linearizing the model at an operating point given by the equilibrium levels and flows
shown in Table 2.7 and defining the deviation variables xi = hi − h0i , uj = qj − q0j with
i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} and j ∈ {a, b} we obtain the following continuos time linear model:
dx
dt
=


−1
τ1
0 A3A1τ3 0
0 −1τ2 0
A4
A2τ4
0 0 −1τ3 0
0 0 0 −1τ4

x+


γa
A1
0
0 γbA2
0 (1−γb)A3
(1−γa)
A4
0

u.
y =
[
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
]
x
where τi =
Ai
ai
√
2h0i
g ≥ 0, with i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are the time constants of each tank. For the
parameters of this benchmark it can be seen that the linear system is defined by four real
stable poles and two non-minimum phase multivariable zeros.
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2.5.3 The benchmark problem
The objective of the benchmark was to test and compare centralized, decentralized, and
distributed predictive controllers under similar operation conditions. To this end the following
experiment is defined in which the controllers must regulate the levels of tanks 1 and 2 to
follow a set of reference changes by manipulating the inlet flows qa and qb based on the
measured levels of the four tanks:
• The first set-points are set to s1 = 0.65 m and s2 = 0.65 m. This first reference is aimed
to steer the plant to the operation point. Once the plant is in the operation point the
test begins maintaining the operation point during 300 seconds.
• In the first step, the reference is changed to s1 = 0.3 m and s2 = 0.3 m during 3000
seconds.
• Then, the reference is changed to s1 = 0.5 m and s2 = 0.75 m during 3000 seconds.
• Finally, the set-points are changed to s1 = 0.9 m and s2 = 0.75 m during 3000 seconds.
To perform this change tanks 3 and 4 have to be emptied and filled respectively.
The set-point signals are shown in Figure 2.21. The total control test takes 9300 seconds.
The objective of the benchmark is to design the distributed MPC controllers to optimize the
following performance index:
J =
Nsim∑
i=0
(h1(i) − s1(i))2 + (h2(i)− s2(i))2 + 0.01(qa(i)− qsa(i))2 + 0.01(qb(i)− qsb(i))2
where qsa and q
s
b are the steady manipulable variables of the plant for the set-points s1 and
s2 calculated from steady conditions of the proposed model of the plant. Although the
controllers tested have been designed using different sampling times, the performance index
has been calculated for a sampling time of 5 seconds, that is, Nsim = 1860 samples.
The evaluation and comparison between the different controllers was performed according
to a collection of indexes. These are aimed to compare different properties for the controllers
as well as their behavior in the control test. These indexes are the following:
• Evaluation of the controller (Qualitative Indexes)
1. Modelling requirements: the class of model considered by each of the controllers,
for instance linear/nonlinear, plant model or subsystem model, etc.
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Figure 2.21: Set-point signals for the benchmark
2. Controller objectives: the properties addressed by the tested controllers, for in-
stance optimality, constraint satisfaction, stabilizing design, recursive feasibility,
etc.
3. Auxiliary software needed: optimization routines, simulation routines, etc.
• Evaluation of the test (Quantitative)
1. Performance index J : gives a measure of the performance of the whole trajectory
of the controlled plant.
2. Performance index during the transient Jt: gives a measure of the performance
index measured during the transients of the trajectory. This allows to remove the
effect of the steady offset.
3. Settling time: gives a measure of the velocity of the controlled plant. This is
calculated by summing all the settling times (for 95%) of the steps in the reference.
4. The number of floating point numbers in the data packet transmitted by the
controllers: the total number of floating point numbers sent by one controller to
the other during a sampling time.
5. Number of data packets transmitted during a sampling time: number of times
that each controller sends data to the other controller.
The controller has been designed using a simulation model implemented in MATLAB/Simulink.
Actually, each tested controller has been implemented using the same Simulink block. With
a small modification this control model receives the measures and sends the calculated ma-
nipulable variables to the real plant by means of the OPC protocol. In the following section,
the different control techniques are presented together with the results of the control test in
the real plant.
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2.5.4 Controllers under test
Application of the proposed controller
In first place we present the results of the distributed MPC scheme based on a cooperative
game scheme presented in this chapter. In order to test the proposed DMPC scheme a
discrete time linear model around the equilibrium point h0, q0 (which corresponds to the first
reference) has been obtained linearizing the nonlinear model of the quadruple tank process
with a sampling time of 5 seconds.
The state and input variables of the linearized model are defined as follows
x1 =
[
h1 − h10
h3 − h30
]
, u1 =
[
qa − qa0
]
, x2 =
[
h2 − h20
h4 − h40
]
, u2 =
[
qb − qb0
]
The discrete linearized model of the first agent is
A1 =
[
0.9705 0.0205
0 0.9792
]
, B11 =
[
0.0068
0
]
, B12 =
[
0.0001
0.0137
]
The model of the second agent is given by:
A1 =
[
0.9661 0.0195
0 0.9802
]
, B11 =
[
0.0002
0.016
]
, B12 =
[
0.0091
0
]
The objective of the MPC controllers is to minimize a performance index that depends
on the future evolution of both states and inputs based on the following local cost functions
J1(x1, U1, U2) =
N∑
j=1
(x1,j − x1r)TQ1(x1,j − x1r) +
N−1∑
j=0
R1(u1,j − u1r)2
J2(x2, U2, U1) =
N∑
j=1
(x2,j − x2r)TQ2(x2,j − x2r) +
N−1∑
j=0
R2(u2,j − u2r)2
where N = 5, xi,j and ui,j are the j-steps ahead predicted states and inputs of controller i
respectively. The variables xi,r and ui,r are the target state and input obtained from the
difference between the equilibrium point and the reference levels and flows. To determine
these values, the nonlinear model has been used to obtain the levels of h3, h4 and the corre-
sponding equilibrium flows qa, qb that guarantee that the references are an equilibrium point
of the system. This implies that it has been done in a centralized manner. The controllers
receive the appropriate references as inputs. In this point we have to remark the fact that
when the reference is switched from one working point to another one it is necessary to reset
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the value of Us to a feasible solution. This solution is obtained solving a feasibility problem,
in particular an LP, based on the full model of the system. Note that for this particular
benchmark, no terminal region has been taken into account.
The weighting matrices were chosen to minimize the benchmark objective function, that
is, Q1 = Q2 = I, R1 = R2 = 0.01. The local controller gains for each controller were
K1 = [0.17 0.21] and K2 = [−0.16 − 0.14]. These gains were designed with LMI techniques
based on the full model of the system in order to stabilize both subsystems independently
while assuring the stability of the centralized system. The role of these gains is important
because the option in the game that allows to guarantee closed-loop stability is constructed
shifting the last decided control action; that is, the first element is dropped after it is applied
in the system and a term evaluated with these gains is added at the end of the horizon control
vector, see [54] for more details.
The proposed distributed MPC controller only needs three communication steps in order
to obtain a cooperative solution to the centralized optimization problem, has low communica-
tion and computational burdens and provides a feasible solution to the centralized problem.
The simulation and experimental results show that the distributed scheme is able to control
the system.
The designed controller has been sucessfully tested on the real plants and the trajectories
are shown in Figure 2.22. The performance index of the test is J = 29.5787. The performance
index is close to the performance index of the centralized MPC for regulation. Note however
that the input trajectories are not smooth because the controllers switch between different
modes during the simulation.
Other controllers
In the benchmark, the subsystems have been chosen according to the pairings derived from
the relative gain array (RGA) analysis. Considering the values of the RGA the sensible pair-
ing is to control the output h1 with qb (y1 with u2) and h2 with qa (y2 with u1). In first place,
we mention the only decentralized controller that was tested. In particular a decentralized
MPC for tracking was implemented, that is, a MPC for tracking [44] was designed for each
subsystem. A communication based DMPC based on nonlinear dynamic optimization was
tested as well. This controller is based on nonlinear dynamic optimization. The optimization
is based on an iterative procedure of information broadcast in which the two local controllers
exchange the value of the interaction variables. A more sophisticated cooperative version
of the last algorithm was also tested. Concretely, the gradient-based distributed dynamic
optimization (GBDDO) method [89] was put to test. Besides the communication of interac-
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Figure 2.22: Evaluation of the control test in the real plant of the DMPC based on a coop-
erative game
tion variables, the GBDDO-based MPC requires a calculation and exchange of sensitivities.
This information is used to modify the local cost function of each agent adding a linear
term which partially allow to consider the other agents’ objectives. The scheme proposed in
[70, 72], which consists on a serial DMPC based on dual decomposition, was tested as well.
This scheme is derived from a serial decomposition of an augmented Lagrangian formulation
of the centralized overall MPC problem. Finally, it is remarkable that another controller
based on game theory concepts was also implemented. Concretely, a feasible-cooperation dis-
tributed model predictive controller based on bargaining game theory concepts was tested.
This approach models the DMPC as a game. According to [69], the solution of the coopera-
tive game associated with the DMPC problem is given by a control vector which maximizes
the product of the difference between the corresponding cost for each system and the cost of
the subsystem when it does not cooperate with the rest[29, 76]. This last cost is computed
through a minmax problem and is called disagreement point. The solution for this problem
is computed in a distributed fashion following the same algorithm used in [98].
Evaluation of the controllers
Table 2.8 shows some qualitative properties of all the controllers that took part on the
HDMPC benchmark. The entry Model Requirements shows whether the controllers need
full or partial knowledge of the system and whether the model used is linear or nonlinear.
The entry Control Objectives shows whether the controller is optimal from a centralized point
of view (i.e., provides the same solution as the centralized MPC for regulation), guarantees
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constraint satisfaction if a feasible solution is obtained and whether it can be designed to
guarantee closed-loop stability in a regulation problem. The Auxiliary software entry shows
which type of additional software is needed by each controller of the distributed scheme.
The centralized controller is based on a linear model of the full plant and is included as
a reference for the performance of the distributed MPC schemes. On the other hand, the
decentralized controller provides a reference on what can be achieved with no communication
among the controllers at all. The other controllers assume that each controller has access
only to its local state and model. All the controllers but the DMPC based on dynamic
optimization are based on a linear model.
From the control objectives point of view, Table 2.8 shows whether the controller is opti-
mal from a centralized point of view (i.e., provides an optimal solution to the corresponding
centralized MPC), considers state and input constraints and whether it can be designed to
guarantee closed-loop stability in a regulation problem. The decentralized controller consid-
ered cannot guarantee optimality, constraint satisfaction, nor stability. Note that in order to
guarantee closed-loop stability, the the DMPC controller proposed in this thesis needs full
model knowledge as we have mentioned in this chapter.
The distributed controllers that guarantee optimality (provided sufficient evaluation time)
are the Serial DMPC and the DMPC based on dynamic optimization with GBDDO. Note
that this controllers are also the ones with a larger communication and computational burden.
Another key issue in distributed schemes is the class of computational capabilities that
each controller must have. In particular, for the schemes considered each controller must
be able to solve either QP problems or general nonlinear optimization problems. In the
experiments, the controllers used MATLAB’s optimization toolbox, in particular quadprog
and fmincon.
Evaluation of the experimental results
The experimental results demonstrated how a centralized solution provides the best perfor-
mance while the performance of a fully decentralized controller is worse. Distributed schemes
in which the controllers communicate in general improve this performance, although the ex-
perimental results also demonstrated that a distributed MPC scheme is not necessarily better
than a decentralized scheme and it depends on the formulation of the controller and its design.
It is also clear how those controllers that incorporate offset-free techniques provide a better
performance index. In order to obtain a measure of the performance without the effect of
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Qualitative Indexes
Model
Requirements
Control
Objectives
Auxiliary
Software
Centralized Regulation
Linear system
Full model
Optimal
Constraints
Stability
QP
Decentralized
Linear system
Local model
Suboptimal QP
DMPC Coop. game
Linear system
Local model
(Full model)
Suboptimal
Constraints
(Stability)
QP
DMPC D.O. (GBDDO On)
Nonlinear system
Local model
Optimal
Constraints
NLP
DMPC D.O. (GBDDO Off)
Nonlinear system
Local model
Suboptimal
Constraints
NLP
DMPC Bargaining game
Linear system
Local model
Suboptimal
Constraints
NLP
Serial DMPC
Linear system
Local model
Optimal
Constraints
QP
Table 2.8: Table of qualitative benchmark indexes of each tested controller.
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the steady offset, the transient performance index Jt has been calculated. This index is
evaluated computing the cumulated cost during the transient. The entry ts shows cumulated
the settling time of the three reference changes. This shows that the offset-free controller
(MPC for regulation) has a transient performance index similar to the total performance
index while for the rest of the controllers, the transient index is better.
The effect of the communication between controllers on the calculation of the control
inputs can be seen comparing the decentralized MPC with the DMPC based on a cooperative
game. The size of the QPs to be solved at each sampling time is similar in both cases, while the
computational time is larger in the DMPC case. The DMPC based on dynamic optimization
exhibits the largest computational time due to the NLP to be solved at each iteration and
the number of iterations.
All the controllers were implemented using a MATLAB function and were not designed to
optimize the evaluation time. For this reason, the computation time has not been taken into
account. In particular, both DMPCs based on dynamic optimization had a computation time
lower than ten seconds, while the rest were of the order of one second. These computation
times were lower than the sampling time chosen for each controller and moreover, they could
be dramatically reduced using an appropriate implementation framework.
Motivated by these issues, the computational burden is best measured on the number
and size of the optimization problems solved at each sampling time. The centralized schemes
solve a single QP problem with 2N optimization variables while the decentralized controller
solves 2 QP problems with N optimization variables. The difference in the computational
burden between these schemes grows with the prediction horizon and the number of con-
trollers. Distributed schemes try to find a tradeoff between computational/communicational
burden and optimality. The DMPC based on a cooperative game and the DMPC based on
a bargaining game solve a fixed number of low complexity optimization problems. DMPC
based on dynamic optimization and Serial DMPC provide optimality at the cost of a higher
computational burden.
In this particular benchmark, the best results are provided by the DMPC based on a
cooperative game, however, there are several issues that must be taken into account. First
of all, because the controller chooses among nine different modes of operation, the resulting
input trajectories are not smooth. Figure 2.22 shows how the input seems to switch among
at least two optimal trajectories. Depending on the application, this switching may not be
acceptable. In addition, this control scheme is specially designed for only two controllers,
because the number of possible modes grows in a combinatorial way with the number of
controllers.
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Quantitative Indexes J Jt ts #
floats
#
trans
Centralized Regulation 25.46 23.78 2735 N.D N.D.
Decentralized 39.54 21.2 1685 0 0
DMPC Coop. game 30.71 28.19 2410 20 3
DMPC D.O. (GBDDO On) 33.91 33.36 2555 150 5
DMPC D.O. (GBDDO Off) 35.65 34.63 1700 75 5
DMPC Bargaining game 46.32 39.52 3715 6 2
Serial DMPC 44.59 41.94 3130
Table 2.9: Table of the quantitative benchmark indexes of each tested controller
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have proposed a novel distributed MPC algorithm based on game theory
for a class of systems controlled by two agents. The proposed controller only needs two
communication steps in order to obtain a cooperative solution to the centralized optimization
problem. Each agent solves an optimization problem that only depends on its local model and
partial state information. After sharing information about the local cost, the agents choose
the solution that yields the best global performance among a set of suboptimal possibilities.
The options are suboptimal because each agent has an incomplete view of the system and
they propose the best solutions from their point of view. The proposed algorithm has low
communication and computational burdens and provides a feasible solution to the centralized
problem. In addition, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee practical stability of
the closed-loop system as well as an optimization based procedure to design the controller so
that these conditions are satisfied. Examples and real experiments have shown the properties
the good performance of the controller, specially taking into account its low communicational
and informational requirements. The robustness of the proposed scheme against failures in
the communication channel has been proved as well, at least when the probability of failure
is lower than a fifty percent. Finally, it is worthwhile to mention that the scheme has been
tested and compared with other distributed algorithms in a benchmark of the european
project HD-MPC.
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Chapter 3
Distributed Model Predictive
Control Based on Game Theory for
Multiple Agents
In the previous chapter we presented a distributed scheme based on a cooperative game for the
particular case in which the system is controlled by two agents. Unfortunately, the complexity
of that scheme grows exponentially with the number of agents. In this chapter we propose a
distributed model predictive control scheme based on agent negotiation suitable for problems
in which the number of control agents is greater than two. Once more, we consider the control
of several subsystems coupled through the inputs by a set of independent agents that are able
to communicate and we assume that each agent has access only to the model and the state of
one of the subsystems. This implies that in order to take a decision which is cooperative from
a global point of view, i.e. for the whole system, the agents must negotiate. At each sampling
time, following a given protocol, agents make proposals to improve an initial feasible solution
on behalf of their local cost function, state and model. These proposals are accepted if the
global cost improves the cost corresponding to the current solution. In addition, we study the
stability properties of the proposed distributed controller and provide precise conditions based
on a new concept of invariance for distributed and decentralized systems that guarantee that
the closed-loop system is practically stable along with an optimization based controller and
invariant design procedure. The theoretical results and the design procedure are illustrated
using different simulation examples. In particular, we use an academical example to show the
main theoretical contributions of this chapter. Next, we test the scalability of the distributed
scheme with supply chains composed by an increasing number of nodes. The last example
consists on the application of the proposed scheme to the control of irrigation canals.
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The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section 3.1 the problem is formulated. Sec-
tion 3.2 defines the proposed DMPC controller. Stability is studied in section 3.3 and a design
method is given in section 3.4. An academical example to show the theoretical properties
of the controller is presented in section 3.5. Section 3.6 deals with the application of the
controller to a supply chain problem and section 3.7 studies its application to an irrigation
canal problem. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented in section 3.8.
This chapter is based on the results and ideas submitted for publication in [57, 102, 103,
58].
3.1 Problem formulation
We consider the following class of distributed linear systems in which there areMx subsystems
coupled with their neighbors through Mu inputs
xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +
∑
j∈ni
Bijuj(t) (3.1)
where xi ∈ Rqi with i = 1, . . . ,Mx are the states of each subsystem, and uj ∈ Rrj with
j = 1, . . . ,Mu are the different inputs
1. The set of indices ni indicates the set of inputs uj
which affect the state xi and the set of indices mj indicates the set of states xi affected by
the input uj . We define mathematically the concept of neighborhood of agent i as
Ni :=
⋃
j∈ni
mj. (3.2)
Therefore, any agent j included in Ni is a neighbor of agent i. Note that this does not imply
that i ∈ Nj , that is, the neighborhood is not a symmetrical property in this context.
We consider the following linear constraints in the states and the inputs
xi ∈ Xi, i = 1, . . . ,Mx
uj ∈ Uj, j = 1, . . . ,Mu (3.3)
where Xi and Uj are closed polyhedra that contain the origin in their interior defined by the
following set of linear inequalities
xi ∈ Xi ↔ Hxixi ≤ bxi , i = 1, . . . ,Mx
uj ∈ Uj ↔ Hujuj ≤ buj , j = 1, . . . ,Mu
(3.4)
Note that, as these polyhedra contain the origin in their interior, then bxi > 0 and buj > 0.
1Throughout this chapter the time dependence is omitted when possible for notational convenience.
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Figure 3.1: Centralized MPC.
There are many different physical systems that can be modeled under this formulation.
For example, in [14] this model is used to represent the dynamics of a traffic network. In [70]
the dynamics of an irrigation canal system are described with a similar formulation. In [54]
the beer game, a typical supply chain problem, is described likewise.
This class of systems can be represented by a graph in which to each node either the state
of one of the subsystems or one of the inputs available is assigned, and the arcs connect the
inputs to the states they affect.
The control objective is to regulate the states of all the subsystems to the origin while
satisfying the state and input constraints. To this end, centralized MPC follows a receding
horizon approach and at each sampling time obtains the current states and solves a single
finite horizon optimal control problem based on a performance index that depends on all the
states and inputs. See figure 3.1 for a scheme of a centralized MPC controller. In distributed
MPC schemes there are several agents that decide all the control inputs. It can be seen that
although the states are not dynamically coupled, the agents need to negotiate in order to
decide the value of the shared inputs. There are many possible distributed schemes depending
on the available information and communication constraints. Figure 3.2 shows a scheme of
a distributed controller in which each agent has access to partial state information and can
communicate with the rest of the agents. This is the class of distributed control scheme
considered in this work that is presented in the next section.
Remark 2 One of the differences between the proposed approach and other cooperative MPC
schemes is that the agents do not have a global model of the system. This may be important in
some applications in which the centralized model is not available or the agents do not want to
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Figure 3.2: Distributed MPC.
share this information with the rest of the subsystems. In addition, there is a potential benefit
from this assumption because if a distributed system adds a new subsystem, in the proposed
scheme, only those agents affected by this new element would have to be updated, while in
other schemes based on global information, the information would have to be broadcasted.
One class of systems in which these issues are relevant are transport networks and supply
chains, where new consumers/suppliers can appear dynamically.
Remark 3 In the proposed scheme, several agents decide upon all or a subset of the control
inputs. This implies that the inputs are not assigned to a particular agent as in most dis-
tributed MPC schemes found in the literature. Moreover, nothing is said about the magnitudes
of Mx and Mu, thus this framework allows modeling situations in which there are agents with
no associated inputs or even states. Hierarchical control or the existence of mediators in the
network (agents that suggest an actuation for the rest of agents based on their own knowledge
of the system) are examples of other interesting possibilities that can be also modeled with
this framework.
3.2 Proposed DMPC controller
In this chapter we propose a distributed scheme assuming that for each subsystem, there is
an agent that has access to the model and the state of that subsystem. The agents do not
have any knowledge of the dynamics of any of its neighbors, but can communicate freely
among them in order to reach an agreement. The proposed strategy is based on negotiation
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between the agents. At each sampling time, following a given protocol, agents make pro-
posals to improve an initial feasible solution on behalf of their local cost function, state and
model. These proposals are accepted if the global cost improves the cost corresponding to the
current solution. To this end, the agent that makes the proposal must communicate with the
neighbors affected. Note that a proposal may modify only a subset of inputs, and hence there
are agents that may not be affected by these changes. Different negotiation/communication
protocols may be implemented. The only requirement is that the protocol must guarantee
that each proposal is evaluated independently. In this chapter, we propose to implement a
controller in which at each sampling time, a fixed number of proposals made sequentially by
random agents are considered.
The control objective of the proposed scheme is to minimize a global performance index
defined as the sum of each of the local cost functions. The local cost function of agent i based
on the predicted trajectories of its state and inputs defined as
Ji(xi, {Uj}j∈ni) =
N−1∑
k=0
Li(xi,k, {uj,k}j∈ni) + Fi(xi,N ) (3.5)
where Uj = {uj,k} is the future trajectory of input j, N is the prediction horizon, Li(·) with
i ∈Mx is the stage cost function defined as
Li(xi, {uj}j∈ni) = xTi Qixi +
∑
j∈ni
uTj Rijuj (3.6)
with Qi > 0, Rij > 0 and Fi(·) is the terminal cost defined as
Fi(xi) = x
T
i Pixi (3.7)
with Pi > 0. We use the notation xi,k to denote the state i, k-steps in the future obtained
from the initial state xi applying the input trajectories defined by {Uj}j∈ni . Note that each
of the local cost functions only depends on the trajectories of its state and the inputs that
affect it.
At the end of the negotiation rounds, the agents decide a set of input trajectories denoted
as Ud. The first input of these trajectories is applied, however, the rest of the trajectories are
not discarded, instead are used to generate the initial proposal for the next sampling round
which is given by the shifted future input trajectories U s of all the inputs. The last input of
each of these trajectories is given by ∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,N (3.8)
where xp,N is the predicted values of the state xp after N time steps obtained applying
Ud(t− 1) from the initial state xp(t). The set of shifted input trajectories will be applied in
case the agents do not reach an agreement. This proposal is necessary in order to guarantee
closed-loop stability.
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We define next the proposed distributed MPC scheme:
• Step 1: Each agent p measures its current state xp(t). The agents communicate in
order to obtain U s(t) from Ud(t − 1). In order to do this, each agent must receive
Kjixi,N from each agent i such that Kji 6= 0 for some j ∈ np. The initial value for the
decision control vector Ud(t) is set to the value of the shifted input trajectories, that
is, Ud(t) = U s(t).
• Step 2: Randomly, agents try to submit their proposals. To this end, each agent asks the
neighbors affected if they are free to evaluate a proposal (each agent can only evaluate
a proposal at any given time). If all the agents acknowledge the petition, the algorithm
continues. If not, the agent waits a random time before trying again. We will use the
superscript p to refer to the agent which is granted permission to make a proposal.
• Step 3: In order to generate its proposal, agent p minimizes Jp solving the following
optimization problem:
{Upj (t)}j∈np = arg min
{Uj}j∈np
Jp(xp, {Uj}j∈np)
s.t.
xp,k+1 = Apxp,k +
∑
j∈np
Bpjuj,k
xp,0 = xi(t)
xp,k ∈ Xp, k = 0, . . . N
uj,k ∈ Uj , k = 0, . . . N − 1, ∀j ∈ np
xp,N ∈ Ωp
Uj = U
d
j (t), ∀j /∈ nprop
(3.9)
In this optimization problem, agent p optimizes over a set nprop of inputs that affect
its dynamics, that is, nprop ⊆ np. Based on the optimal solution of this optimization
problem, agent p presents a proposal defined by a set of input trajectories {Upj (t)}j∈np
where Upj (t) stands for the value of the trajectory of input j of the proposal of agent p.
From the centralized point of view, the proposal at time step t of agent p is defined as
Up(t) = {Upj (t)}j∈np
⊎
Ud(t) (3.10)
where the operation
⊎
stands for the update of the components relatives to {Upj (t)}j∈np
in Ud(t) and leaving the rest unmodified.
• Step 4: Each agent i who is affected by the proposal of agent p evaluates the predicted
cost corresponding to proposed solution. To do so, the agent calculates the difference
between the cost of the new proposal Up(t) and the cost of the current accepted proposal
Ud(t) as
∆Jpi (t) = Ji(xi(t), {Upj (t)}j∈ni)− Ji(xi(t), {Udj (t)}j∈ni) (3.11)
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This difference ∆Jpi (t) is sent back to the agent p. If the proposal does not satisfy the
constraints of the corresponding local optimization problem, an infinite cost increment
is assigned. This implies that unfeasible proposals will never be chosen.
• Step 5: Once agent p receives the local cost increments from each neighbor, it can
evaluate the impact of its proposal ∆Jp(t), which is given by the following expression
∆Jp(t) =
∑
i∈
⋃
j∈nprop
mj
∆Jpi (t) (3.12)
This global cost increment is used to make a cooperative decision on the future inputs
trajectories. If ∆Jp(t) is negative, the agent will broadcast the update on the control
actions involved in the proposal and the joint decision vector Ud(t) will be updated to
the value of Up(t), that is Ud(t) = Up(t). Else, is discarded.
• Step 6: The algorithm goes back to step 1 until the maximum number of proposals
have been made or the sampling time ends. We denote the optimal cost corresponding
to the decided inputs as
J(t) =
Mx∑
i=1
Ji(xi(t), {Udj (t)}j∈ni) (3.13)
• Step 7: The first input of each optimal sequence in Ud(t) is applied and the procedure
is repeated the next sampling time.
In figure 3.8 a flow diagram for a single agent of the proposed DMPC scheme is shown
assuming that all the states are affected by all the inputs (hence, all the agents are neighbors).
It can be seen that the agent must communicate several times with the rest of the agents.
Note that in order to implement the proposed algorithm, it is necessary to obtain a set
of future input trajectories that satisfy all the constraints for the initial state; that is, to
initialize U s(0).
The situation that arises from the application of the proposed control strategy has been
studied by game theory, the mathematical discipline that study all the phenomena that arise
from the mutual interaction of agents that take their decisions alone or in cooperation [9, 66].
From a game theory point of view the situation can be described as a cooperative team game
in which the possible strategies for each player are defined by its own proposals and the
proposals of the rest of the agents. The utility of the proposals for each agent is defined by
its local cost functions, however in order to find a solution, each agent chooses the option
that is best from the global point of view.
Remark 4 The time variable t, which is always used between parenthesis, references sam-
pling times. The variable k, which is used always as a subscript, references the future time
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Figure 3.3: Flow diagram for a single agent which is granted permission to make a proposal
of the proposed DMPC scheme.
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steps along the prediction horizon of a given optimization problem and always takes values
between 0 and N .
Remark 5 Several proposals can be evaluated in parallel as long as they don’t involve the
same set of agents; that is, at any given time an agent can only evaluate a single proposal.
The communication protocol to implement the algorithm in parallel is beyond the scope of this
work.
Remark 6 Centralized MPC solves a single large-scale problem based on the model of the
whole system such as the following optimization problem:
{U cj }j=1,...,Mu = arg min
{Uj}j=1,...,Mu
∑Mx
i=1 Ji(xi, {Uj}j∈ni)
s.t.
xi,k+1 = Aixi,k +
∑
j∈ni
Bijuj,k
xi,0 = xi
xi,k ∈ Xi, k = 0, . . . , N
uj,k ∈ Uj, k = 0, . . . N − 1, ∀j ∈ ni
xi,N ∈ Ωi
∀i = 1, . . . ,Mx
(3.14)
3.3 Stability
Stability is a major issue in distributed systems. In general, it is a difficult problem because it
is not enough to guarantee the stability of each of the subsystems. Actually, stable subsystems
may lead to an unstable global system. In this section we provide sufficient conditions that
guarantee asymptotic stability of the closed-loop system following a standard region/terminal
cost approach [61].
Assumption 1 There exist linear feedbacks uj =
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp and sets Ωi ⊆ Rqi such that
if xi ∈ Ωi for all i = 1, . . . ,Mx then the following conditions hold for all i = 1, . . . ,Mx
Mx∑
i=1
Fi(Aixi +
∑
j∈ni
Bij
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp)− Fi(xi) + Li(xi, {
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp}j∈ni) ≤ 0 (3.15a)
Aixi +
∑
j∈ni
Bij
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp ∈ Ωi (3.15b)
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp ∈ Uj (3.15c)
Ωi ∈ Xi (3.15d)
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The requirements of Assumption 1 are twofold, first, the local feedbacks must satisfy con-
straint (3.15a) which implies that the system in closed-loop with these set of local controllers
is stable. Second, sets Ωi such that (3.15b) to (3.15d) are satisfied must exist. We denote
these sets as jointly positive invariants for system (3.1) in closed-loop with the controllers
defined by matrices Kij . It is important to note that although the cartesian product of these
sets is a positive invariant of system (3.1), in general it is not possible to obtain the jointly
positive invariant sets from an invariant set of system (3.1) obtained following standard pro-
cedures because each Ωi is defined only in a subspace of the whole state space; that is, in the
space corresponding to the state xi. This property is necessary in order to define for each
agent a set of constraints that depend only on its state, and hence, only on its model. See
the constraints of problem (3.9).
Theorem 4 If Assumption 1 holds and at time step t = 0, U s(0) is given such that each
of the Mx optimization problems (3.9)
2 are feasible for xi,0 = xi(0) and Uj = U
s
j (0) with
i = 1, ..,Mx and j ∈ ni, then the proposed algorithm is feasible for all time steps t ≥ 0 and
system (3.1) in closed-loop with the proposed distributed MPC controller is asymptotically
stable.
Proof
The proof consists of two parts. We first prove that there is always a proposal which
satisfies all the constraints (3.9) and then we prove that, under the stated assumptions,
J(t) =
Mx∑
i=1
Ji(xi(t), {Udj (t)}j∈ni) (3.16)
is decreasing sequence lower-bounded by zero.
Part 1. Taking into account that {Udj (t− 1)}j∈ni satisfies all the constraints of (3.9) and
Assumption 1, it is easy to prove that {U sj (t)}j∈ni provides a feasible solution for xi(t). It
follows, that Ud(t) provides a feasible solution for the optimization problem of agent i because
it is chosen among a set of proposals which are required to be feasible in order to be accepted.
Note that a proposal which is unfeasible for any of the agents cannot be chosen because the
corresponding local cost is infinite. Taking into account that by assumption, U s(0) satisfies
all the constraints for all the agents at time step t = 0 and using the above result recursively,
the statement of this part is proved.
Part 2. Taking into account the definitions of Udi (t− 1) and U si (t) it follows that
Ji(xi(t), {U sj (t)}j∈ni)− Ji(xi(t− 1), {Udj (t− 1)}j∈ni) (3.17)
2Although we used the index p in the definition of the optimization problems solved to obtain each proposal,
in the proof of Theorem 4 we will use the index i.
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is equal to
Fi(Aixi,N +
∑
j∈ni
Bij
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,N )− Fi(xi,N )
+Li(xi,N , {
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,0}j∈ni)− Li(xi,0, {
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,0}j∈ni)
(3.18)
Taking into account (3.15a), this implies that
Mx∑
i=1
Ji(xi(t), {U sj (t)}j∈ni)− J(t− 1) ≤ −
Mx∑
i=1
Li(xi,0, {
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,0}j∈ni) (3.19)
As the proposed algorithm chooses Ud(t) as an input trajectory that improves the cost, it is
easy to see that
J(t) ≤ J(t− 1)−
Mx∑
i=1
Li(xi,0, {
∑
p∈mj
Kjpxp,0}j∈ni) (3.20)
Taking into account that recursive feasibility is guaranteed (see the first part of the proof)
and the definitions of Fi and Li and following the same lines of though as in [61] or [42],
attractiveness and stability can also be proved. This implies that system (3.1) in closed-loop
with the proposed distributed MPC controller is asymptotically stable.

The proof of Theorem 4 follows the standard terminal region/terminal constraint ap-
proach, see [61]. Stability is inherited from the set of local controllers defined by matrices
Kij which by (3.15a) are known to stabilize the system. In fact this result is based on the
well known idea “Feasibility implies stability”, see [90].
Remark 7 The stability properties of the proposed scheme rely heavily on the fact that Us
satisfies all the constraints of the optimization problem. This implies, that in the start-up
and when the controller looses feasibility due to disturbances, Us has to be calculated either
by a centralized supervisor or in a distributed manner by the agents.
Remark 8 When applied to a real system in the presence of disturbances and/or possible
model errors, if the controller operates close to the state constraints in practice the shifted
input trajectory may become unfeasible and in would have to be evaluated again (in a cen-
tralized manner or using an appropriate distributed approach). This issue must be taken into
account in the implementation procedure of this control strategy.
Remark 9 Although in order to implement the proposed controller, the agents don’t need
information about the state or the dynamics of the rest of the subsystems, a centralized model
of the full system is needed to design the controller so that closed-loop stability is guaranteed.
This issue will be shown in the next section.
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3.4 Controller design procedure
The local controllers Kij must satisfy two necessary conditions. First, the centralized system
composed by theMx subsystems (3.1) in closed-loop with the local controllers must be stable.
Second, the jointly invariant sets must exist.
The local controllers that depend on each agent; that is, matrices Kji such that i ∈ mj,
must be designed in a way such that (3.15a) holds. To take this condition into account, we
will use the following centralized model of the system
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) (3.21)
where
x = [xT1 , . . . , xMx ]
T , u = [uT1 , . . . , uMu ]
T (3.22)
and matrices A and B are appropriate matrices that depend of the model (3.1) of each
subsystem.
In addition, stability of each subsystem in closed-loop with its corresponding local feed-
back must be guaranteed. A sufficient condition to guarantee stability of each of the subsys-
tems is to require that the cost function defined by the matrices Pi is a Lyapunov function
for the subsystem in closed-loop with its corresponding local feedback. To take into account
this condition, we will use the following uncertain model of each of the Mx subsystems
xi(t+ 1) = Aixi(t) +Bivi(t) + Eiwi(t) (3.23)
where vi is made of the part of the inputs that depend on xi and wi is the part of the inputs
that depend on the rest of the states when the local controllers are applied; that is,
Bivi(t) =
∑
j∈ni
BijKjixi
Eiwi(t) =
∑
j∈ni
Bij
∑
p∈mj−{i}
Kjpxp
(3.24)
In this case, the objective is to design a controller Ki = {Kji}j∈ni that stabilizes the subsys-
tem considering wi an unknown disturbance. Matrices Bi and Di are appropriate matrices
that depend of the model (3.1) of each subsystem.
We provide next a set of linear matrix inequalities (LMI) that guarantees that (3.15a)
holds and that Ki stabilizes the subsystem i. These LMI constraints are obtained following
standard procedures, see for example [40, 1, 41].
Theorem 5 Consider system (3.1). If there exist matrices Wi, Yi with i = 1, . . . ,Mx such
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that the following inequalities hold3 

Υ Φ Ψ Ξ
∗ Υ 0 0
∗ ∗ I 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I

 ≥ 0 (3.25)
with Ri =
∑
j∈ni
Rij , R = diag(R1, . . . , RMx), K = [K1, . . . ,KMx ], K
T
i = [K1i, . . . ,KMui]
and
Φ =


W1A
T
1 + Y
T
1 B
T
1 Y
T
1 B
T
2 · · · Y T1 BTMx
Y T2 B
T
1 W2A
T
2 + Y
T
2 B
T
2 · · · Y T2 BTMx
...
...
. . .
...
Y TMxB
T
1 Y
T
Mx
BT2 · · · WMxATMx + Y TMxBTMx

 (3.26)
Υ =


W1 0 · · · 0
∗ W2 · · · 0
∗ ∗ . . . ...
∗ ∗ ∗ WMx

 ,Ξ =


Y T1 R
1
2
Y T2 R
1
2
...
Y TMxR
1
2

 ,Ψ =


W1Q
1
2
1 0 · · · 0
∗ W2Q
1
2
2 · · · 0
∗ ∗ . . . ...
∗ ∗ ∗ WMxQ
1
2
Mx


(3.27)
and 

Wi WiA
T
i − Y Ti BTi WiQ
1
2
i Y
T
i R
1
2
i
∗ Wi 0 0
∗ ∗ I 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I

 ≥ 0 (3.28)
for i = 1, . . . ,Mx then (3.15a) is satisfied for the matrices Pi = W
−1
i , Ki = {Kji}j∈ni =
YiW
−1
i and systems (3.23) are stable in closed-loop with vi = Kixi.
Proof
We will prove the theorem in two parts. In the first part we will prove that if (3.25)
holds, then (3.15a) is satisfied for the matrices Pi = W
−1
i , Ki = {Kji}j∈ni = YiW−1i . In the
second part, we will prove that if (3.28) holds then system (3.23) is stable in closed-loop with
vi = Kixi.
Part 1: In this part, we will prove that (3.25) is equivalent to (3.15a). Taking into account
the definition of the centralized system (3.21), (3.15a) can be posed as follows
(A+BK)TP (A+BK)− P +Q+KTRK ≤ 0 (3.29)
3The symbol “∗” stands for the symmetric part of a matrix.
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with
R = diag(R1, . . . , RMx)
Q = diag(Q1, . . . , QMx)
P = diag(P1, . . . , PMx)
(3.30)
with Ri =
∑
j∈ni
Rij. Taking into account that the P and P
−1 are positive defined matrices,
if we multiply (3.29) by minus one and apply the Schur’s complement we can recast (3.29)
as the following constraint[
P −Q−KTRK (A+BK)T
(A+BK) P−1
]
≥ 0 (3.31)
This LMI can be transformed into an equivalent one by pre and post multiplying it by a
positive definite matrix[
P−1 0
0 I
] [
P −Q−KTRK (A+BK)T
(A+BK) P−1
][
P−1 0
0 I
]
≥ 0 (3.32)
The resulting equivalent matrix inequality is given by[
P−1 − P−1QP−1 − P−1KTRKP−1 P−1(A+BK)T
(A+BK)P−1 P−1
]
≥ 0 (3.33)
In order to obtain a LMI inequality let Υ = P−1 = diag(W1,W2, . . . ,WMx) with Wi = P
−1
i
for i = 1, 2, ..,Mx and Y = KΥ = [Y1 Y2 . . . YMx ]. It follows that[
Υ−ΥQΥ− Y TRY ΥAT + Y TBT
AΥ+BY Υ
]
≥ 0 (3.34)
Using the decomposition Q = Q1/2Q1/2 and applying Schur’s complement we obtain[
Υ− Y TRY ΥAT + Y TBT
AΥ+BY Υ
]
−
[
ΥQ1/2
0
]
I
[
Q1/2Υ 0
]
≥ 0 (3.35)

 Υ− Y
TRY ΥAT + Y TBT ΥQ1/2
AΥ+BY Υ 0
Q1/2Υ 0 I

 ≥ 0 (3.36)
The same procedure is repeated for R = R1/2R1/2 obtaining
 Υ ΥA
T + Y TBT ΥQ1/2
AΥ+BY Υ 0
Q1/2Υ 0 I

−

 Y
TR1/2
0
0

 I [ R1/2Y 0 0 ] ≥ 0 (3.37)


Υ ΥAT + Y TBT ΥQ1/2 Y TR1/2
AΥ+BY Υ 0 0
Q1/2Υ 0 I 0
R1/2Y 0 0 I

 ≥ 0 (3.38)
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Defining Φ = ΥAT + Y TBT , Ψ = ΥQ1/2 and Ξ = Y TR1/2, the following LMI constraint is
obtained and hence the proof is completed

Υ Φ Ψ Ξ
∗ Υ 0 0
∗ ∗ I 0
∗ ∗ ∗ I

 ≥ 0 (3.39)
Part 2: In this part, we will prove that if (3.28) holds then system (3.23) is stable in
closed-loop with vi = Kixi. To this end, we will prove that (3.28) is equivalent to the
following constraint
(Ai +BiKi)
TPi(Ai +BiKi)− Pi +Qi +KTi RiKi ≤ 0 (3.40)
which implies that Vi(x) = x
T
i Pixi is a Lyapunov function of the closed-loop system and
hence is stable. To prove this part of the theorem the constraint (3.40) is transformed in its
equivalent LMI constraint (3.28) following the same procedure used in the first part.

Remark 10 Additional constraints can be added to the design procedure so that there is no
need to know the state xi in order to calculate the input uj. This is relevant because in order
to evaluate the shifted input trajectory, all the subsystems whose state affects a given input
must communicate, so in certain cases, it may be desirable to limit these communications.
Once the local controllers and the terminal cost functions are fixed, in order to design a
distributed MPC scheme that satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 4 one needs to find sets
Ωi such that (3.15b) to (3.15d) hold. In general this is a difficult problem because each of
the sets depends on the others. The size of the terminal region for agent i is determined by
the magnitude of the disturbances induced by its neighbor agents and viceversa. A similar
class of invariant systems was studied in [81] within the polytopic games framework. We
provide next an optimization based procedure to solve this problem. In order to present the
algorithm we need the following definitions.
Definition 2 Given the following discrete-time linear system subject to bounded additive
uncertainties
x+ = Aˆx+ Bˆu+ Eˆw (3.41)
with w ∈ Wˆ, subject to constraints in the state and the input x ∈ Xˆ , u ∈ Uˆ and a linear
feedback u = Kˆx; a set Ω is said to be a robust positive invariant set for the system if the
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following constraints hold
x ∈ Ω→ (Aˆ+ BˆKˆ)x+ Eˆw ∈ Ω, ∀w ∈ Wˆ
Kˆx ∈ Uˆ
Ω ⊆ Xˆ
(3.42)
Given system matrices Aˆ, Bˆ, Eˆ, Kˆ and the sets Xˆ , Uˆ , Wˆ , there exists several methods to
find a set Ω that satisfies these constraints, see for example [39] for a procedure to find
the maximal robust positive invariant and [80] for a procedure to find an approximation of
the minimal robust positive invariant. We denote Ω(Aˆ, Bˆ, Eˆ, Xˆ , Kˆ, Uˆ , Wˆ) the corresponding
maximal robust positive invariant set.
In order to obtain sets Ωi such that Assumption 1 is satisfied, we will use the uncertain
model (3.23) of each agent; that is, each agent assumes that the contribution of its neighbors
to the inputs that affect its dynamics are an unknown bounded disturbance. The size of the
set in which these disturbances are bounded depend on the size of the sets Ωi. This implies
that finding these sets is in general a complex problem. In order to decouple the design of
each set, each agent i limits its contribution to each input j by a factor λji ∈ (0, 1] with∑
i∈mj
λji ≤ 1; that is,
Kjixi ∈ λjiUj, ∀i, j (3.43)
Using the same notation introduced in (3.23), this implies that
vi ∈ Vi(Λ), wi ∈ Wi(Λ) (3.44)
with
Vi(Λ) = λ1iU1 × λ2iU2 × . . .× λMuiUMu
Wi(Λ) = (
∑
p∈m1−{i}
λ1p)U1 × (
∑
p∈m2−{i}
λ2p)U2 × . . .× (
∑
p∈mMu−{i}
λMupUMu)
(3.45)
where Λ = {λij}∀i,j is a vector made of all the parameters λij . Note that the maximum
contribution of a given agent inside Ωi, is the maximum contribution to the disturbance for
the rest of the agents. In order to decouple the computation of the jointly invariant sets Ωi,
we use the following result based on finding a robust positive invariant set for each subsystem:
Lemma 1 Given constants λji ∈ (0, 1) with
∑
i∈mj
λji ≤ 1, if the sets defined as
Ωi = Ω(Ai, Bi, Ei,Xi,Ki,Vi(Λ),Wi(Λ)) (3.46)
are not empty, they satisfy the constraints (3.15b) to (3.15d).
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The lemma stems from the definition of the operator Ω. If all the sets exists, then
they satisfy the stability constraints. Note that there exists an infinite number of possible
values of λji such that these sets exist. In order to chose one, we propose to solve the
following optimization problem which maximizes the feasibility region of the distributed MPC
controller:
max
λji
f(Ω1 × Ω2..× ΩMx)
Ωi = Ω(Ai, Bi, Ei,Xi,Ki,Vi(Λ),Wi(Λ))
λji ∈ (0, 1), ∀j, i∑
i∈mj
λji ≤ 1, ∀i
(3.47)
where function f(·) is a measure of the size of a polyhedron (for example, its Chebyshev
radius).
Solving problem (3.47) may be difficult in general, however, under certain assumptions
it can be posed as a convex problem. In [81] it was proved that the feasibility region of
this problem is convex. In the next lemma we prove that the jointly invariant sets Ωi are
polyhedra defined by a set of inequalities whose right hand side can be expressed as an affine
combination of the constants λij . This implies, that if an appropriate function f(·) is chosen,
problem (3.47) can be cast into a convex optimization problem.
Lemma 2 If Ai +
∑
j BijKji is stable, then the set
Ωi = Ω(Ai, Bi, Ei,Xi,Ki,Vi(Λ),Wi(Λ)) (3.48)
is a polyhedron that can be defined as a set of inequalities whose independent term can be
expressed as an affine combination of the constants λij, that is,
Ωi = {xi :Mixi ≤ bi +
∑
j∈ni
∑
p∈mj
λjpbij} (3.49)
Proof :
The calculation of the robust invariant for a linear system is a well known problem and
several procedures can be found in the literature, for instance in [37] or [39]. In order to prove
the lemma, we will follow the procedure presented in [39]. The main idea is to find the set
of states such that the trajectories of the closed-loop system starting from these states fulfill
all the state and input constraints for all possible disturbances. This is done in an iterative
manner. The set of states that fulfill the constraints after k steps is determined for increasing
values of k. This process is repeated until convergence is obtained, that is, the same set of
states is obtained for k and k + 1. The resulting set is the maximum invariant set. Note
that each value of k adds new constraints that the invariant set must fulfill, so the number
of restrictions grows with each iteration.
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First of all, we will define the state constraints that the closed-loop system has to satisfy
taking into account the constraints in uji, the contribution of the state xi to the different
inputs uj . By definition of Ωi, uji has to verify
uji = Kjixi ∈ λjiUj , j ∈ ni (3.50)
Hence, the input constraint condition for the input j (3.4) can be transformed into the
following set of inequalities:
HujKjixi ≤ λjibuj , j ∈ ni (3.51)
Note that as λji ∈ (0, 1), the set of inequalities is equal or more restrictive than the original
input constraints. These inequalities have to be taken into account in the state constraints
of the closed-loop system. The new set of state constraints can be written as
Hˆxixi ≤ bˆxi (3.52)
For example, if ni = {1, 2, . . . ,Mu}, that is, subsystem i is affected by all the inputs, then
Hˆxi =


Hxi
Hu1K1i
...
HuMuKMui

 , bˆxi =


bxi
λ1ibu1
...
λMuibuMu

 (3.53)
Note that the right hand side of the inequalities can be expressed as an affine combination
of the constants λij with j ∈ ni.
Let ACLi = (Ai +
∑
j BijKji). If ACLi is stable, then for each value of Λ, the robust
invariant set Ωi can be determined in a finite number of steps backward k(Λ). Let k
∗ =
maxΛ k(Λ). We can compute the robust invariant set for all possible values of Λ as the set of
states such that its k-steps ahead predictions satisfy all the constraints for all possible future
disturbances; that is,
Hˆxi(A
k
CLixi +
k−1∑
g=0
AgCLi
∑
j∈ni
∑
p∈mj−{i}
Bijujp) ≤ bˆxi , k = 1, . . . , k∗ (3.54)
for all ujp ∈ λjpUj with j ∈ ni and p ∈ mj −{i}. Taking into account that for all ujp ∈ λjpUj
with p ∈ mj − {i} there exists zj ∈ Uj such that
zj
∑
p∈mj−{i}
λjp =
∑
p∈mj−{i}
ujp (3.55)
constraint (3.54) is equivalent to
Hˆxi(A
k
CLixi +
k−1∑
g=0
AgCLi
∑
j∈ni
Bijzj
∑
p∈mj−{i}
λjp) ≤ bˆxi , k = 1, . . . , k∗ (3.56)
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for all zj ∈ Uj with j ∈ ni.
In order to eliminate the disturbance from the constraints and obtain a deterministic set,
let us focus on each of the nr rows of Hˆxi (which define a different constraint for each time
step k taken into account in the definition of the invariant set). To denote the r-th row of a
matrix A we will use the [A]r. Using this notation, constraint (3.56) is equivalent to
[HˆxiA
k
CLi
]rxi ≤ [bˆxi ]r − [Hˆxi
k−1∑
g=0
AgCLi
∑
j∈ni
Bijzj
∑
p∈mj−{i}
λjp)]r,
k = 1, . . . , k∗, r = 1, . . . , nr
(3.57)
Let us define
σgrij = maxzj∈Uj ([(HˆxiA
g
CLi
Bij)]rzj) (3.58)
Note that σgrij is a scalar that can be calculated from the system model and constraints. This
definition allows us to rewrite constraint (3.57) as:
[HˆxiA
k
CLi ]rxi ≤ [bˆxi ]r −
k−1∑
g=0
∑
j∈ni
σgrij (
∑
p∈mj−{i}
λjp), k = 1, . . . , k
∗, r = 1, . . . , nr (3.59)
Taking into account that the second term of each of the constraints of (3.59) is an affine
combination of the constants {λip} it is possible to find matrixMi and vectors bi and bij with
j ∈ ni such that
Ωi = {xi :Mixi ≤ bi +
∑
j∈ni
∑
p∈mj
λjpbij} (3.60)

Using this result, the problem of finding a matrix Λ that maximizes a measure of the
distance can be cast into a convex optimization problem. For instance, let us suppose that
our criterium to compare the invariant sets is the radium of a Chebyshev ball inside the
invariant region. In this case we are interested in obtaining the maximum xTx as function of
Λ that verifies all the constraints, which is a convex problem.
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3.5 Example
Consider a system of the form (3.1) defined by the following matrices
A1 =
[
1 0.8
0 0.7
]
, B11 =
[
0
1
]
, B12 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B13 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B14 =
[
0
0
]
A2 =
[
1 0.6
0 0.7
]
, B21 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B22 =
[
0
1
]
, B23 =
[
0
0
]
, B24 =
[
0
0.15
]
A3 =
[
1 0.9
0 0.8
]
, B31 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B32 =
[
0
0
]
, B33 =
[
0
1
]
, B34 =
[
0
0.15
]
A4 =
[
1 0.8
0 0.5
]
, B41 =
[
0
0
]
, B42 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B43 =
[
0
0.15
]
, B44 =
[
0
1
]
(3.61)
subject to the following linear constraints in the state and the inputs
|x1|∞ ≤ 1, |x2|∞ ≤ 2, |x3|∞ ≤ 1, |x4|∞ ≤ 2
|u1|∞ ≤ 1, |u2|∞ ≤ 1, |u3|∞ ≤ 1, |u4|∞ ≤ 1 (3.62)
A graph that represents the couplings between the individual subsystems can be seen in
figure 3.4. The box represent the subsystems while the arrows represent the coupling between
neighbors. We assume that each agent can communicate with all the neighbors to evaluate
the shifted input trajectory as well as the global cost of the proposals. The weighting matrixes
that define the cost function of the MPC controller are the following:
Qi =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, Rij = 10 (3.63)
with i = {1, 2, 3, 4} and j ∈ ni.
In order to implement the proposed DMPC control scheme we need to design the local
feedbacks and the terminal cost functions according to LMI constraints presented in The-
orem 5 to find matrices Kij and Pi such that all the stability conditions are satisfied. In
particular, matrices W , Y such that constraints (3.28) and (3.25) hold while maximizing the
sum of the traces of the matrices Wi. Applying the variable change presented in Theorem 5,
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Figure 3.4: Graph of the system (3.61).
the following matrices K and P such that the stability assumptions hold are obtained
KT =


−0.27 −0.01 0 0
−0.59 −0.02 0 0
0 −0.28 0 −0.01
−0.01 −0.5 0 −0.02
0 0 −0.24 −0.01
−0.01 0 −0.68 −0.02
0 −0.01 0 −0.30
0 −0.02 0 −0.48


P =


4.92 5.76 0 0 0 0 0 0
5.76 11.30 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 5.65 5.42 0 0 0 0
0 0 5.42 8.82 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 4.45 5.81 0 0
0 0 0 0 5.81 13.74 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.61 5.80
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.80 8.95


(3.64)
The controller defined by matrix K stabilizes not only the centralized system but also the
four subsystems individually considered. Note that in the optimization problem, additional
constraints where imposed consisting in the absence of communication between some of the
agents for the purpose of computing the local control law. This specification is reflected in
the presence of zeros in the matrix. For example, agents 1 and 4 do not have to exchange
any information in order to compute the shifted input trajectory. This class of additional
constraints are particularly relevant when more involved communications protocols are taken
into account.
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The next step in the design procedure is to find the set of Λ that maximizes the size of
the jointly invariant sets. In particular, we measure the size by the Chebyshev radius of the
resulting centralized invariant set. The resulting optimization problem is convex problem (in
particular, it can be posed as a LP problem) and has been solved using Matlab’s fmincon
function. The optimal matrix Λ is
Λ =


0.4568 0.0931 0.0115 0
0.0116 0.4576 0 0.0699
0.0805 0 0.4908 0.0235
0 0.1635 0.0354 0.4128

 (3.65)
where the element of the i-th row and the j-th column corresponds to the constant λij. Note
that the constants λji that correspond to matrices Kji = 0 are set to zero.
The properties of the equivalent centralized system provide useful information to establish
a comparison with the distributed approach. In particular, the size of the maximum invariant
set for the centralized nominal case provides an upper bound of the size of the invariant set
obtained from the jointly invariant sets. In this case, the radium of the largest Chebyshev ball
is 0.74. The invariant set calculated for the distributed system has a radium of 0.66, a value
very close to the centralized case. The reduction of the invariant region is 11%. In figure 3.5
the invariant set of each subsystem can be seen along with the corresponding projection of
the centralized invariant set.
In general, the closed-loop stability properties are independent on how many proposals
are evaluated or how this proposals are generated. This implies that the proposed controller
scheme can be implemented using different proposal generation protocols. In this simulation,
a communication protocol based on broadcast different from the one presented in Section 3
is used. At each sample time, each agent makes a single proposal optimizing its local cost
function with respect to all the manipulated variables that affect him. All the proposals are
compared (including U s) and the one with the lower cost function is applied.
Figure 3.7 shows the closed-loop state trajectories of all the subsystems with the corre-
sponding jointly invariant sets. The simulations presented were done for a prediction horizon
N = 12, for the initial state
x1(0) =
[
−0.2311
0.9072
]
, x2(0) =
[
−1.3558
0.9929
]
, x3(0) =
[
−0.6533
−0.2228
]
, x4(0) =
[
−1.0419
1.1576
]
(3.66)
and an initial control vector U s(0) calculated as a feasible control vector for the centralized
system for such initial state.
Figure 3.6 shows the proposal chosen at each time step. Numbers 1 to 4 indicate the
agent that made the chosen proposal while 0 indicates that the shifted trajectory was chosen.
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Figure 3.5: Jointly invariant set of each subsystem (solid lines) along with the corresponding
projection of the centralized invariant set (dashed lines).
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Figure 3.6: Proposal chosen at time k.
3.6 Application to a supply chain problem
In this section, we apply the proposed controller to a linear supply chain, which can be defined
as the set of structures and processes used by an organization to provide a service or a good
to a consumer. It is clear that the nodes of a supply chain may not have incentives to share
other information about their models than their control actions. Supply chain flows usually
present three interesting phenomena from the control point of view: oscillation, amplification
and phase lag [92]. Due to material or informational delays production and inventories
overshoot and undershoot the optimal levels. The magnitude of the fluctuations increase as
they propagate from the customer to the factory, in what is commonly known as the bullwhip
effect. For these reasons supply chains dynamics have been deeply analyzed and have been
used as an application example in several distributed control papers [23, 54].
In this example, we consider a cascade of Mx firms. In particular, the discrete time
equations that define the dynamics of firm i are given by:
si(t+ 1) = si(t) + ui−1(t− di−1,i)− ui(t) (3.67)
The super-scripts i − 1 and i + 1 represent, respectively, the dynamics of the upstream and
downstream nodes. Variable si(t) is the stock level; that is, the number of items available for
shipment downstream. The manipulated variable at each stage is ui(t) which stands for the
number of items sent to the downstream node. This is a difference with respect to models
in which there is one variable that stands for the order rate and another, which is usually
modeled as a disturbance, that stands for the shipment itself. The information flows are
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Figure 3.7: (a) Agent 1 state evolution. (b) Agent 2 state evolution. (c) Agent 3 state
evolution. (d) Agent 4 state evolution.
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Figure 3.8: Linear supply chain.
assumed to have no time delays and the material flows have a delay modeled by di,j which
corresponds to the time taken by the shipments from node i to node j.
The only information shared by the agents is their inputs. In particular, the model of a
node needs to keep track of the shipments made by its upstream node. This implies that a
model of the form (3.1) can be obtained assigning a different subsystem to each firm i with
the following state vector xi
xi(t) =


si(t)
ui−1(t− 1)
ui−1(t− 2)
...
ui−1(t− di−1,i)


Note that this model takes into account the different delays by augmenting the state vectors.
The inputs are defined by the different shipments variables uj.
In this model the first firm, with state x1(t) is the supplier which demands items directly
to the factory by u0(t) which is modeled as a pure delay of value d0,1. The last firm is
the retailer which must satisfy the external demand uMx(t) which is an external signal not
controlled by the system. The control objective is to regulate the stock levels to a desired
value ri(t). In addition, the last node of supply chain, the retailer, has to satisfy the external
demand. To this end, we consider the following local cost function for each firm
Ji =
N∑
k=1
2i(rik − sik −
di−1∑
l=k−1
ui−1k−l)
2
where N is the prediction horizon, the subindex k denotes the k-steps predicted value of a
signal. No terminal cost function is considered. The cost penalizes the deviation of the sum
of current stock and the items traveling from the upstream node from the desired reference.
Note that if the controller ignores those units that have to arrive in the future, it would ask
for more units than needed. The weights of the local cost grow with 2i, that is, the closer a
node is to the retailer the more important is. This way of weighting the error is natural since
the most important goal of a supply chain is to satisfy the external demand.
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The class of linear supply chains considered in this example is defined by the number
of firms Mx and the delay parameters di,j . In the following tables we show the results of a
set of simulations with three different supply chains of 5, 10 and 20 firms. We denote these
scenarios as SUPPLY5, SUPPLY10 and SUPPLY20 respectively. The delay parameters of
each supply chain have been randomly chosen with values between 2 and 5. The initial stock
si(0) was chosen randomly between 100 and 300. In all these simulations, we assume that
the external demand uMx(t) is null and that the objective of the controller is to regulate the
stocks to their references. The references ri(t) were supposed to be constant and were chosen
randomly between 180 and 280. The simulation times Tf were set respectively to 50, 100 and
200 sample times.
In order to study the effect of the number of proposals considered at each sampling time
in the performance of the proposed DMPC scheme, we have applied several controllers which
consider a different number of proposals Nprop. Given that the proposals are made randomly,
each simulation was repeated 10 times. In addition, a centralized MPC controller has also
been applied to the three scenarios as a reference of the performance that can be obtained
with a centralized approach.
The tables show the cumulated cost mean J¯cum and the corresponding standard deviation
σJ of each controller. The cumulated cost of each simulation was computed as:
Jcum =
Tf∑
t=0
Mx∑
i=1
2i(ri(t)− si(t))2
In addition the tables show the mean number of sample times t¯ss that an agent needs to
have less than a 5% of error with respect to its reference, as well as the average number of
sample times tss that the slowest agent needs to have less than a 5% of error with respect to
its reference. These two entries provide additional information on the performance of each
controller.
In general, the simulations show that increasing the number of proposals Nprop improves
the performance of the proposed DMPC scheme. It can be seen that J¯cum and σJ are
decreasing functions of the parameter Nprop. However, communications can be a scarce
resource for some systems and it is important to find a trade-off between the number of
communications and the performance. In our example it can be seen that a good trade-off
happens when Nprop is around 5Mx communications, whereMx is the number of agents. This
implies that each agent makes an average of 5 proposals to its neighbors.
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Controller J¯cum σJ t¯ss tss Nprop
DMPC 2.36e+6 1.80e+6 25.57 30.70 1
DMPC 9.39e+5 2.99e+6 15.20 18.30 3
DMPC 6.64e+5 3.05e+5 11.25 13.80 5
DMPC 5.53e+5 1.40e+5 9.85 12.20 7
DMPC 5.39e+5 1.69e+5 9.05 11.30 10
DMPC 4.34e+5 8.30e+4 8.25 10.50 15
DMPC 3.88e+5 1.25e+4 7.70 9.50 20
DMPC 3.86e+5 1.24e+4 7.65 9.30 30
MPC 3.71e+5 - 7.50 9.00 -
Table 3.1: Simulation results for SUPPLY5
Controller J¯cum σJ t¯ss tss Nprop
DMPC 8.50e+7 1.95e+7 58.32 93.50 1
DMPC 4.57e+7 1.20e+7 29.48 46.30 3
DMPC 2.61e+7 3.28e+6 21.78 34.30 5
DMPC 2.62e+7 4.23e+6 20.34 29.50 7
DMPC 2.06e+7 2.98e+6 16.18 24.20 10
DMPC 1.71e+7 1.98e+6 13.81 21.30 15
DMPC 1.70e+7 2.00e+6 13.68 21.50 20
DMPC 1.63e+7 1.25e+6 12.82 20.50 30
DMPC 1.53e+7 9.56e+5 12.91 20.50 50
DMPC 1.52e+7 7.07e+5 12.36 20.10 70
DMPC 1.52e+7 6.51e+5 12.07 20.10 100
MPC 1.45e+7 - 13.00 20.00 -
Table 3.2: Simulation results for SUPPLY10
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Controller J¯cum σJ t¯ss tss Nprop
DMPC 5.84e+11 1.24e+11 162.49 199.80 1
DMPC 2.66e+11 6.02e+10 132.96 187.00 3
DMPC 1.46e+11 2.83e+10 93.34 137.50 5
DMPC 1.30e+11 1.48e+10 76.09 112.90 7
DMPC 9.85e+10 1.73e+10 60.21 88.90 10
DMPC 8.23e+10 1.11e+10 49.48 73.40 15
DMPC 6.19e+10 7.09e+9 42.24 61.70 20
DMPC 5.55e+10 4.52e+9 39.02 56.40 30
DMPC 5.24e+10 3.01e+9 32.38 46.70 50
DMPC 5.07e+10 1.38e+9 31.15 44.30 70
DMPC 5.01e+10 9.34e+8 30.36 42.90 100
DMPC 4.98e+10 8.90e+8 29.91 42.10 125
DMPC 4.97e+10 5.79e+8 29.65 41.80 150
DMPC 4.98e+10 4.03e+8 29.23 41.90 175
DMPC 4.95e+10 6.09e+8 28.31 41.10 200
MPC 3.84e+10 - 19.53 26.00 -
Table 3.3: Simulation results for SUPPLY20
3.7 Application to control of irrigation canals
In this chapter we apply the proposed controller to a model of a section of the “postrasvase
Tajo-Segura” in the south-east of Spain. The ‘postrasvase Tajo-Segura’ is a set of canals
which distribute water coming from the Tajo river in the basin of the Segura river. This
water is mainly used for irrigation (78%), although a 22% of it is drinking water. The
selected section is a Y-shape canals (see figure 3.9), a main canal that splits into two canals
with a gate placed at the input of each one of them: Canal de la Pedrera, with a total length
of 6,680 kilometres, and Canal de Cartagena, with a lenght of 17,444 kilometres.
The total length of the canals is approximately of 24 kilometres. At the end of Canal de
Cartagena there is a reservoir with limited capacity.
The main elements in the canals are the main gates, which regulate the level of water
along the canals, and the off-take gates, where the farmers take water from the canals for
irrigation. There are 7 main gates and 17 off-take gates in the section studied.
Figure 3.9 and table 3.4 show a scheme of the location of the gates, the off-take gates and
the milestones where they are located.
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Code Type P/G Description Km
Canal del Campo de Cartagena
Starting Campo de Cartagena canal 0,000
CCMICAR-01 Gate G Initial Gate 0,200
MICAR-01 Off-take G Off-take 5 - Fuensanta and Estafeta 1,170
MICAR-02 Off-take G Off-take 5’ - Palacete 2,540
MICAR-03 Off-take P Off-take 6 - Santo Domingo 2,840
CCMICAR-04 Gate Gate Canal Pedrera 4,485
MICAR-04 Off-take P Off-take 7 - Campo Salinas 5,970
MICAR-05 Off-take G Off-take 8 - San Miguel 6,550
MICAR-06 Off-take G Off-take 9 - Las Caadas 8,050
MICAR-07 Off-take G Off-take 10 - San Miguel 9,390
MICAR-08 Off-take P Off-take 11 - Campo Salinas 9,590
CCMICAR-05 Gate Gate Tunel San Miguel 10,480
MICAR-09 Off-take G Off-take 12 - San Miguel 12,630
MICAR-10 Off-take P Off-take 13 - Campo Salinas 12,780
CCMICAR-06 Gate Gate La Rambla La Fayona (start) 14,433
CCMICAR-07 Gate Gate La Rambla La Fayona (end) 14,579
MICAR-11 Off-take P Off take 14 - Villamartin 16,540
CCMICAR-08 Gate Gate Caada La Estacada 17,444
Canal de la Pedrera
CCMIPED-01 Gate Starting La Pedrera canal 0,000
MIPED-01 Off-take G Off-take 1P - S. Domingo 0,770
MIPED-02 Off-take G Off-take 2P - S. Domingo y Mengoloma 3,740
MIPED-03 Off-take P Off-take 3P - S. Domingo 4,260
MIPED-04 Off-take G Off-take Riegos Levante 1 5,260
MIPED-05 Off-take G Off-take 4P - Santo Domingo 6,440
MIPED-06 Off-take G Off-take Riegos Levante 2 y 3 6,680
Table 3.4: Data of irrigation canal Cartagena-La Pedrera
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Figure 3.9: Scheme of the canal.
The dynamics of water flowing in irrigation open canals can be obtained by applying the
Saint Venant equations [16, 17], which are nonlinear partial differential equations.
The irrigation canals considered are divided into several sections separated by gates; the
controlled variables are the downstream water levels, hi(t) ∈ R+(m) and the manipulated
variables are the check point to gates, ui(t) ∈ R+(m).
Each canal reach has an inflow from an upstream canal reach, Qin,i ∈ R+(m3/s), and
an outflow to a downstream canal reach, Qo,i ∈ R+(m3/s). Also, other flows are considered
as perturbation variables. In particular, qin,i ∈ R+(m3/s) models the flows due to rainfall,
failures in upstream gate and other unknown disturbances and qo,i ∈ R+(m3/s) models the
known offtake outflows from farmers, considered as measurable perturbations.
The discrete model that has been considered using the previous variables is:
Ai(hi(k + 1)− hi(k)) = Td(Qin,i(k − td) + qin,i(k)−Qo,i(k)− qo,i(k)) (3.68)
where Td(s) is the sampling time, Ai is the surface of the reach and td the delay of the input
Qin (the level is measured downstream).
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The discharge through a submerged flow gate Qo(t) is usually determined as[16]:
Qo(t) = CdL
√
2gu(t)
√
hup(t)− hdn(t), (3.69)
where Cd is the gate discharge coefficient, L is the gate width, u(t) the gate opening and
hup(t), hdn(t) are the upstream and downstream water levels, respectively.
The main target is to manage the water in the canals in order to guarantee the flows
requested by users. Another objective to be considered is the minimization of the leaks and
evaporation (which can be obtained as function of the levels) and also to minimize mainte-
nance costs (the maintenance of concrete blocks and junctions is better if they are submerged,
so high levels are preferred for that purpose). For these purposes, it is necessary to maintain
the level of the canal over the off-take gate when flow is requested. The controlled variables
are the upstream levels beside the gates, which have to satisfy maximum and minimum level
constraints. The minimum level is determined by the demand of irrigation of surrounded
lands; it must be guaranteed that off-take points are submerged. The maximum level is
determined to provide regulation capabilities to the system in order to avoid floods. The ma-
nipulated variables are the flow at the head of the canal and the position of the gates, which
are are also constrained. The flow at the head is limited by the total amount of available
water and the gates have maximum and minimum openings.
The actual reference in levels are sent to the DMPC in the low level. For this controller,
the sample time has been considered 1 minute and the horizon, N, has been set to 5. The
cost function has been designed to include the water traveling from the upstream gates, that
is, the states which correspond to the traveling water are also weighted. It is necessary to
consider the water coming from the upstream gate as a part of the level under consideration
to be able to compensate the effect of the delay in the controller. The weights of the local
costs in the canals grow with 2i, that is, the farther a node is from the beginning , the more
important is. This way of weighting the error facilitates a faster flow of water towards the
last canals. Finally, the matrix that weights the control effort Ri has been set to zero for
simplicity.
In figure 3.10 it can be seen a simulation in which all the reaches begin with a water
level of 3 meters. At sampling time k = 0, the reference is set to 3.15m to all the reaches.
After a whole day (k = 1440) there is another change of reference for all the reaches to 3.6m.
These changes are originated in the upper control level as a function of the risk mitigation
policy. It can be seen how the level in the reaches follow the reference even in the presence of
disturbances (farmers take water, rains...). It is important to remark that these results have
been obtained with an average number of 5 communications per agent and sampling time.
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In other words, each agent makes up to 5 proposals in a minute in order to get a cooperative
solution with the rest of the agents.
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Figure 3.10: Water level evolution.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter we have presented a novel distributed MPC algorithm based on negotiation
for a class distributed linear systems coupled through the inputs. We assume that each
agent has access only to the model and the state of one of the subsystems and that the
agents must negotiate in order to reach a cooperative solution. The proposed algorithm
has low communication and computational burdens and provides a feasible solution to the
centralized problem. In addition, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee practical
stability of the closed-loop system as well as an optimization based procedure to design the
controller so that these conditions are satisfied.
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Chapter 4
Distributed Receding Horizon
Kalman Filter
The most common approach to estimate the state of stochastic systems is the Kalman fil-
ter [36], developed in 1960 and named after his discoverer. The Kalman filter is the optimal
state estimator for unconstrained linear systems subject to gaussian state and output noise.
It is not possible to apply directly the centralized Kalman filter to a multiagent problem
unless there is a node in the network that receives all the information. For example in [87],
it can be seen how a central agent gathers the information from the moving devices and then
distributes the position estimation back to them. An alternative is to calculate a decentralized
version of the Kalman filter that takes into account the communications restrictions [31, 87].
In this thesis we follow a different approach to solve the estimation problem in a dis-
tributed manner. First, the Kalman filter is posed as a dynamic programming problem [18].
Then, the resulting optimization problem is distributed among the agents by means of dual
decomposition. This idea has been successfully applied to distributed control in [82] and [28].
Given that the observation problem is the dual of the control problem, it is natural to apply
and enhance the techniques presented in these papers to deal with the state estimation prob-
lem. Moreover, some of the results that will be shown in this chapter have direct application
to distributed control based on dual decomposition.
In this context, the application of state estimation schemes to problems in which the state
represents the position of an object is very attractive [4], [31]. The localization of moving
entities, such as robots or people, is important for many applications. Military applications
in which the goal is to track a target that moves in a distributed sensor environment are
typical examples. Other examples in which these techniques play an important role would
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be smart homes [49], in which it is basic to know where the inhabitants of the house are in
order to control the heating and the lights and traffic and speed control. For this reason, they
constitute good applications for the distributed state estimation algorithm that we present.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In section I the problem is formulated. Section
II explains how dual decomposition can be used to distribute the problem among the agents
involved. In section III the techniques presented in the previous sections are applied in
simulation examples. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented.
Part of this chapter has been published in [50].
4.1 Problem formulation
In this section we present a moving horizon estimation strategy that solves approximately
the Kalman filter. Let us consider the following uncertain distributed linear system
xi(τ + 1) = Aiixi(τ) + wi(τ)
yi(τ) =
J∑
j=1
Cijxj(τ) + vi(τ)
(4.1)
where xi(τ) ∈ Rni , yi(τ) ∈ Rqi , wi(τ) ∈ Rni and vi(τ) ∈ Rqi are the state, measurable
output, state noise and measurement noises of the i-th subbsytem respectively. The state
and measurement noises are characterized by a normal distribution with zero mean and
variances Qi and Ri respectively; that is, wi(τ) is a N(0, Qi) and vi(τ) is a N(0, Ri). From
a centralized point of view the system can be described with the following model
x(τ + 1) = Ax(τ) + w(τ)
y(τ) = Cx(τ) + v(τ)
(4.2)
where
x(τ) = [x1(τ) x2(τ) . . . xJ(τ)]
T ∈ Rn
y(τ) = [y1(τ) y2(τ) . . . yJ(τ)]
T ∈ Rq
w(τ) = [w1(τ) w2(τ) . . . wJ(τ)]
T ∈ Rn
v(τ) = [v1(τ) v2(τ) . . . vJ(τ)]
T ∈ Rq
n =
∑
i
ni, q =
∑
i
qi.
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Note that w(τ) is a N(0, Q) with Q = diag(Qi) for i = 1, . . . , J and v(τ) is a N(0, R) with
R = diag(Ri) for i = 1, . . . , J .
From the point of view of probability theory, a state estimator attempts to reconstruct
the a posteriori distribution p(xˆ(τ)|Y (0 : τ)), which is the probability that the state of the
system is xˆ(τ) given measurements Y (0 : τ) = {y(0), . . . , y(τ)}. It is also possible to calculate
the joint probability for a trajectory of state values, for example p(Xˆ(0 : τ)|Y (0 : τ)). It is
clear that if the distribution can be calculated, then it is possible to obtain an estimate that
maximizes it, that is,
Xˆ∗(0 : τ) = arg max
Xˆ(0:τ)
p(Xˆ(0 : τ)|Y (0 : τ)). (4.3)
Note that the number of optimization variables involved in the estimation optimization
problem grows with each new sample that has to be estimated. In order to bound the
computational burden it is possible to estimate the state trajectory inside a window of size
N (see for example [30]). In this case, equation (4.3) becomes
Xˆ∗(τ −N, τ) = arg max
Xˆ(τ−N,τ)
p(Xˆ(τ −N, τ)|Y (0 : τ)). (4.4)
We will also use this approximation in the approach presented in this chapter to build a
distributed version of the Kalman filter. In this case, the problem of obtaining an estimate
that maximizes the probability density function can be reduced to a dynamical programming
problem. See [4] or [85] to obtain more details. In particular, the maximization of p(Xˆ(τ−N :
τ)|Y (0 : τ)) can be solved in a recursive fashion with the introduction of the following
auxiliary function
I(xˆ(τ)) = max
Xˆ(τ−N :τ−1)
p(Xˆ(τ −N : τ − 1), xˆ(τ)|Y (0 : τ)), (4.5)
which can be interpreted as the probability of the most probable trajectory that reaches xˆ(τ).
We assume that p(xˆ(τ)|Xˆ(τ − N : τ − 1)) = p(xˆ(τ)|xˆ(τ − 1)), that is, the state in time τ
depends only on the state in time τ−1. This assumption is known as the Markov assumption
and, together with Bayes’ Theorem, allows to rewrite the equation (4.5) as
I(xˆ(τ)) = max
xˆ(τ−1)
p(y(τ)|xˆ(τ))p(xˆ(τ)|xˆ(τ−1))
p(y(τ)|Y (0,τ−1)) I(xˆ(τ − 1)). (4.6)
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Note that it is possible to maximize individually the probability of all the state transitions
from from xˆ(k) to xˆ(k + 1) for all k ∈ [τ − N, τ − 1] due to the Markov assumption. Note
too that the term p(y(τ)|Y (0 : τ − 1)) can be discarded since it does not depend on the
optimization variable. In addition, note that if we take into account the system dynamics
given by (4.2), it is possible to calculate explicitly p(y(τ)|xˆ(τ)) and p(xˆ(τ + 1)|xˆ(τ)). Simply,
taking into account that
w(τ) = x(τ + 1)−Ax(τ)
v(τ) = y(τ)− Cx(τ).
It is clear that p(y(τ)|x(τ)) = p(v(τ)) and p(x(τ + 1)|x(τ)) = p(w(τ)). Given that w(τ)
and v(τ) are assumed to be normal random variables we can obtain their corresponding
probability density functions as
p(xˆ(i+ 1)|xˆ(i)) = p(w(τ)) = 1
(2pi)n/2
√
|Q−1|
e−
1
2
w(τ)TQ−1w(τ)
p(y(i)|xˆ(i)) = p(v(τ)) = 1
(2pi)q/2
√
|R−1|
e−
1
2
v(τ)TR−1v(τ).
(4.7)
The recursive equation (4.6) can be transformed into a dynamic programming problem
applying the logarithm operation to the both sides or the equality, that is,
log(I(xˆ(τ))) = max
xˆ(τ−1)
(log p(y(τ)|xˆ(τ)) + log p(xˆ(τ)|xˆ(τ − 1)) + log(I(xˆ(τ − 1))).
Therefore, the most probable trajectory of states Xˆ∗(τ − N, τ) can be calculated in the
following way:
Xˆ∗(τ −N, τ) = arg min
Xˆ(τ−N,τ)
(−
τ∑
k=τ−N+1
log p(y(k)|xˆ(k)) + log p(xˆ(k)|xˆ(k − 1)) + Φ(xˆ(τ −N))),
(4.8)
where Φ(xˆ(τ−N)) = log(I(xˆ(τ−N))) is a term that weights the uncertainty of the first state
estimated in the window. Note that we have changed the maximization to a minimization
by changing the sign of all the terms of the objective function.
Substituting (4.7) into equation (4.8), the moving horizon estimation problem can be
posed as a quadratic programming optimization problem. In addition, the logarithm function
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allows us to ignore the terms 1/((2π)n/2
√|Q−1|) and 1/((2π)q/2√|R−1|) in the cost function,
which become simply constants (assuming that R and Q are constant matrices). In order to
simplify the introduction of the quadratic programming problem, we define next the following
quadratic function:
V N (Xˆ(τ −N : τ)) =
τ∑
k=τ−N+1
1
2(y(k)− Cxˆ(k))TR−1(y(k)− Cxˆ(k))
+
τ−1∑
k=τ−N
1
2(xˆ(k + 1)−Axˆ(k))TQ−1(xˆ(k + 1)−Axˆ(k)) + Φ(xˆ(τ −N)),
(4.9)
Remark 11 Note that equation (4.9) can expressed as the sum of a stage cost for each
estimate but the last one, which value is calculated through the terminal cost. According to
this,
V N (Xˆ(τ −N : τ)) =
τ∑
k=τ−N+1
l(xˆ(k)) + Φ(xˆ(τ −N)). (4.10)
Remark 12 The terminal cost in equation (4.9) is commonly referred as the arrival cost.
This term summarizes the information not considered in the horizon at time τ . In the case
considered, that is, linear model and gaussian noises, this term would simply become Φ(xˆ(τ −
N)) = ‖xˆ(τ −N)−m‖2P−1(τ−N) [85], where P−1(τ − N) is the inverse of the covariance
matrix of the estimation error and m is the mean of x(τ − N). Nevertheless, it is not
practical in a distributed dynamic programming problem to keep track of P−1(τ − N) and
approximations are needed. One possible choice is to use the steady state covariance matrix
to weight the estimation at the beginning of the window. In this thesis the problem will be
relaxed assuming that x(τ−N) takes the value calculated in its latest estimation xˆ(τ−N). This
assumption works well as long as the previous estimates are correctly estimated. Actually,
in the case that the trajectory of estimated states out of the estimation window were all
exact (which, of course, is highly improbable) then this approximation would become just an
application of Bellman’s principle of optimality [10].
The optimal estimation for the trajectory of states Xˆ∗(0 : τ) = {xˆ∗(0), . . . , xˆ∗(τ)} is
obtained solving the following minimization problem
Xˆ∗(0 : τ) = arg min
Xˆ(0:τ)
V τ (Xˆ(0 : τ)) (4.11)
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subject to (4.2) and taking Φ(x(0)) = ‖x(0)−m(0)‖2P−1(0). This problem is equivalent to the
Kalman filter [18] but it has a major drawback: the computational burden of (4.11) grows
with τ as more measurements become available. We use an approximate moving horizon
estimation approach to fix the computational cost. The estimation we make is Xˆ(τ − N :
τ) = {xˆ(τ −N), . . . , xˆ(τ)} and can be calculated solving the following QP problem:
Xˆ∗(τ −N : τ) = arg min
Xˆ(τ−N :τ)
V N (Xˆ(τ −N : τ)) (4.12)
subject to (4.2) and x(τ −N) = xˆ(τ −N).
Remark 13 Note that the state equation in (4.2) can be used to determine the noise trajec-
tory once the state trajectory has been calculated. This relationship can be used in the opposite
way so that the QP problem can also be solved minimizing with respect the noise trajectory
w(τ −N), .., w(τ − 1). Taking into account the duality between the control and estimation
problems, a possible interpretation for the minimization alternative is that the term wi(τ) is
used to control the estimation.
4.2 Dual decomposition
The goal of this chapter is to distribute the estimation problem between all the agents present
in the system. Under certain assumptions, in [28] dual decomposition was used to distribute
the optimization problem corresponding to a MPC controller between several agents. As the
problem of estimation is the dual of the control problem, and we have reduced the estimation
to the optimization of a cost function, the same methodology will be applied.
It can be seen in equation (4.1) that the outputs of the subsystems are coupled through
the states. The coupling term represents the effect of the rest of the subsystems in the
measurements of agent i. We will define di(τ) =
∑
i 6=j Cijxj(τ) to denote this effect. The
subsystem model can be rewritten as
xi(τ + 1) = Aiixi(τ) + wi(τ)
yi(τ) = Ciixi(τ)− di(τ) + vi(τ) (4.13)
subject to the constraint di(τ) = −
∑
i 6=j Cijxj(τ).
4.2. DUAL DECOMPOSITION 115
Dual decomposition can be used to distribute the centralized problem (4.12) between the
agents. The introduction of Lagrange multipliers pi in the cost function allows the distribution
of the cost function (4.9). First, we define the Lagrange extended cost function as
V N,p(Xˆ(τ −N : τ),D(τ −N : τ), P (τ −N : τ)) =
J∑
i=1
{
τ−1∑
k=τ−N
‖xˆi(k + 1)−Axˆi(k)‖2Q−1i (k)
+
τ∑
k=τ−N
‖−Ciixˆi(k) + yi(k) + di(k)‖2R−1i (k)
+
τ∑
k=τ−N
pTi (k)(di(k) +
∑
i 6=j Cij xˆj(k))}
(4.14)
where pi(τ) ∈ Rqi is the lagrange multiplier corresponding to the constraint induced by di(τ) ∈
R
qi , which is now a free variable. Their corresponding centralized vectors are respectively
p(τ) = [p1(τ) p2(τ) . . . pJ(τ)]
T ∈ Rq and d(τ) = [d1(τ) d2(τ) . . . dJ (τ)]T ∈ Rq. Finally, we
denote the sequences of these vectors in time as P (τ − N : τ) = {p(τ − N), . . . , p(τ)} and
D(τ −N : τ) = {d(τ −N), . . . , d(τ)}.
If we take Q−1i (τ) = 0 in 4.14 we can reduce the two summations to one. Then, if we
rearrange the lagrangian multipliers it is possible to rewrite the extended cost function as:
V N,p(Xˆ(τ −N : τ),D(τ −N : τ), P (τ −N : τ)) =
J∑
i=1
τ∑
k=τ−N
[‖xˆi(k + 1)−Axˆi(k)‖2Q−1i (k)
+ ‖−Ciixˆi(k) + yi(k) + di(k)‖2R−1i (k)
+pTi (k)di(k) + xˆi(k)
T
∑
i 6=j C
T
jipj(k)]
=
J∑
i=1
V N,pi (Xˆi(τ −N : τ),Di(τ −N : τ), P (τ −N : τ))
The quadratic problem can be distributed among the agents because the local extended
cost functions V N,pi (Xˆi(τ − N : τ),Di(τ − N : τ), P (τ − N : τ)) are decoupled. From a
centralized point of view the problem that is solved at each time sample is
max
P (τ−N :τ)
J∑
i=1
min
Xˆi(τ −N : τ ),
Di(τ −N : τ )
V N,pi

 Xˆi(τ −N : τ),Di(τ −N : τ),
P (τ −N : τ)


Remark 14 If we define the stage cost at the time sample k as
li(xˆi(k), di(k)) = ‖−Ciixˆi(k) + yi(k) + di(k)‖2R−1i (k) + ‖xˆi(k + 1)−Axˆi(k)‖
2
Q−1i (k)
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Then, the extended local cost function can be posed as
V N,pi (Xˆi(τ −N : τ), P (τ −N : τ)) =
τ∑
k=τ−N
[li(xˆi(k), di(k)) + p
T
i (k)di(k) + xˆi(k)
T
∑
i 6=j C
T
jipj(k)]
The local stage cost can also be extended to include the terms due to the lagrangian prices
lpi (xˆi(k), di(k), P (k)) = li(xˆi(k), di(k)) + p
T
i (k)di(k) + xˆi(k)
T
∑
i 6=j C
T
jipj(k), which allows to
write the extended local cost function as:
V N,pi (τ) =
τ∑
k=τ−N
lpi (xˆi(k), di(k), P (k)) (4.15)
Remark 15 After the introduction of dual variables, and assuming that the prices of the
neighbors are given, it is possible to interpret the distributed optimization procedure in eco-
nomic terms. Each agent behavior can be represented as a two player game. The first player
objective is to minimize the price-extended stage cost
τ∑
k=τ−N
lpi (xˆi(k), di(k), P (k)),
which is composed of three elements that are interpretable as
lpi (xˆi(k), di(k), P (k)) = li(xˆi(k), di(k))︸ ︷︷ ︸
local cost
+
neighbor help cost︷ ︸︸ ︷
pTi (k)di(k) + xˆi(k)
T
∑
i 6=j
CTjipj(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
incomes due to required help
.
The second player chooses the prices pi(τ −N), . . . , pi(τ) to maximize
pTi (k)(di(k) +
∑
i 6=j
Cij xˆj(k)).
This game is repeated iteratively. First, an estimate is calculated according to the given prices.
Then, the prices are updated and the cycle starts again. As a result of the repeated interaction
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of both players in each node the prices evolve until a maximum is reached. The consequence
of this standard Lagrangian optimization procedure is that the minimum for the cost function
(4.12) is attained and the constraints are satisfied when the price gradient is zero.
The algorithm that is followed by the agents in the system can be summarized as:
• Step 1: Each agent i estimates his own current state trajectory {xˆi(τ −N), xˆi(τ −N +
1), .., xˆi(τ)} solving the optimization problem given in (4.15) for a set of given prices
pi i = 0, . . . , J .
• Step 2: Once the state trajectory has been calculated then the prices of agent i are
updated by a gradient step as follows.
pk+1i (τ) = p
k
i (τ) + γ
k
i [di(τ) +
∑
i 6=j
Cijxˆj(k)] (4.16)
Convergence of such gradient algorithms has been proved under different type of as-
sumptions on the step size sequence γki . See for example [91]. Note that in order to
update the prices the agents must communicate.
• Step 3: If the precision obtained with the estimation is enough then there is no need to
continue iterating. In the next section precise conditions are given. If enough precision
is not attained and the number of iterations K exceeds a given threshold maxiter, then
the algorithm also stops. In other case then the process is repeated from step 1 for
K = K + 1.
4.2.1 Coordination alternatives for the price update
It can be seen that the calculation of the estimate xˆi(t) for t = τ − N, . . . , τ is completely
decentralized once that prices are given. Therefore it is mandatory for an agent to keep the
track of its neighbor prices. Nevertheless, in order to update the prices, coordination among
the agents is necessary. The agents send their estimates xˆi(τ) to their neighbors so that
equation (4.16) can be applied. For some systems it could be desirable not to share the state
information with their neighbors. To avoid the exchange of the state estimates we propose
two alternatives:
• Decentralized approach: The need for the shared information comes from term∑i 6=j Cij xˆj(k)
in equation equation (4.16). According to the dynamics of the subsystems
∑
j 6=i
Cijxi(τ) =
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yi(τ) − Ciixi(τ) − vi(τ), and thus it could be approximated by
∑
j 6=i
Cij xˆi(τ) ≈ yi(τ) −
Ciixˆi(τ).
• Market approach: This alternative consists on changing the way in which prices are
updated. To understand better this approach it is convenient to use the behavior
model that represents each agent as a two player game. Then, it is possible to think
on the centralized problem as a game with 2J players. The objective of the first player
in each node is to minimize his own cost according to the given prices. However, the
second player in each node bargains with the the rest of the second players to maximize
(4.15) with respect to the prices. The second players can be seen as market makers
that fix the prices of the help services that the agents provide each other according to
the offer and demand of such services. To do so, a gradient optimization of the cost
function (4.15) is implemented. Each update is based on the addition of contributions
of the different agents. The contribution of agent i is
∇pki (τ) =


xˆi(k)
TCT1ip1(k)
...
xˆi(k)
TCTi−1,ipi−1(k)
di(k)
xˆi(k)
TCTi+1,ipi+1(k)
...
xˆi(k)
TCTJipJ(k)


Theorem 6 The price update mechanism defined in the market approach provides the
same results than the one presented in equation (4.16).
Proof:
It is straight forward to check that both methods provide the same centralized price
vector. It is enough to sum the contribution ∇pki (τ) for all i
pk+1(τ) = pk(τ) + γ
∑
i
∇pki (τ).
Then it can be seen that the price for agent i is just
pk+1i (τ) = p
k
i (τ) + γ
k
i [di(τ) +
∑
i 6=j
Cijxˆj(k)]

If we move back to the agents and forget the game theory interpretation, it can be
seen that under the market approach agents update their prices and also the prices
of their neighbors and therefore there is no need to exchange the state estimate. All
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the public information needed are the prices and their updates. The estimation of the
agents through the different iterations bring increments or decrements in the prices
until equilibrium prices are reached. However, there is a price to pay in terms on the
amount of model information that agents have. With this price mechanism it is needed
that agent i has knowledge of the terms Cji. In other words, agents have knowledge of
the collateral effects they induce in their neighbors.
Remark 16 From an economic point of view, the situation can be interpreted as a
market of help services. The price pi(τ) is the unit price that agent i has to pay to his
neighbors for them to change their current contribution to his output. The fact that
neighbors of an agent i change their estimates affects to his price in such a way that it
reflects how costy is for his neighborhood to help him after the estimate update. On the
other hand helping his neighbors is rewarded in (4.15). Taking all of this into account,
agents are both service offerers and demanders. All of them behave selfishly according
to the prices fixed by the market, that is, the distributed price mechanism proposed in
this approach.
Remark 17 In welfare economics, under certain assumptions such as the absence of
externalities in transactions, it is proved that market prices guarantee that, despite of
agents selfish behavior, a Pareto optimum is achieved [97]. In the optimization problem
that we have, unfortunately we have to deal with the presence of externalities, taking
this term in a wide sense. That is, decisions taken by agent i also affect other agents. In
order to overcome this problem and still reach a Pareto optimum while keeping selfish,
i.e. decentralized, behavior in the agents, some modifications have to be introduced in
the market: first, all the agents behave as price takers as they were in a competitive
market when they really have power to modify the prices and, second, prices are updated
globally according to the proposed mechanism.
4.3 Examples
The problem of estimating the position of a moving object can be faced using different
approaches. For outdoor applications in which the precision requirements are low GPS es-
timation is the most used choice. Radar measurements help to improve the quality of the
estimation. When it comes to indoor applications the problem of localization is normally
solved by means of a sensor network. In cases in which low precision is needed some it may
be enough with a network of presence detectors. If more precision is required then more
sophisticated techniques have to be used. In the case that the application is executed in a
very controlled scenario, it is possible to use cameras to estimate the position. Infrared or
ultrasonic sensors also provide a greater accuracy than the presence detectors. In the last
120 Distributed Receding Horizon Kalman Filter
years the use of the link quality between wireless transceivers has been used too for this kind
of applications [49].
4.3.1 Application to mobile robot localization
This subsection is based on the simulation scenario proposed in [31].
Let us consider a system consisting a set of µ = {1, ..,M} reference nodes or beacons and
a set η = {1, .., J} of mobile devices. In this example we will consider M = 6 beacons and
J = 8 mobile devices, which are located in the positions depicted in figure 4.1.
The goal is to estimate the position of the moving devices. If the sample time is assumed
to be low enough, it is possible to simplify the dynamics considering that the devices move
at every sample time a bit with respect their position. The equations for each device are:
xi(τ + 1) = xi(τ) + ∆xi(τ) ∀i ∈ η = {1, .., J}
with xi(0) = x
0
i . The beacon position is fixed so that xi(K + 1) = xi(0) ∀i ∈ µ = {1, ..,M}.
The distance between the nodes and the mobile devices can be calculated using
d2ij = (xi − xj)T (xi − xj) ∀i, j ∈ η, µ.
The distance can be linearized around the steady state positions xi using a first order
Taylor approximation, which leads to
d2ij = d
2
ij + 2(xi − xj)T (xi − xj) + 2(xi − xj)T (xi − xj)
with d
2
ij = d
2
ij(xi, xj). Now, system variables can be introduced for all the mobile devices
such that:
xi(τ) = xi(τ)− xi ∀i ∈ η
yji(τ) = d
2
ij − d
2
ij ∀i ∈ η,∀j ∈ η, µ
Cji = 2(xi − xj) ∀i ∈ η,∀j ∈ η, µ.
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Figure 4.1: Initial situation of the devices.
Each moving device’s output provides information about the distance with respect the other
moving devices and the beacons. If white gaussian additive noise is assumed in the state and
output then each device can be modeled according to equation (4.1).
In order to make the situation more realistic it is assumed that only devices and beacons
within a range can communicate. Thus a communication radius ρ is defined. In general two
devices i and j can communicate if dij < ρ. A communication graph can be defined to reflect
which devices can communicate at each sample time. The communication graph at initial
time is given by the following matrices:
Aη0 =


1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1


, Aµ0 =


1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1


where Aη0(i, j) = 1 if the mobile device i is able to communicate with the mobile device j and
Aµ0 (i, j) = 1 if the mobile robot i is able to communicate with the beacon j.
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The simulations have been done considering a dynamic graph, that is, a situation where
the movement of the devices is big enough to guarantee that the communication graph changes
with the relinearization of the system. At each time in which the system is relinearized it is
necessary not only to update the equations but the information about the last samples that
is kept in the agents. Let us assume that in time τ there is a change of linearization point of
the system. Then,
xi(t) = x¯i(t) + xi(t)− x¯i(τ) ∀t ∈ [τ −N, τ ]
yi(t) = Ci(τ)xˆi(t) ∀t ∈ [τ −N, τ ]
This change of coordinates in the state estimates and the outputs allow to compute the
distributed problem without suffering estimation disturbances after the change of linearization
point.
The system has been simulated for 40 time samples with a state noise stronger than the
original one. The first 10 samples a centralized Kalman filter is working and the second 20 the
distributed strategy. In t = 20 and t = 30 the system is relinearized. The window size used
for the estimation was 4. In blue it is depicted the real trajectory and in red the estimation.
The results for the estimation of the position of the mobile devices can be seen in figure 4.2.
The overall picture is shown in figure 4.3. The quality of the estimation depends on several
parameters. For example, the more iterations are made the better the estimation gets. In
this figure it can be seen that the estimation is very precise for most agents.
4.3.2 Application to traffic and speed control
Imagine a scenario where there are reference nodes in roads and streets, and cars are equipped
with wireless transceivers. Each car could estimate its position using the link quality indicator
from the packets in the reference nodes and other cars as an indicator of the distance. In
such set up it is possible to imagine many useful applications that benefit from the algorithm
presented in this chapter. Some ideas to take advantage of the position estimation would be
to use the information as a way to monitor and control the traffic, or to check if the cars are
moving without exceeding the speed limits, or, for example, for cars with free parking places
around there to communicate it to the network, reducing search time for neighbors. The
price to pay to fully enjoy this possibilities would be a loss of privacy because the network
would be aware of the position of all the cars in this hypothetic scenario. An alternative
could be to hide the identity of the cars so that applications such as traffic control could be
maintained.
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Figure 4.2: Robots’ state evolution with noise model mismatch.
In figures 4.5 and 4.4 it can be seen a very simple simulation of what would happen if
the mobile robots of the previous subsection scenario would behave as cars going left or right
as in a normal road. It is assumed that once a robot has been located it is only necessary
to estimate its x component. For this simulation the window size was fixed to 3 and the
communication radius to 5. The average number of iterations to reach a 95% of accuracy
was 6.27.
4.4 Conclusions
A distributed version of the Kalman filter based on dynamic programming has been devel-
oped. The use of dual decomposition allowed the problem distribution. In the simulations
presented promising results of the future applications of these techniques are shown.
The different coordination alternatives for the price update that have been presented are
also remarkable. In particular, the market approach allows to use dual decomposition without
revealing the state of the subsystems. This feature may be interesting in control applications
in which dual decomposition is used as well. It will be important for future work some kind of
suboptimality bounds to determine the precision obtained in the estimation after a number of
iterations. Practical experiments will be developed too to see how the distributed estimation
works in real application.
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Figure 4.3: Robots’ trajectories with noise model mismatch.
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Chapter 5
Applications of Cooperative Game
Theory to the Control and
Estimation of Distributed Systems
In the previous chapters we have presented distributed control and estimation schemes in
which the division of the system into different subsystems was assumed to be fixed ”a priori”.
In a distributed system, the network configuration imposes constraints on the way agents
communicate. However, it is not required that all the agents connected by the network
communicate all the time. In fact, broadcast algorithms are avoided if possible. In some
cases, it may be better for the agents to separate themselves into different coalitions. In this
sense, an interesting topic that is rarely considered in the literature is the evolution of the
couplings with time. Decentralized and distributed control schemes often assume that the
centralized system is partitioned into a fixed set of low coupled neighborhoods. While the
coupling inside a neighborhood is high and demands a coordinated actuation of all its agents,
coordination between coalitions is not a major issue. In general, the composition of these
neighborhoods is assumed static, that is, the possibility of time varying neighborhoods is not
considered. In addition, there are other interesting questions that are not usually addressed
such as which elements of a given distributed control system are more critical. Motivated
by these issues, in this chapter we focus on distributed systems in which the agents switch
between different communication strategies that define which network links are used and we
study the underlying properties of a given distributed control scheme using tools from game
theory. From a mathematical point of view, game theory is an appropriate framework to
study all the phenomena that arise from the mutual interaction of agents that take their
decisions alone or in cooperation; see [9, 66].
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In particular, we focus on the following three different problems:
• Given a communication network, do all the links have to be enabled all the time?
Assuming that there exists a cost for using the communication links, probably at some
point it will be preferable to let those agents whose respective subsystems are not highly
coupled to work in a decentralized manner. As the coupling effects changes, so does
the composition of the neighborhoods.
• Do all the links and the agents have the same relevance in a networked control system?
Even when redundancy is one of the major advantages of distributed systems, the
consequences of a failure change depending on the link or local controller that fails. It
is interesting to determine what agents and links are more relevant in order to take
preventive actions if needed. In this way, it would be possible to guarantee a better
performance of the overall system in the case of a failure.
• When several agents cooperate to reach a certain objective, do they have to share
equally the costs or benefits of the cooperation? This question makes sense specially
when the control performance has a direct economical impact. For example, one could
think of a power network in which several companies cooperate to provide a service
to the final customer. Unless all agents contribute equally, it is not fair to distribute
equally the economical benefits of the cooperation.
In this chapter, we study in first place a distributed control scheme in which a set of
agents can communicate through a network in order to regulate to the origin a set of uncon-
strained linear systems by switching between different linear control laws depending on the
available information. In second place, it will be seen how to apply these techniques to a state
estimation problem. In this context, the application of state estimation schemes to problems
in which the state represents the position of an object is very attractive. The localization of
moving entities, such as robots or people, is important for many applications. Ideally, there
would not be costs or constraints attained to communications. Unfortunately this assumption
does not hold in real systems and a trade-off between precision and communicational burden
has to be obtained. For this reason, the example chosen to illustrate the concepts that are
presented in this chapter is an application in which a set of moving devices try to self localize
their own positions.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, some grounds of cooperative game theory are
provided. Next, the class of distributed control problems considered is introduced. In the
next section example is given to illustrate the results presented in the chapter. Section IV
presents the estimation problem and section V presents the estimation simulation example.
Finally, in section VI the conclusions of the chapter are shown.
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Part of this chapter has been submitted for publication in [56] and it has been presented
in [48].
5.1 Cooperative games
In the first chapter of the thesis we introduced some basic concepts of cooperative game
theory. In this section we will introduce formally the concepts that will be used in this
chapter.
A cooperative game is defined only with two elements, a set N = {1, 2, .., n} of different
players and a function v that assigns a value to each of the 2N possible coalitions S of agents.
In this point we have to remark that v(S) represents the cost to reach the common goal
without the assistance of the agents that are not present in the coalition. This definition of
cooperative game can be complemented taking into account both the network and the cost
associated to the use of the different links. Mathematically a network is defined as a graph
(N,L), where L is the set of edges L ⊆ LN = {{i, j}|{i, j} ⊆ N, i 6= j}. Note that this implies
that ij and ji represent the same link. The necessary and sufficient condition for any two
agents to communicate, and hence cooperate, is that they are at least indirectly connected
by the network, that is, there exists a path of active links that connect them. In addition, a
cooperative game can also take into account the costs of communication. Therefore, it can be
considered that the existence of each link has a fixed cost c > 0. With all these ingredients,
we can define a cost-extended communication situation H as the tuple (N, v, L, c).
Therefore, the set of players may be partitioned into different coalitions S. It is important
to notice that not all the agents in a given coalition S have to be connected by the network
L, that is, only those agents in S that are at least indirectly connected will be able to
communicate. This fact may cause the partition of the set S into different subsets of agents
C that will be called communication components. We will denote by S/L the set of all
communication components in a coalition S and by L(S) the links used by that coalition.
Note that these concepts can also be applied to the grand coalition N ; that is, the coalition
composed of all the agents in the game.
As it can be seen, the definition of a game requires to provide a value for each of the
2N possible coalitions of players. Undoubtedly, this is too much information for any analyt-
ical purpose. Thus, it is interesting to have a mathematical tool which provides individual
outcomes of the game, that is, a payoff vector that specifies the benefit or cost that each
player may reasonably expect from the game. Mathematically, a payoff or allocation vector
is defined as o = (oi)i∈N ∈ RN and specifies for each player i the profit or cost oi when he
cooperates with other players. This is just the role of allocation rules, which are designed to
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provide a payoff vector as the expected solution of the cooperative game. However, given a
game there are several possible rules to determine a payoff vector as a solution. In this thesis
it will be used the Shapley value , which is the only allocation rule γ(N, v) that verifies the
following properties [66]:
• Efficiency: that is, the payoffs of the players add exactly v(N).
v(N) =
∑
i∈N
γi(N, v).
In terms of control theory this can be interpreted as a way to distribute the cost of the
centralized system between the agents.
• Additivity: let γ(N, v) and γ(N,w) be two coalitional games, this property implies that
γ(N, v + w) = γ(N, v) + γ(N,w).
From the point of view of control theory this is equivalent to have a set of players
cooperating in two different goals. The gains from cooperation in one area would be
γ(N, v) and in the other γ(N,w). The result from cooperation in both areas would be
described by the game γ(N, v + w).
• Symmetry: player that contribute in the same quantity to a given coalition receive the
same payoff, that is,
γi(N, v) = γj(N, v)↔ v(S
⋃
i) = v(S
⋃
j) ∀S.
• Passive-player property: a player that do not contribute marginally to the value of any
coalition must not receive anything extra from cooperation, that is:
γi(N, v) = v(i)↔ v(S
⋃
i) = v(S) + v(i) ∀S.
The Shapley value can be interpreted as the payoff vector that gives to each player his
expected marginal contribution to a random coalition. The Shapley value for the agent game
defined by (N,wH) is called the Myerson value of the game. In the case of the link game
(L, rH) the Shapley value offers information about the cost of each of the links and it can
also be used to construct the so called position value of the game, which is a payoff vector
that assigns to each of the agents a value consisting in the sum of half the value the links
that are incident to him.
The combination of the Shapley value and cost-extended communication situations will
allow us to study several inherent properties of the agents and the network. To this end, we
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consider two different games based on the same elements. First, we consider a game (N,wH)
defined by characteristic function wH(S) which assigns to each coalition the following cost
wH(S) =
∑
C∈S/L
v(C) + c|L(S)|, ∀S ⊆ N, (5.1)
where |L(S)| is the number of links that are used in the coalition and c is the link cost. We
denote this game as the “agent game”. Note that according to (5.1) the value of a coalition S
is the sum of the values of its members separated into their corresponding communication
components. The analysis of the coalitions in a cost-extended network game provides infor-
mation about which are the most valuable agents for the system.
The second game considered was proposed by Borm [75] and consists on changing the
focus to links instead of agents. The gains or costs from cooperation are attributed to
communication links, which lead us to define a cost-extended “link game” as a tuple (L, rH)
associated to the cost-extended communication situation H. The characteristic function for
this game is defined as
rH(A) =
∑
C∈N/A
v(C) + c|L(A)|, ∀A ⊆ L, (5.2)
which is defined for all the possible subsets A of links contained in the original network L.
Note that, in the characteristic function of the link game defined by equation (5.2), the grand
coalition is divided into its communication components and therefore its value is the sum of
the values of the corresponding components and the cost of the links that are employed for
the communication defined by the set A. The analysis of all the coalitions of links provides
information about the relevance of each link and show which network configuration is better
at a given time instant.
These two games are useful to evaluate two different and important aspects of a distributed
system: which agents and links are more relevant at a given time and state. Note that despite
the solutions in cooperative games are focused in the obtention of payoff vectors to estimate
the distribution of costs or benefits between the players, in this thesis it will be shown that
it is possible to use these values as tools for the analysis of relevance of the agents and the
links in a distributed control problem.
In the following sections we will show how a distributed system can be characterized by a
cost-extended communication situation H. The relation is not straight forward, though. The
main difficulty comes from how to define the characteristic function. This function is defined
for each possible coalition S in the coalitional game and its calculation requires to determine
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the cost that would suppose for the agents in S achieve the goal without the cooperation of
the agents out of S for a given communication architecture L.
5.2 Distributed control problem formulation
In this chapter an application of coalitional games to distributed control is proposed. The
main objective of the proposed approach is to provide an a priori analysis of the best possible
use of the communication network at each sampling time assuming that the use of each link
has a cost. In addition, a qualitative interpretation of the results is given so that it can be
determined which agents need most to communicate and which links are more important for
a given distributed scheme.
We consider a linear system divided in i = 1, . . . , N subsystems defined by the following
model
xi(t+ 1) = Aiixi(t) +Biiui(t) + di(t),
di(t) =
∑
j 6=iAijxj(t) +
∑
j 6=iBijuj(t),
(5.3)
where xi ∈ Rqi and ui ∈ Rri with i = 1, . . . , N1 are the states and inputs of each subsystem
respectively. The variable di(t) is the influence of the neighbors’ states and inputs in the
update of xi. Each agent i has access only to its state xi and decides at each sample time
the value of its corresponding input ui.
We assume that there exists a network L which allows the agents to exchange information.
The type of information exchanged depends on the distributed control algorithm that is being
used. Any two agents that are not indirectly connected by the network will not be able to
exchange any type of information.
The control objective is to regulate the state of all the subsystems to the origin while
minimizing a cost which depends on the state and input trajectories and on the communica-
tions. This cost will be used to define the characteristic function of a cooperative game. The
stage cost of each agent is defined as follows
ℓi(t) = x
T
i (t)Qixi(t) + u
T
i (t)Riui(t).
The objective is to minimize the total cumulated cost taking into account the commu-
nication costs defined in the previous section. In some applications the stage cost can be
interpreted in economic terms.
1In this chapter, the letter N stands for the number of players in the game, not the horizon used in the
MPC schemes.
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The communication costs depend on the number of links that are being used. Note
that given an initial network L not all the links have to be used all the time. The term
network mode will be used to denote each of the possible subset of links A in L. The change
of performance for the control system will be analyzed for the case in which some of the
links were not present. The analysis of the cost trade-off between control performance and
communicational costs will determine which is the best network mode A at state x.
Remark: The value of the cost of the use of a communication link during a sample time
has to be determined ad hoc. For example, in a wireless network this value can be function
of the inverse of the remaining battery of the nodes that support the link. In case that the
characteristic function of the games can be interpreted in economic terms then it could be
calculated the actual cost of transmissions through the link. In general, a simple way to
provide a value is to assign is to average the cost impact between enabling or disabling the
link in the system or just to set a bound on cost improvement for the link to be enabled.
Remark: In systems where the number of agents is too big the calculations can be simpli-
fied assuming that w(U
⋃
V ) = w(U)+w(V ), that is, the value of the coalition of the players
in the set U
⋃
V is equal to the sum values of U and V . This approximation is much better
when U and V are in different communication components.
Remark: Note that initially the characteristic function for a game defined from a dis-
tributed control problem should be subadditive, that is w(S) + w(T ) ≤ w(S⋃T ), that is,
the control performance gets better as there are more agents involved. However there is a
hidden implication in the last property: communication is costless. Theoretically the last
statement can be a good starting point to develop some results, but in practice this results
to be a fallacy.
5.2.1 Distributed control algorithm
In this section we present a distributed control scheme that at each sampling time, implements
a certain communication strategy defined by a network mode A. The communication strategy
A is chosen every D sample times. To this end, the agents must broadcast their state and
take a decision about the communication strategy that will be used in the next D time steps.
This leads to a double sample rate control system. As a result of this policy, the agents are
separated into separated groups C that are able to communicate defined as communication
components. We will denote by N/A the set of all communication components in which the
set N is partitioned. Note that
⋃
∀i∈N/A
Ci = N and Ci
⋂
Cj = 0 for all i 6= j.
We assume that for each network mode A, a different controller that stabilizes the whole
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system which takes into account which agents can communicate is defined. The details about
the calculation of the controller will be presented later in this section. In particular, we
assume that each communication component C ⊆ N/A implements a linear controller
uC = K
A
CxC ,
where uC ∈ R
∑
i∈C ri is the input of a given communication component defined as uC =
{ui}i∈C , xC ∈ R
∑
i∈C qi is the the state of a given communication component defined as xC =
{xi}i∈C andKAC is the matrix which defines the controller implemented by the communication
component for the network mode A.
From the set of the matrices KAC , the following centralized linear controller for the overall
system, characterized by the absence of communication for agents in different communication
components can be obtained
u = KAx
where u ∈ R
∑
i∈N ri is the input of the centralized system defined as u = {ui}i∈N , x ∈ R
∑
i∈N qi
is the the state of the centralized system defined as x = {xi}i∈N and KA is the matrix which
defines the centralized controller implemented for the network mode A.
Note that matrix KA takes into account the communications constraints in A. For ex-
ample, if the i-th element of u and the j-th element of x belong to different communication
components, then KA(i, j) = 0; that is, the i-th input does not depend on the j-th state. For
the particular case in which each communication component is composed by systems with
consecutive numeration in the set N , then KA = diag(K
A
C1
,KAC2 , . . .). Note that all the ma-
trices KAC have to be designed so that KA guarantees closed-loop stability for the centralized
system. If a given mode is not able to stabilize the system, then it is not taken into account.
In order to decide which communication strategy must be implemented, we assume that
there exists a quadratic function that satisfies
xTPAx ≥
∑
j∈N
∑
k=0,..,∞
ℓj(k) (5.4)
that is, PA is a weight matrix that provides an upper bound of the cost to infinity of the
centralized system in closed-loop with the controller u(k) = KAx(k) starting from the initial
state x(0) = x. This quadratic function will be used so decide the optimal communication
mode as well as to define the link problem.
Summing up, the proposed distributed control scheme is implemented as follows:
1. If the sample time is a multiple of D, all the agents broadcast their state and calculate
which is the network mode A that minimizes the function rH(A, x). Otherwise, each
agent sends his state only to those agents that belong to his communication component.
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2. Each agent uses the state information received in order to update its control action
using its corresponding communication component feedback matrix KCA . Globally, this
implies that the linear controller u = KAx is applied.
Remark: It is possible to establish more sophisticated assumptions about the system.
However, it has been preferred to simplify the system as much as possible in order to focus
on the three mentioned problems. The definitions done are enough to identify both the agent
and link games and to solve the decision problem of what agents should communicate at each
sample time.
Remark: The ideas presented in this chapter can also be applied to different distributed
control strategies (such as distributed MPC schemes) or to more complex systems (such as
non-linear systems). In that case, an appropriate definition of the utility function has to be
provided. We propose to use a bound of the cost-to-go of the different modes, but other
approaches are also possible.
5.2.2 Network modes
In order to analyze which agents should communicate, the link game associated to the cost-
extended communication situation H of the current state x is studied. The characteristic
function that assigns a value to each communication mode A is based on the upper bound
of the cost-to-go of all the communication components in the network and the corresponding
communication costs and is defined as
rH(A, x) = xTPAx+ c|L(A)|, ∀A ⊆ L.
The best possible communication mode provides the winner network configuration choice.
This mode is obtained for a given state x by minimizing rH(A, x) over A. The function
rH(A, x) will be also used to define the link game.
We introduce next the concept of dominance between modes. The mode A dominates
the mode B if rH(A, x) < rH(B,x). In general, we say that mode i is dominant if the last
inequality holds ∀B 6= A ⊆ L. Therefore, the set of points CRA for which a network mode A
is dominant is characterized by the states such that A provides the best (lower) cost, that is,
CRA = {x ∈ R|rH(A, x) ≤ rH(B,x),∀B ⊆ L}.
The union of all these regions covers the whole state space. The distributed controller will
switch between the different modes as the state moves from one region to another. In order
to check online which is the optimal network mode for the particular distributed control
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scheme presented, it is sufficient to evaluate the quadratic functions which define the cost
of each mode. Note that in general, the regions associated to the network modes are non
convex. For more complex cases it may not be possible to calculate a explicit characteristic
function rH(A, x) for each network mode and the application of techniques might be neces-
sary to find off-line the regions of each of the modes in order to check the optimal mode.
Suboptimal approaches based on exhaustive simulation of all the possible network modes can
be used to find these regions of dominance. For the distributed control scheme considered,
the boundaries of the regions are defined by quadratics which depend on the different weight
matrices PA and number of links |L(A)| which define each mode. In particular, it is possible
to calculate explicit frontiers. To do so, let Ji = x
TPix+ ci and Jj = x
TPjx+ cj be the costs
for network modes i and j respectively. Mode i is chosen if Ji < Jj and viceversa. Thus, the
frontier between the regions of dominance of networks modes i and j is given by the following
equation:
Ji = Jj
xTPix+ ci = x
TPjx+ cj
xT (Pi − Pj)x+ ci − cj = 0
(5.5)
The shape of the bound will depend on the matrix Pi − Pj, which in general does not have
to be positive definite.
5.2.3 Link analysis
The link game is constructed by a set of players composed by the links of the network L
and a characteristic function that assigns to each communication mode A an given utility.
In this case, we propose to use rH(A, x) to define the link game. Once the link game is
constructed, a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the relevance of the links in the game
may be obtained from the corresponding Shapley value γ(L, rH , x). Each component of this
vector represents the cost of a given link for the system. In other words, the lower value a
link has, the higher utility it has for the system.
5.2.4 Agent analysis
A qualitative and quantitative analysis of the relevance of the agents of the system may be
obtained from the Shapley value γ(N,wH , x) of the corresponding agent game. To build
such game it is necessary to define the characteristic function that assigns a value to each
coalition S of agents for a given network L. To this end, it is not possible to use the
controllers defined for each communication component for a given network mode A because
those controllers take into account the particular communication constraints of A. For this
reason, for each communication component of L, we define a controller KC and a weight
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matrix PC such that
xTCPCxC ≥
∑
j∈C
∑
k=0,..,∞
ℓj(k) (5.6)
where xc is obtained from the current state x and is composed of the states of all the subsys-
tems that belong to C; PC is a weight matrix that provides an upper bound for the cost to
infinity of the systems that belong to C in closed-loop with the controller uC(k) = KCxC(k)
starting from the initial state xC(0) = xC assuming that all the inputs and states that belong
to agents outside the coalition are zero.
Then, the characteristic function of the agent game that defines the utility of a coalition
S is defined as
wH(S, x) =
∑
C∈S/L
xTCPCxC + c|L(S)|, ∀S ⊆ N.
The Shapley value of the game (N, vH , x) provides concise information about the relevance
of all the agents in the game. The lower the value the is, the more relevant role the agent
has in the game. It is important to stand out that the Shapley value of the agent game, as
it is defined, does not have any physical meaning.
Remark : This assumption allows only to calculate a simple approximation of the Shapley
value of the agent game. More conservative choices could have been made, for example the
agents outside of the coalition could have been considered as disturbances and then a min-
max approach used. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the goal of all the agents is to
regulate the system to the origin. Moreover, with the design method presented in the next
subsection it is possible to calculate feedback gains such that the coalitions C and N − C
are able to stabilize the overall system. For this reason, we consider the approximation made
appropriate.
5.2.5 Coalitional game design method
In this section we present a method to design for a given system (5.3) all the matrices that
define the controllers and the weights of the upper bound functions for each of the networks
modes (KA and PA for all A ⊆ L) as well as each of the possible communication components
of the agent problem (KC and PC for all C ⊆ N/L). To this end, we present two different
theorems.
First, we deal with the problem of finding the matrices that define the controllers and the
weights of the upper bound functions for both each of the possible communication components
of the agent problem (KC and PC for all C ⊆ N/L). In this case, KC must stabilize the
states of C assuming that the outputs and inputs that do not belong to that communication
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component are zero. In addition, PC must guarantee that (5.16) holds. The following theorem
presents an LMI constraint that can be used to solve this design problem.
Theorem 7 Let C ∈ S/L be a set of independent communication components for a given
communication situation H whose dynamics are given by AC = {Aij}, ∀i, j ∈ C and BC =
{Bij}, ∀i, j ∈ C and its stage cost defined by QC = diag(Qi) and RC = diag(Ri), ∀i ∈ C. If
there exist matrices WC and YC such that the following constraint is satisfied


WC WCA
T
C + Y
T
C B
T
C WCQ
1/2
C Y
T
C R
1/2
C
ACW +BCY WC 0 0
Q
1/2
C WC 0 I 0
R
1/2
C YC 0 0 I

 > 0 (5.7)
then matrices PC = W
−1
C and KC = YCW
−1
C satisfy (5.16) and stabilize the states of C
assuming that the outputs that do not belong to that communication component are zero.
Proof: Applying iteratively backwards Schur’s complement to equation (5.7) and taking
into account the proposed variable change, it can be seen that if (5.7) holds then the following
constraint can be obtained
(AC +BCKC)
TPC(AC +BCKC)− PC +QC +KTCRCKC ≤ 0 (5.8)
This constraint guarantees that the system defined by matrices AC , BC is stable in closed-
loop with a the linear controller defined by KC . In addition, pre and post multiplying (5.8)
by xC(k) we obtain the following inequality
xC(k + 1)
TPCxC(k + 1)− xC(k)PCxC(k) +
∑
j∈C
Lj(k) ≤ 0
Summing the previous inequality from k = 0 to k =∞ and assuming that limk→∞ xC(k) = 0
(recall that the closed-loop system is stable) we obtain that
xC(0)PCxC(0) ≥
∞∑
k=0
∑
j∈C
Lj(k).

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In the agent game the approximation of the cost of the communication component C is
based on the cost to infinity given by the xTCPCxC . This upper bound is calculated assuming
that the rest of the agents states and inputs are zero. The agent game only provides grounds
for distributing the benefits or costs between the agents during the game and the resulting
feedback gains are never used to control the system, so it is not necessary to impose centralized
stability as a requirement.
The link game is based on a different point of view of the communication situation.
In this case the grand coalition controls the system taking into account all the possible
network configurations A ⊆ L. Each network configuration A divides the system in a set of
communication components C ∈ N/A. In this case the stability of the centralized system
has to be guaranteed because these linear feedback will be applied to control the system..
Following the same approach as in the agent game, the following theorem is presented.
Theorem 8 Let A ∈ L be a set of active links for a given communication situation H. The
dynamics of the whole system are given by AN = {Aij}, ∀i, j ∈ N and BN = {Bij}, ∀i, j ∈ N
and its stage cost defined by QN = diag(Qi) and RN = diag(Ri), ∀i ∈ N . If there exist
matrices WN = {Wij}, ∀i, j ∈ N , where Wi,j ∈ Rqi×qj , and YN = {Yij}, ∀i, j ∈ N , where
Yi,j ∈ Rri×qj , such that the following constraints are satisfied


WN WNA
T
N + Y
T
N B
T
N WNQ
1/2
N Y
T
N R
1/2
N
ANWN +BNYN WN 0 0
Q
1/2
N WN 0 I 0
R
1/2
N YN 0 0 I

 > 0 (5.9a)
s.t.
Wij = 0, Yij = 0 ∀i, j such that xi ∈ C, xj /∈ C (5.9b)
then matrices PA =W
−1
N and KA = YNW
−1
N satisfy (5.4), all the communication constraints
imposed by the network mode A and stabilize the whole system.
Proof: The proof follows the same reasoning as the proof of Theorem 9. In this case
the LMI constraint (5.9b) and the proposed variable change guarantee that the following
inequality holds
(AN +BNKA)
TP (AN +BNKA)− PA +QN +KTARNKA ≤ 0. (5.10)
Stability and (5.4) follow.
The constraints imposed to the LMI guarantee thatKA and PA satisfy the communication
restrictions of network mode A. Let PA and KA be descomposed in blocks analogously to
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WN and YN , that is PA = {PAij }, where PAij ∈ Rqi×qj , and KA = {KAij}, where KAi,j ∈ Rri×qj .
Without loss of generality let us assume that all the states of the subsystems that belong to
a same communication component have been grouped, that is, PA can be written as a block
diagonal matrix PA = diag(PC ) ∀C ∈ N/A, where PC = {PAij } such that i, j ∈ C ∈ N/A.
Given that the inverse of a block diagonal matrix another block diagonal matrix in which
the original blocks are inverted, that is WN = P
−1
A = diag(P
−1
C ), it can be concluded that
Wij = 0 ∀i, j such that xi ∈ C ∈ N/A, xj /∈ C ∈ N/A implies that PAij = 0 ∀i, j such
that xi ∈ C ∈ N/A, xj /∈ C ∈ N/A. Reordering the states in communication components
also allows to write KA as a block diagonal matrix KA = diag(KC ) ∀C ∈ N/A, where
KC = {KAij} such that i, j ∈ C ∈ N/A. As KC and PC are dimensioned for the same
state xC then YN = KAWN = diag(KCP
−1
C ) ∀C ∈ N/A. Thus, the fact that Yij = 0∀i, j
such that ui ∈ C ∈ N/A, xj /∈ C ∈ N/A is equivalent to make Kij = 0∀i, j such that
ui ∈ C ∈ N/A, xj /∈ C ∈ N/A. 
Remark: This theorem can be used also to provide a cost approximation for the agent
game following a coherent criterium for all the agents that are not in communication compo-
nent C. For example, the matrices PC could be calculated assuming that all agents outside
C work in a decentralized manner.
5.3 Distributed control simulation results
In this section we show an academic example that illustrates the concepts and techniques
presented in the chapter. The distributed system considered in the example is shown in figure
5.1. It consists of four agents, represented by boxes, which are coupled by pairs (the coupling
interactions are represented by arrows). For example, agent 1 disturbs agents 2 and 3 and is
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Figure 5.1: Four systems coupled through the inputs.
also disturbed by these two agents. The matrices that define the system are the following:
A11 =
[
1 0.8
0 0.7
]
B11 =
[
0
1
]
B12 =
[
0
0.15
]
B13 =
[
0
0.15
]
A22 =
[
1 0.6
0 0.7
]
B21 =
[
0
0.15
]
B22 =
[
0
1
]
B24 =
[
0
0.15
]
A33 =
[
1 0.9
0 0.8
]
B31 =
[
0
0.15
]
B33 =
[
0
1
]
B34 =
[
0
0.15
]
A44 =
[
1 0.8
0 0.5
]
B42 =
[
0
0.15
]
B43 =
[
0
0.15
]
B44 =
[
0
1
]
Aij =
[
0 0
0 0
]
∀i 6= j
(5.11)
where xi ∈ R2 with i ∈ {1, .., 4} are the states of each subsystem and ui ∈ R with i ∈ {1, .., 4}
are the corresponding inputs. The stage costs ℓi of all the subsystems are defined by matrices
Qi = diag(1, 1), Ri = 1 with i = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
In order to implement the proposed control scheme, matrices KA and PA have to be
designed for each of the possible modes. Figure 5.2 shows the set of network modes for which
each link is enabled. The number of possible modes is 16 and they have been numbered from
0 to 15. For example, in mode 0 no link is enabled while in mode 5 links I and II are enabled.
Modes 11 to 15 have been omitted in the figure and only appear in the legend. These
modes constitute all the cases where the grand coalition is formed, that is, there are at least 3
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links enabled which allows the agents to have full state information. All these five cases have
been grouped in mode number 11 and are considered as a single mode for the purposes of
this example. Although there are some differences that deserve to be remarked. First, mode
number fifteen has an unnecessary link since only 3 links are needed for full communication
between the agents. For this reason the control system would never put this mode into
play, which is a logical consequence of the fact that only indirect connectivity between nodes
is required. Another important issue is that although modes from 11 to 14 may have the
same cost associated, they are not equally preferable. Using the techniques presented in this
chapter, it is possible to provide an order of preference between all these modes because not
all individual links are equally relevant for the system.
For each mode, a different LMI problem designed according to Theorem 10 have been
solved to obtain the corresponding matrices KA and PA using Matlab’s LMI toolbox. For
example, for mode 4, which corresponds to the case in which agents 1 and 3 communicate
and coordinate their actions. The resulting matrices are:
KT4 =


−0.25 0.00 0.02 0.00
−0.53 0.00 0.06 0.00
0.00 −0.26 0.00 0.00
0.00 −0.45 0.00 0.00
0.01 0.00 −0.23 0.00
0.05 0.00 −0.63 0.00
0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.27
0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.43


P4 =


4.56 5 0 0 −0.36 −1.1 0 0
5 9.61 0 0 −0.8 −2.48 0 0
0 0 5.48 5.14 0 0 0 0
0 0 5.14 8.34 0 0 0 0
−0.36 −0.8 0 0 4.17 5.08 0 0
−1.1 −2.48 0 0 5.08 11.69 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.37 5.44
0 0 0 0 0 0 5.44 8.40


It can be seen that KA satisfies the communication constraints of mode 4.
Once the matrices PA that define the upper-bound on the different cost-to-go values are
obtained, it is possible to determine the optimal network mode for a given state. In addition,
it is possible to partition the state space in regions associated to different modes. In order
to visualize the boundaries of these sets, we restrict our attention to changes in the state x1
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Figure 5.2: Links enabled in each mode.
while the rest of subsystems states are set at the origin. The communication cost is set to
c = 0.5. In figures 5.3 and 5.4 it can be seen how for values of x1 far from the origin it is
better to apply a centralized mode. The cooperation of all the agents is needed to regulate
x1 to the origin. As state x1 gets closer to the origin, the recommended mode is number 7,
which means that cooperation of agents 1,2 and 3 is recommended. When x1 gets closer then
mode number 4 is applied; only agents 1 and 3 have to cooperate. Finally, as x1 is around
the origin mode 0 is used, that is, all agents can work in a decentralized manner. Finally,
in figure 5.5 we restrict our attention to the frontier between network modes 0 and 4 as a
function of x1, which is a ellipse.
Using the matrices PA, the link game can be constructed for a given state x in order to
analyze which links are more relevant. The set of players for this game is defined by the links
enumerated by roman letters in figure 5.1. Note that a coalition of links imply a different
network configuration mode A, which is equivalent to consider that some of the links in the
original network L are disabled. The characteristic function for each of the possible players
of the link game for the state
x1 =
[
4
3.6
]
x2 =
[
2.1
−3
]
x3 =
[
0.4
0.8
]
x4 =
[
0
0
]
, (5.12)
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Figure 5.3: Modes as a function of x1 for x2 = x3 = x4 = 0.
is the following
v(I) = 440.84
v(II) = 437.61
v(III) = 439.24
v(IV ) = 364.54
v(I, II) = 402.93
v(I, III) = 439.74
v(I, IV ) = 358.35
v(II, III) = 430.53
v(II, IV ) = 361.81
v(III, IV ) = 365.95
v(I, II, III) = 354.01
v(I, II, IV ) = 354.01
v(I, III, IV ) = 354.01
v(II, III, IV ) = 354.01
v(I, II, III, IV ) = 354.51
These values show that the optimal network mode A for this state is any of the four composed
by three links. It is important to note that 3 links are enough to guarantee communication
between all the agents because the only condition for communication between to agents is
that they must be at least indirectly connected. For this reason all the coalitions with 3 links
enabled have the same value. The Shapley value for this game is
γ(L, rH , x) =
[
98.94 96.91 104.28 54.36
]
.
This payoff vector guarantees that the players (links) are the responsible of the costs or
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Figure 5.4: Modes (z-axis) as a function of x1 for x2 = x3 = x4 = 0.
benefits the grand coalition gets. This implies that the higher value a link has, the less useful
for the system is. It is clear that the link that is more necessary is link number IV , the one
that connects agents 1 and 3, and for this reason this link has the lowest value. On the other
hand link number III, the one that connects agents 3 and 4, is the one that contributes less
to the global objective, and so it is logical that it has the highest value: it gets benefits from
cooperation but its contribution is not high in comparison with the other links.
An analogous procedure can be made for the agents, but before matrices KC and PC have
to be obtained for each of the possible communication components in N/L. In this case we use
Theorem 9 to obtain the appropriate matrices for the 15 possible coalitions/communication
components. For example, the matrices KC and PC for the only communication component
in coalition S = {1, 2} are:
PC =


4.57 5.02 −0.48 −0.86
5.02 9.67 −1.11 −1.99
−0.48 −1.11 5.26 4.75
−0.86 −1.99 4.75 7.63


KC =
[
−0.25 −0.53 0.02 0.05
0.01 0.03 −0.26 −0.44
]
.
Using the set of controllers designed, we evaluate the characteristic function for the agent
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Figure 5.5: Frontier for network modes 0 and 4 as a function of x1.
game for state x:
v(1) = 391.12
v(2) = 35.99
v(3) = 13.2222
v(4) = 0
v(1, 2) = 427.61
v(1, 3) = 328.55
v(1, 4) = 391.12
v(2, 3) = 49.21
v(2, 4) = 33.26
v(3, 4) = 12.13
v(1, 2, 3) = 358.35
v(1, 2, 4) = 389.70
v(1, 3, 4) = 329.96
v(2, 3, 4) = 39.40
v(1, 2, 3, 4) = 354.01
If we calculate the Shapley value for this game the following vector is obtained
γ(N,wH , x) =
[
349.89 28.46 −19.07 −5.26
]
.
The Shapley value is helpful from two points of view. The sum of its components adds up
exactly the value that the grand coalition, that is the coalition formed by agents 1, 2, 3 and
4, has assigned in the game. In cases where the characteristic function has an economic
meaning this is very helpful because it provides a possible allocation vector to distribute the
profits and benefits from cooperation. Actually, this is sometimes the case when using control
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techniques as model predictive control, where the cost function may represent an economic
value. The second utility of the Shapley value is the fact that it shows from a qualitative
point of view which agents are more benefited from communication or, in other words, which
agents have greater need of communication and help from their neighbors. In this example
it is clear that the Shapley value is much greater for agent 1, something logical since is the
one furthest from the origin, so he has to assume most of the costs. Agent 2 is also far, but
much closer than 1, and so he assumes a lower cost. Agent 3 is also not at the origin but
its cooperation is important for agent 1 and this is why he receives a negative cost, that is a
profit, because his contribution is greater than his own costs. Finally agent 4 is initially at
the origin and so he receives also a reward for his cooperation, less than agent 3 because his
help is specially useful to agent 2, which is certainly close to the origin.
The two coalitional games presented in this subsection can be calculated easily once
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the state is defined and they offer very useful and concentrated information through their
respective Shapley values. It is possible to gain a valuable insight into the communication
structure of the distributed system just with the information of these values. This information
could be helpful for example to make an off line analysis about the relative importance of
each of the links, so that useless links can be erased and the most important ones can be
reinforced.
We present next some simulations of the proposed distributed controller which can be
seen as a hierarchical control scheme. The highest level of hierarchy is executed every D
seconds. In this level agents exchange their states and the current network mode is updated
according to the state. The second level is executed every T seconds, with T < D. This
level is responsible of implementing the corresponding control actions to the plant, so agents
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exchange their states according to the current network topology and the update the control
action. The simulation presented here have been done with values of D = 3 and T = 1 and
for the initial state:
x1(0) =
[
2
1.8
]
x2(0) =
[
0
0
]
x3(0) =
[
0
0
]
x4(0) =
[
0
0
]
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 show the evolution of the system states and inputs respectively as a
function of time. Note that when one of the agents is not at the origin it disturbs the rest
of the agents from their equilibrium point. Figure 5.8 shows the different network modes
active during the simulation. In figure 5.9 the cumulated cost of the coalitional distributed
algorithm is compared to the cumulated cost of applying full communication at each sample.
Note that the additional communicational cost produced by the dynamic change of network
mode is included in the cumulated cost of the coalitional distributed algorithm. For this
reason it offers a higher cost during the first steps. Then, as the system is closer to the
origin the advantages of the change of network mode can be seen. The advantages of the
algorithm become even clearer when a comparison is made without taking into account the
communication costs. In figure 5.10 the cumulated cost of the algorithm is compared to
the cases of centralized and decentralized control. In this case, the cumulated cost of the
proposed distributed controller is almost the same that the cumulated cost of the centralized
controller, but this mode is hardly used as it is shown in figure 5.8. It can also be seen
that decentralized control provides the worst closed-loop performance. Similar figures to the
ones shown here have been obtained for other initial states. In each simulation, different
modes come into play depending on which subsystems need the most to cooperate with their
neighbors.
The techniques presented in the chapter can be applied to analyze WSAN systems in
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which the number of agents is not high. The number of LMI’s that have to be solved grows
exponentially with the number of nodes as there are 2N different communication nodes that
have to be considered. However, this number can be reduced in the practice depending
on the application. For example, not all the communication modes may make sense. In a
wireless setting there are nodes that will never be able to communicate. Moreover, if the
wireless nodes broadcasts their packages they may transmit at the same time to different
receivers, which once more reduce the number of modes that have to be taken into account.
In some cases, the designer may drop some of the communication modes because they are
not probable. The on-line implementation of the algorithm may also be simplified. If only
a change in one link is allowed every D sampling times, then the number of different modes
that have to be explored is reduced to N . All these possible simplifications have to be studied
for the particular problem considered.
5.4 Distributed estimation problem formulation
In the previous sections we have seen a scheme to dynamically manage the links of the network
in a distributed control problem. In this section we focus on the dual of the distributed control
problem, that is, the distributed estimation problem. As we pursue the same goals for this
problem, we will transpose all the results developed for control to the estimation field. To
this end, we consider the following uncertain distributed linear system
xi(t+ 1) = Aix(t) + wi(t)
yj(t) =
∑
k∈Ij
Cjkxk(t) + vj(t) (5.13)
with i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ M = {1, . . . ,m}, that is, there are n different subsystems
whose states are given by xi(t) ∈ Rni and m different outputs yj(t) ∈ Rqj . The set Ij ⊆ N
stands for the set of states that contribute to the output j. The state and measurement noise
components are characterized by normal distributions with zero mean and variances Qi and
Rj respectively; that is, wi(t) ∈ Rni is a N (0, Qi) and vj(t) ∈ Rqi is a N (0, Rj). Note that
under this formulation it is not necessary to assign the outputs to any concrete subsystem.
The problem we face is to estimate the state of all the subsystems while minimizing a cost
function that comprehends both estimation and communication costs. As we already know,
the communication costs depend on the number of links that are used at each sampling time.
The change of performance in the estimation will be analyzed in the case that some of the
links were not present in the system. The analysis of the cost trade-off between estimation
performance and communicational costs will determine what is the best network mode A at
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time sample t.
Again, the network mode A is chosen every D sample times following a cooperative game
approach and the agents are separated in groups, the so called communication components
C ⊆ N/A. At each sample time, each communication component C ⊆ N/A implements
a Kalman filter using the available information; that is, the outputs and the current state
estimation of all the agents that can be known inside C. From the point of view of an agent
i ∈ C, we have the following filter
xˆi(t) = Aixˆi(t− 1) +
∑
j∈Y Ci
KAij (yj −
∑
k∈Ij
⋃
{i}
Cjkxk(t))
where Y Ci is the set of outputs available in the communication component C that are com-
pletely determined by states of the agents inside this coalition and that offer information
about the state of agent i. Mathematically, this set can be defined as
Y Ci = {j ∈M |Ij
⋃
{i} ⊆ C}
From the set of the matrices KAij , the following observer is obtained for the centralized
system characterized by the absence of communication for agents in different communication
components of the network mode A
xˆ(t) = Axˆ(t− 1) +KA(y(t)− CAxˆ(t− 1)) (5.14)
where x(t) and y(t) are, respectively, the state and the output of the equivalent centralized
system. The centralized state and observation matrices are A = diag(Ai) and C = [Cij ] for
i, j = 1, . . . , N . The matrix KA
2 is the matrix which defines the centralized Kalman filter
implemented for the network mode A. It is important to remark that the matrix KA takes
into account the communications constraints in A because it is made of the matrices KAij .
In order to implement the proposed strategy we need to design the filter gain of (5.14)
and provide a measure of the performance of each network mode. To this end we propose
to use as a measure of performance the steady covariance matrix PA to estimate at a given
state the value of the uncertainty as
φA(xˆ) = xˆ
TP−1A xˆ
Note that each network mode is characterized by a steady covariance matrix PA, but in order
to obtain a performance measure, the current estimate of the state xˆ must be used. For this
2Note that in this section the matrix KA stands for the Kalman filter gain while in the previous section it
was used to denote the controller. We have not changed the notation to stand out the duality between the
problems.
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reason, this operation is done in a centralized manner; that is, when a new operation mode
has to be chosen, all the agents must communicate their current state estimate.
In order to decide what communication strategy must be implemented, we use the quadratic
function φA(xˆ). This quadratic function will be used so decide the optimal communication
mode as well as to define the link problem.
5.4.1 Network modes
In order to analyze which agents should communicate, the link game associated to the cost-
extended communication situation H of the current estimate xˆ(t) is studied. The characteris-
tic function rH(A, xˆ) assigned to each communication mode A is based on the error variance
of the steady Kalman filter of all the communication components in the network defined by A.
This function is defined as
rH(A, xˆ) = xˆTP−1A xˆ+ c|L(A)|, ∀A ⊆ L. (5.15)
The best possible communication mode provides the winner network configuration choice.
The function rH(A, xˆ) will be also used to define the link game.
Note that, again, we can speak of regions of dominance. We will denote CRA as the set
of points for which a network mode A is dominant is characterized by the states such that A
provides the best (lower) cost.
5.4.2 Link analysis
The link game is constructed by a set of players composed by the links of the network L and
a characteristic function that assigns to each communication mode A an given utility. In this
case, we propose to use rH(A, xˆ) to define the link game. Once the link game is constructed,
a qualitative and quantitative analysis from the importance of the links in the game may be
obtained from the corresponding Shapley value γ(L, rH , xˆ). Each component of this vector
represents the cost of a given link for the system. In other words, the lower value a link has,
the higher utility it has for the system.
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5.4.3 Agent analysis
A qualitative and quantitative analysis from the importance of the agents of the system may
be obtained from the Shapley value γ(N,wH , x) of the corresponding agent game. To build
such game it is necessary to define the characteristic function that assigns a value to each
coalition S of players for a given network L. First we define the cost of a communication
component
φC(t, xˆC) = xˆC(t)
TP−1C xˆC(t) + γc|L(C)| (5.16)
where xˆC(t) is obtained from the current state estimate xˆ and PC is the steady covariance
matrix of the communication component C assuming that there is no communication with
agents outside the coalition.
Based on these functions, the characteristic function of the agent game that defines the
utility of a coalition S is defined as
ωH(S, x) =
∑
C∈S/L
xˆC(t)
TP−1C xˆC(t) + γc|L(S)|, ∀S ⊆ N.
The Shapley value of the game (N, vH , x) provides concise information about the relevance
of all the players in the game. The lower the value the is, the more relevant role the agent
has in the game. It is important to stand out that the Shapley value of the agent game, as
it is defined, does not have any physical meaning.
5.4.4 Coalitional game design method
In this section we present a method to design for a given system all the matrices that define
the Kalman gain matrices for for both each of the networks modes (KA and PA for all A ⊆ L)
as well as each of the possible communication components of the agent problem (KC and PC
for all C ⊆ N/L).
In what it follows it is assumed that the centralized system matrices A and C are constant
and observable. The covariance matrices Q and R are also assumed to be constant and known.
Under these assumptions it is possible to calculate oﬄine the matrices needed to implement
the Kalman filter.
First, we deal with the problem of finding the matrices that define the estimators and the
weights of the cost functions for both each of the possible communication components of the
agent problem (KC and PC for all C ⊆ N/L). In this case, KC must estimate the states of
C assuming that the outputs that do not belong to that communication component are zero.
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The following theorem, which is a particularization of the theorem 1 in [7], provides an
LMI constraint that can be used to design appropriate matrices.
Theorem 9 Let C ∈ S/L be a set of independent communication components for a given
communication situation H whose dynamics are given by AC = diag(Ai), ∀i ∈ C and CC =
[Cij ], ∀i, j ∈ C, and let the noise be characterized by QC = diag(Qi) and RC = diag(Ri), ∀i ∈
C. If there exist matrices WC and SC such that the following optimization problem
max tr(WC)
s.t.

−WC WCAC − SCCCAC WC − SCCC SC
∗ −WC 0 0
∗ ∗ −Q−1C 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −R−1C

 < 0
(5.17)
then the filter gain and the error variance of the steady Kalman filter are KC = (WC)
−1SC
and PC = (WC)
−1.
In the agent game the approximation of the cost of the communication component C is based
on the cost given by xˆTCPC xˆC . This upper bound is calculated assuming that the rest of
the agents states are null. Note the agent game only provides grounds for distributing the
benefits or costs between the agents during the game.
The link game imposes a different perspective for the communication situation. In this
case the grand coalition controls the system having into account all the possible network
configurations A ⊆ L. Each A imposes communicational constraints and divides the system
in a set of communication components C ∈ N/A. Following the same approach as in the
agent game, the following theorem is presented.
Theorem 10 Let A ∈ L be a set of active links for a given communication situation H. The
dynamics of the whole system are given by A = diag(Ai), ∀i ∈ N and C = [Cij], ∀i, j ∈ J
and its noised matrices defined by Q = diag(Qi) and R = diag(Ri), ∀i ∈ J . If there exist
matrices W = [Wij], ∀i, j ∈ N , where Wi,j ∈ Rni×nj , and S = [Sij ], ∀i, j ∈ N , where
Si,j ∈ Rni×qj . If there exist matrices W and S such that the following optimization problem
max tr(W )
s.t.

−W WA− SCA W − SC S
∗ −W 0 0
∗ ∗ −Q−1 0
∗ ∗ ∗ −R−1

 < 0
(5.18)
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then the filter gain and the error variance of the steady Kalman filter are K = (W )−1S and
P = (W )−1.
5.5 Distributed estimation simulation results
This section presents an example to show the strongest result of this work: the dynamical
change of the communication mode in a network. The strategy we propose is based on the
simulation scenario proposed for the localization of robots in [31] that was also used in chapter
4.
Let us consider a system consisting of a set µ = {1, . . . ,M} of reference nodes or beacons
and a set η = {1, . . . , J} of mobile devices. In this example we will consider M = 6 beacons
and J = 8 mobile devices, which are located in the positions depicted in figure 5.11.
The goal is to estimate the position of the moving devices. We assume that the sample
time is sufficiently small to consider that the devices’ displacement at each sample is small
enough to be considered noise. The equations for each device are:
xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) + ∆xi(t) ∀i ∈ η = {1, .., J}
where xi(t) ∈ R2 is the position of the i-th robot at time t and ∆xit ∈ R2 with xi(0) = x0i .
The beacon position is fixed so that xi(K + 1) = xi(0) ∀i ∈ µ = {1, ..,M}. The distance
between the nodes and the mobile devices can be calculated using
d2ij(t) = (xi(t)− xj(t))T (xi(t)− xj(t)) ∀i, j ∈ η, µ.
The distance can be linearized around the steady state positions xi using a first order Taylor
approximation, which leads to
d2ij = d
2
ij + 2(xi − xj)T (xi − xj) + 2(xi − xj)T (xi − xj)
with d
2
ij = d
2
ij(xi, xj). Now, system variables can be introduced for all the mobile devices
such that:
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Figure 5.11: Initial situation of the devices.
xi(t) = xi(t)− xi ∀i ∈ η
yji(t) = d
2
ij − d
2
ij ∀i ∈ η,∀j ∈ η, µ
Cji = 2(xi − xj) ∀i ∈ η,∀j ∈ η, µ.
Each moving device’s output provides information of the distance with respect the other
moving devices and the beacons. If white gaussian additive noise is assumed in the state and
output then each device can be modeled according to equation (5.13).
In order to make the situation more realistic we assume that only devices and beacons
within a given range can communicate. Thus a communication radius ρ is defined. In general
two devices i and j can communicate if dij < ρ. A communication graph can be defined to
reflect which devices can communicate at each sample time. The initial communication graph
for the employed value of ρ = 2.5 is given by the following matrices:
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Aη0 =


1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1


Aµ0 =


1 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 1


where Aη0(i, j) = 1 if the mobile device i is able to communicate with the mobile device j
and Aµ0 (i, j) = 1 if the mobile robot i is able to communicate with the beacon j. As long the
devices move the communication graph will change with the time.
If we assume that each moving devices is able to establish individual communication with
the rest of the devices, then it is straight forward to check that the number of possible links
ascends to (J2 − J)/J . In this case we have a total amount of 28 possible links. As any
link can be either active or inactive then it is possible to define 28 possible network modes.
However, given that only 16 links are available due to the range constraint, the number of
network modes that have to be compared is reduced to 216. In practice the number of modes
to be compared is much lower due to the fact that many of the modes are redundant because
they connect the same set of devices. Moreover, there are modes that are not redundant
but make no sense because they are based on long routes to connect the devices. An oﬄine
analysis is recommended so that the on-line burden is reduced to the comparison of a lower
number of modes. In addition, it is recommended to use a link cost that penalizes the distance
between nodes as a way to obtain those modes with shorter links during the oﬄine analysis.
The noise considered for the design of the Kalman gains was defined by Qi = diag(0.001)
and Ri = 0.05 for all i ∈ [1, J ] and the weighted link unitary cost was c = 0.1 (this value was
obtained after a proper tuning procedure). However, in order to test the robustness of the
proposed distributed estimation scheme, the simulations were done with a noise higher than
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Figure 5.12: Agents state evolution.
the employed in the design procedure. The system has been simulated for 50 time samples.
Each 10 samples it was decided what was the best mode to continue the state estimation.
During the first 10 time samples the state noise was 20 times stronger. During the next 10
samples this value was 40. Then it was incremented again up to 80 during 10 more samples.
Finally and until the rest of the simulation it was reduced to 20 again.
In figure 5.12 it can be seen the time evolution of the states during the simulation. In
blue it is depicted the actual state and in red it can be seen the estimation. In figure 5.13
it can be seen the trajectory of the plane of the robots. Again in blue it is the real position
and in red it can be seen the estimated.
During this simulation the following modes were decided by the distributed control mech-
anism. During the first 20 samples the system worked decentralized, which is natural given
that agents begin at the linearization point of the system. After that some links are en-
abled to cope with the increasing deviation from the linearization point. In particular the
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Figure 5.13: Agents state plane trajectory.
links between the pair of agents (2,6), (3,6), (5,6) and (3,8) are enabled, which means that
agents 2, 6, 3, 8 and 5 are in the same communication component while the others work
decentralizedly. Finally, after 10 samples and until the end of the simulation, the distributed
estimation scheme implements the grand coalition to estimate the state of the system, that is,
7 links are on so that all the agents can communicate using the network. We have considered
the same cost c for all the links in the system. However if the link distance is taken into
account then the shortest path that communicates all the agents will be implemented when
the great coalition is implemented.
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5.6 Conclusions
This chapter provides a bridge between coalitional game theory and control. In particular, an
application of cooperative game theory to analyze distributed control and estimation schemes
has been proposed. The modeling of distributed systems from the game theory point of view
allows us to extract useful information about the communication structure of a system and
the relative importance of the agents and links. It is possible to use this information for
interesting applications such as the online change of network mode to optimize the use of the
communication resources. The main contribution of the chapter from the control point of
view consists on the dynamic switching of the communication links as a part of the control
algorithm. In addition, an optimization based design method has been provided for the class
of systems considered.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
In this thesis we have developed new distributed control and estimation schemes based on
unifying model predictive control and game theory. As it has been seen, game theory pro-
vides an appropriate framework to tackle the class of problems that appear in distributed
architectures. Moreover, game theory allows one to obtain a deeper insight in distributed
problems in comparison with other approaches which consist on a mere distribution of the
calculations needed to solve the centralized optimization problem.
It is worthwhile to stand out that in this thesis a great effort has been made obtain control
and estimation schemes with a low communicational burden. Likewise, we have developed
techniques to switch dynamically the links of a network with the goal of saving unnecessary
communications. In general, previous distributed algorithms have been more focused on
reducing the computational burden instead. This implies that many distributed schemes are
not suitable for systems in which there are communicational constraints. On the other hand,
there has been a price to pay in terms of performance due to the simplifications that were made
in order to reduce the communicational complexity of our distributed solutions. Nevertheless,
our results show that our schemes provide a very good trade-off between performance and
communicational burden.
One of our most important objectives during this work has been to minimize the amount of
information about the centralized model that the agents need to have in order to implement
the proposed schemes. In particular we have focused on schemes that do not require the
agents to share information about their state and objectives. Actually, in our framework the
only information about the rest of the system that an agent has is the way its neighbors affect
it, which from our point of view a very reasonable assumption.
161
162 Conclusions and Future Research
Finally, it is important to stand out that all the schemes and techniques developed
throughout this work have been tested, at least, in simulation.
6.1 Conclusions
We present next the main contributions of each of the chapters of this thesis:
• Distributed Model Predictive Control and Game Theory. In chapter 1 we have
explained the main problems associated to distributed model predictive control. Basic
concepts and taxonomies for both game theory and distributed control were given. In
addition, a profound literature review of previous distributed MPC results has been
done from the communicational point of view, that is, special attention has been paid
to the type and amount of information shared by the agents.
• Distributed Model Predictive Control Based on Game Theory for Two
Agents. In chapter 2 we focused on distributed model predictive control for systems
controlled by two agents. A novel algorithm with low communicational requirements
based on game theory was proposed and put to test with simulated and real exam-
ples. It is also important to remark that each agent solves an optimization problem
that only depends on its local model and partial state information. For this reason,
the algorithm is suboptimal since the agents have an incomplete view of the system
and propose the best solutions from their point of view. In addition, we have provided
sufficient conditions that guarantee practical stability of the closed-loop system as well
as an optimization based procedure to design the controller so that these conditions are
satisfied.
• Distributed Model Predictive Control Based on Game Theory for Multiple
Agents. In chapter 3 the ideas proposed in chapter 3 were extended for the general
case of a system controlled by more than two agents. The original algorithm proposed
in chapter 2 could not be readily extended due to the combinatorial explosion of pos-
sible strategies that appear in a multiple agent problem. In this case the agents make
proposals to improve an initial feasible solution on behalf of their local cost function,
state and model at each sample time. These proposals are only accepted if the global
cost improves the cost corresponding to the current solution. The agents exchange a
greater number of suboptimal proposals in comparison with the algorithm presented
in chapter 2 but our simulations showed that still a good performance can be achieved
with a low number of communications per agent. The proposed algorithm provides a
feasible solution to the centralized problem. Finally, we introduced a new concept of
invariance for distributed and decentralized systems that guarantee that the closed-loop
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system is practically stable along with an optimization based controller and invariant
design procedure.
• Distributed Receding Horizon Kalman Filter. In chapter 4 a distributed version
of the Kalman filter based on dynamic programming was developed. In this case, the
distribution of the centralized problem between the agents was done by means of dual
decomposition, which is one of the most popular techniques for distributed control
problems. It is common that in dual decomposition agents exchange their state in
order to update the prices introduced by the Lagrange multipliers. For this reason,
different coordination alternatives for the price update were considered so that agents
do not need to exchange their state. Note that this feature may be interesting in control
applications in which dual decomposition is used as well. The techniques developed in
this chapter were tested for a simulated application for the self-localization of robots.
• Applications of Cooperative Game Theory to the Control and Estimation
of Distributed Systems. In chapter 5 a bridge between coalitional game theory and
control has been built. The main result of this chapter was a distributed scheme that
dynamically enabled or disabled links of a network with the goal of saving communi-
cations. In this sense, an optimization based controller and estimator design method
was provided for the class of systems considered. In addition, it was shown how to
use the Shapley value in order to extract useful information about the communication
structure of a system and the relative importance of the agents and links.
6.2 Future research
Although the research of distributed systems have become a hot issue in the last decade, there
are still many interesting topics that will have to be studied in the future. In this section we
enumerate some research lines that are interesting from our point of view:
• Many distributed schemes have been proposed but few have been tested in real systems.
Real applications demand communication protocols specially designed for distributed
control. In addition, it has to be studied how distributed techniques can be applied in
low resource systems. Home networking technologies point towards the ambient intelli-
gence paradigm, a scenario where the cooperation among the electronic systems at home
is essential. This topic constitutes an interesting research line in telecommunications
engineering.
• Real communication networks do not behave ideally. In 1992, Peter Deutsch provided
a list with eight typical assumptions usually made when building distributed applica-
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tions [21]. All of them prove to be false in the long run and therefore cause “painful
learning experiences”. The complete list of fallacies of distributed computing is:
1. The network is reliable.
2. Latency is zero.
3. Bandwidth is infinite.
4. The network is secure.
5. Topology doesn’t change.
6. There is one administrator.
7. Transport cost is zero.
8. The network is homogeneous.
As it can be seen, some of this fallacies have been addressed in this thesis, specially
those related with the transport cost and reliability. In the literature there are several
works that deal with the dynamics induced by the communication network (such as
time-varying delays and data losses) [63, 20] but very few has been investigated about
topology changing networks. The homogeneity and security of the network are also
common assumptions many works. Probably, the main reason for this is that by now
distributed applications are developed ad hoc for certain systems. However, these issues
will have to be addressed in the future before the application of distributed techniques
is successful in real world applications.
• Although game theory is often applied to explain human behavior, it is the field of
automatic control where its assumptions of players’ rationality and intelligence hold
better. According to [96], the “hyper-rationality” of game theory may actually be
an appropriate model for software agents. For this reason, it will be necessary to
apply game theory tools to prevent selfish agents mechanisms to take advantage of
distributed applications. In this sense, the application of mechanism design may be
interesting. Mechanism design is a branch of game theory that attempts to implement
desired social choices in a strategic setting. In this context, a social choice is defined
as an aggregation of the preferences of the different participants toward a single joint
decision. Examples of social choices are: elections, markets, auctions... Deep down, any
cooperative distributed control scheme is a way to determine a social choice. Therefore,
it would be interesting to develop techniques to so that distributed algorithms are
prepared in case the agents show strategic selfish behavior.
• It will be important for future works to provide some kind of suboptimality bounds to
determine the performance obtained by distributed estimation schemes. In the case of
distributed control interesting results can be found in [28]. However, the application
of the results of this paper to the estimation problem is not straight forward. Sub-
optimality bounds are important since they allow to establish the trade off between
performance and communicational burden in an explicit way.
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• Finally, it would be desirable to transpose results from welfare economics into dis-
tributed control and estimation problems. Under several assumptions, in welfare eco-
nomics it is shown how selfish agents may achieve results optimal in the sense of Pareto
behaving selfishly. This approach is based mainly in the idea of exchanges that have
positive surplus for all the agents involved in the transactions. Note that, in a certain
way, this is the same idea that is behind the control scheme proposed based on agent
negotiation (chapter 3). Nevertheless, it would be interesting to investigate how to
modify the scheme in order to determine under which conditions centralized optimality
could be achieved.
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Appendix A
Resumen en castellano
Desde hace miles de an˜os el hombre ha son˜ado con aparatos que funcionen solos. Homero,
por ejemplo, hace referencia en la Il´ıada a unos tr´ıpodes fabricados por Hefesto con ruedas de
oro en los pies “para que del propio impulso pudieran entrar donde los dioses se congregaban
y volver a la casa”, accio´n e´sta que el propio texto calificaba como “¡Cosa admirable!” y que
refleja la emocio´n que la propia idea suscita. Precisamente, este es el objeto de la teor´ıa de
control auto´matico, que es la rama de la ingenier´ıa que comprende aquellos conocimientos
te´cnicos necesarios para hacer que las cosas funcionen por s´ı mismas.
En general, el primer problema que el ingeniero de control debe resolver es el de obtener un
modelo matema´tico que sintetice el conocimiento previo que se tiene sobre el comportamiento
del sistema u objeto que se pretende controlar. Dicho modelo proporciona informacio´n de
tipo causa-efecto y permite calcular que´ acciones de control deben llevarse a cabo para que
el sistema se comporte de la manera deseada. El propio ser humano se basa en estos mismos
principios cuando controla, es decir, cuando ejerce acciones sobre un objeto encaminadas
a obtener un cierto resultado. Por ejemplo, imaginemos a una persona al volante de un
veh´ıculo. Es evidente que el conductor decide que´ acciones ha de realizar (girar el volante,
acelerar, frenar...) a partir de la informacio´n disponible sobre el estado del coche (posicio´n en
la carretera, velocidad,...) y del modelo mental que tiene sobre el comportamiento del coche.
El ejemplo anterior permite sen˜alar dos elementos fundamentales de cualquier problema
de control: la informacio´n y el tiempo. La informacio´n disponible determina la calidad del
control que puede llevarse a cabo. Cuanto mejores sean el modelo del sistema y las medidas
del estado, mejores decisiones podra´n tomarse. Por su parte, el tiempo para la toma de
decisiones no es infinito. La dina´mica del sistema impone restricciones temporales para la
toma de decisiones que no deben violarse; una buena accio´n de control aplicada de forma
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tard´ıa bien puede convertirse en una mala accio´n de control. En el ejemplo del coche queda
claro que el riesgo de que el conductor falle en el control del veh´ıculo es mucho mayor si e´ste
conduce con los ojos tapados (menos informacio´n) o a 250 km/h (tiempo para la toma de
decisiones reducido).
Tradicionalmente la teor´ıa de control se ha enfrentado a las limitaciones impuestas por
la informacio´n y el tiempo de una forma centralizada. En otras palabras, el disen˜o de los
dispositivos de control se realiza suponiendo que se dispone de toda la informacio´n necesaria
en un u´nico punto donde ha de tomarse una decisio´n en el tiempo preciso. Es indudable
que esta forma de proceder proporciona los mejores resultados posibles. Por desgracia, no
siempre se puede trabajar de manera centralizada. Hay diferentes razones que lo impiden.
Entre ellas destacan las siguientes:
• La complejidad del sistema es tal que es imposible obtener un modelo que determine
su comportamiento globalmente.
• Aunque pueda obtenerse un modelo, e´ste es tan complejo que no es posible procesar
toda la informacio´n necesaria para la toma de decisiones en un tiempo razonable.
• El sistema se extiende en un a´rea lo suficientemente grande como para que no sea posible
concentrar la informacio´n de las medidas en u´nico punto en un tiempo razonable.
• El sistema esta´ compuesto por diferentes entidades que interactu´an entre s´ı y alguna
de ellas no quiere revelar su modelo de funcionamiento.
Cuando se presenta alguna de las situaciones anteriores, no se puede encontrar una
solucio´n centralizada al problema de control. Es en este punto en el que entran en juego
los sistemas de control descentralizados y distribuidos. La filosof´ıa de estos esquemas es sen-
cilla: el problema de control global se divide en varias partes diferentes, cada una las cuales
es asignada a un controlador local o agente. Por lo tanto, cada agente carece de una visio´n de
conjunto del problema centralizado, lo cual constituye la caracter´ısitica ma´s importante de
este tipo de sistemas. En funcio´n del grado de interaccio´n existente entre las diferentes partes
en el que se divide problema centralizado, es posible que deban establecerse mecanismos de
comunicacio´n entre los agentes para que trabajen de forma coordinada. De esta manera,
cuando el grado de interaccio´n es bajo, los agentes pueden trabajar sin comunicarse entre s´ı,
por lo que se habla de sistemas descentralizados. En cambio, cuando se dispone de medios
para que los agentes trabajen coordinadamente se habla de sistemas distribuidos.
En contra de lo que pueda parecer, trabajar de forma decentralizada o distribuida tambie´n
presenta importantes ventajas, algunas de las cuales justifican por s´ı solas que se recurra a este
tipo de esquemas aun cuando no resulte estrictamente necesario. Algunas de estas ventajas
son:
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• Simplicidad de las soluciones: en lugar de resolver un problema dif´ıcil, se resuelven
varios problemas ma´s sencillos.
• Escalabilidad: resulta muy sencillo ampliar un sistema distribuido dada su modularidad
inherente.
• Facilidad de mantenimiento: no hay que detener el proceso controlado cada vez que se
llevan a cabo tareas de mantenimiento en el sistema de control.
• Robustez: al no depender del correcto funcionamiento de un u´nico elemento, el sistema
de control resulta ma´s tolerante a los fallos que puedan presentarse.
Como puede suponerse, disfrutar de estas ventajas tiene un precio expresable en te´rminos
de pe´rdida de rendimiento frente al control centralizado. El grado de pe´rdida depende del
nivel de interaccio´n entre las diferentes partes del problema de control centralizado y de
los mecanismos de coordinacio´n existentes entre los agentes. En general, la calidad de las
decisiones de control dependera´ del intercambio que se establezca entre el nu´mero de comu-
nicaciones que los agentes realizan para coordinarse y los costes derivados del hecho de la
comunicacio´n, como son el tiempo empleado, la carga computacional o el consumo ele´ctrico
de los dispositivos, factor crucial en muchas aplicaciones. Es justamente en este punto en
el que se desarrolla la presente tesis doctoral, que tiene por objeto desarrollar te´cnicas de
control distribuido que ofrezcan un buen desempen˜o al mismo tiempo que minimicen el coste
comunicacional.
A.1 Redes de sensores y actuadores
El concepto de sistema descentralizado o distribuido no es nuevo, sin embargo no ha sido
hasta los u´ltimos an˜os cuando se ha producido el verdadero auge de las l´ıneas de insvesti-
gacio´n de control distribuido. El intere´s por este tipo de sistemas ha venido motivado por el
advenimiento de los transceptores inala´mbricos de bajo coste y su aplicacio´n a las redes de
sensores y actuadores.
Las redes de sensores y actuadores inala´mbricas constituyen una de las a´reas ma´s impor-
tantes dentro de la ingenier´ıa de control en la actualidad. Cualquier sistema, sin importar
su naturaleza, posee una serie de magnitudes susceptibles de ser medidas o influenciadas,
por lo que cualquier tecnolog´ıa que incida en estos puntos esta´ directamente relacionada con
las propias ra´ıces del control automa´tico. Hasta no hace muchos an˜os, la u´nica manera de
llegar a los puntos de medicio´n o actuacio´n era a trave´s de cables, lo que implica el despliegue
de una infraestructura relativamente costosa. Los primeros sistemas inala´mbricos existentes
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proporcionaban una solucio´n a este problema, si bien su coste y su elevado consumo ele´ctrico
impedidieron que se generalizara su uso. No´tese que un consumo elevado de electricidad
implica o bien una renovacio´n muy frecuente de las bater´ıas, o bien el despliegue de cables
que alimenten a los dispositivos.
Este panorama cambio´ con la llegada de tecnolog´ıas basadas en el esta´ndar IEEE 802.15.4,
como por ejemplo Zigbee. A diferencia de otras tecnolog´ıas que, como Wifi o Bluetooth, esta´n
orientadas a la provisio´n de un elevado ancho de banda, Zigbee se concentra en la reduccio´n del
consumo ele´ctrico de los dispositivos, hasta el punto de que pueden pasar an˜os sin necesidad de
cambiar las bater´ıas. Por ello, ofrece un ancho de banda relativamente bajo, aunque ma´s que
suficiente para la informacio´n que se necesita transmitir en una gran cantidad de aplicaciones
de control. Este factor, unido con la rapidez de despliegue de las redes inala´mbricas, ha
provocado una aute´ntica explosio´n en las aplicaciones de esta tecnolog´ıa y, por tanto, de los
sistemas distribuidos.
En la actualidad se viven tiempos emocionantes para el ingeniero de control gracias a
las redes de sensores y actuadores inala´mbricas. Sin duda se trata de una tecnolog´ıa que
revolucionara´ el mundo del control tal y como lo conocemos, tanto a nivel dome´stico como
industrial. Se abren multitud de interrogantes que deben ser debidamente estudiados para
aprovechar de forma o´ptima las nuevas posibilidades a nuestro alcance. Por ejemplo, paradig-
mas como el de la sensorizacio´n ubicua eran poco ma´s que una utop´ıa hasta hace poco tiempo.
Ahora que la tecnolog´ıa permite convertir en realidad este antiguo suen˜o, la comunidad de
control tiene ante s´ı un fe´rtil campo de estudio que habra´ que saber sembrar adecuadamente
para recoger resultados a la altura de las expectativas creadas.
En este orden de cosas, cobran importancia capital l´ıneas de investigacio´n como son el
ana´lisis y estudio de sistemas descentralizados, la realizacio´n e implementacio´n de algoritmos
de control distribuidos, la integracio´n de diferentes tecnolog´ıas dentro en una misma red o el
aprovechamiento o´ptimo de la informacio´n manejada por la misma, por citar solo algunos de
los campos de investigacio´n en cuya interseccio´n puede encuadrarse este trabajo. Estamos
pues ante una tarea eminentemente pluridisplicinar, cuyo desarrollo exige la integracio´n de
resultados provenientes de ramas muy diversas.
A.2 La teor´ıa de los juegos
Mencio´n especial merece la teor´ıa de los juegos en esta tesis, una joven pero prol´ıfica disciplina
de las matema´ticas cuyo origen puede situarse en 1944 con la publicacio´n del libro Game
Theory and Economic Behaviour de Von Neumann y Morgenstern [100]. La teor´ıa de los
juegos estudia situaciones o juegos en las que una serie de agentes o jugadores con poder de
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decisio´n intentan conseguir unos determinados objetivos que pueden estar en conflicto entre
s´ı. Todos los jugadores son conscientes de que el resultado final depende, no so´lo de sus
decisiones individuales, sino de las decisiones tomadas por el resto de jugadores. La teor´ıa de
juegos, por tanto, se centra en el estudio de lo que podr´ıamos denominar como situaciones
de decisio´n interactiva. Esta interactividad situ´a a la teor´ıa de juegos en clara contraposicio´n
con los problemas de optimizacio´n habituales en ingenier´ıa, en los que hay un u´nico ente con
poder de decisio´n.
A pesar de que la teor´ıa de juegos ha sido aplicada con gran frecuencia para estudiar
situaciones econo´micas de todo tipo, existen otros muchos campos donde su aplicacio´n es
directa como son la biolog´ıa, la sociolog´ıa, las ciencias pol´ıticas o las propias ingenier´ıas.
Habida cuenta de que en este trabajo de investigacio´n se trabaja con sistemas distribuidos,
es natural que se produzcan situaciones en las que aparece la interaccio´n que estudia la teor´ıa
de los juegos. Por consiguiente, dicha teor´ıa tiene un papel protagonista en esta tesis.
En general, cada controlador en un sistema distribuido se encarga de un subproblema
del problema original. La probabilidad de que las decisiones individuales de cada uno de
los controladores coincidan con las que conducen a un resultado o´ptimo desde el punto de
vista global es remota, especialmente cuando los intereses individuales de los diferentes con-
troladores entran en conflicto entre s´ı. La teor´ıa de los juegos nos ensen˜a que la interaccio´n
entre los controladores llevara´ al sistema a una de las siguientes situaciones:
• Inestabilidad. Se produce cuando se forma un ciclo pernicioso entre las acciones de unos
agentes y las reacciones de otros. El bucle entre acciones de unos y respuestas de otros
acaba conduciendo a un comportamiento nocivo para todos los agentes implicados.
• Equilibrio de Nash. En caso de que cada agente este´ satisfecho con sus decisiones
despue´s de haber observado las decisiones de los dema´s, no habra´ incentivos para que
ningu´n agente cambie su l´ınea de actuacio´n en el futuro. La estabilidad de este tipo de
equilibrios tiene un precio en te´rminos de rendimiento o coste del control, por lo que
en principio no son muy deseables. No obstante, la estabilidad es una caracter´ıstica
tan deseable que hay esquemas de control distribuidos que se basan en el equilibrio de
Nash [43],
• O´ptimo de Pareto. Se dice que se ha alcanzado un o´ptimo de Pareto cuando las acciones
realizadas por los agentes son tales que no existe la posibilidad de que ningu´n agente
mejore sus resultados sin empeorar los de otro. La solucio´n o´ptima del problema es en
s´ı misma un o´ptimo de Pareto, el mejor que puede conseguirse. Idealmente, los agentes
deber´ıan mostrarse predispuestos a colaborar entre s´ı con el objeto de encontrar algu´n
tipo de o´ptimo de Pareto, aunque la predisposicio´n y coordinacio´n necesarias no son
siempre posibles.
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De las tres situaciones anteriores, es evidente que la primera resulta totalmente indeseable,
lo que nos permite obtener una conclusio´n muy valiosa para el control de sistemas distribuidos:
el primer objetivo de todos los agentes de un sistema de control distribuido es garantizar la
estabilidad del sistema. Una vez conseguido ese objetivo, cada agente puede preocuparse de
perseguir sus objetivos individuales. En este punto conviene destacar que, lamentablemente,
la estabilidad de un sistema de control distribuido no puede garantizarse sin un ana´lisis desde
el punto de vista centralizado del mismo. A pesar de lo parado´jico de la u´ltima afirmacio´n,
resulta razonable que no se pueda certificar una propiedad global de un sistema sin conocer
en detalle el comportamiento global del mismo. Por otra parte lo contrario no tiene por que´
ser cierto, es decir, el desconocimiento del modelo centralizado de un sistema distribuido no
implica la inestabilidad del sistema; lo u´nico que implica es que no puede garantizarse la
estabilidad del sistema a priori.
Todas las dificultades provenientes de la interaccio´n entre las decisiones de un conjunto
de agentes giran en torno a un concepto muy sencillo: la empat´ıa. En el lenguaje cotidiano
la empat´ıa se define como la identificacio´n mental y afectiva de un sujeto con el estado de
a´nimo de otro. Este concepto debe interpretarse en un sentido ma´s amplio en este contexto;
si cada agente conoce y valora el impacto de sus acciones sobre el resto, es ma´s fa´cil que se
llegue a una situacio´n de equilibrio para todas las partes. La anterior afirmacio´n descansa
expl´ıcitamente en dos suposiciones:
• Cada agente conoce el impacto de sus acciones sobre el resto, lo que implica que o bien
cada agente dispone de la suficiente informacio´n del problema global como para conocer
las consecuencias de sus acciones, o bien los agentes disponen de algu´n mecanismo de
comunicacio´n que les permita transmitirse entre ellos el impacto que las acciones de
cada uno tiene sobre el resto.
• Cada agente valora el impacto de sus acciones sobre el resto, lo que implica que cada
agente hace suyo, hasta un cierto punto al menos, el bienestar del resto. Por lo tanto,
la informacio´n sobre el impacto de un agente sobre el resto se utiliza con un fin social
y no individual.
En caso de que ninguna de estas suposiciones se cumpla es complicado, cuando no im-
posible, que el resultado de las interacciones del juego sea favorable para los intereses de
todos los jugadores. En esta tesis se parte de la base de que las dos suposiciones anteriores
se mantienen, algo nada descabellado en el control de sistemas distribuidos. En concreto se
utiliza la red de comunicacio´n que une a los agentes para que e´stos compartan informacio´n
acerca del impacto de las acciones de unos sobre otros. De este modo, ningu´n agente necesita
conocer detalles de la dina´mica del resto, hecho e´ste que refuerza el cara´cter distribuido de
la solucio´n a la vez que aleja este trabajo de otros esquemas existentes en la literatura [99].
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Por otra parte, la necesidad de una solucio´n que de´ estabilidad al sistema en bucle cerrado,
exige que cada agente deba preocuparse por el bienestar del resto.
A.3 Objetivos de la tesis
Como se vera´ a lo largo de la tesis, las te´cnicas de control distribuido que se han desarrollado
buscan resultados que conduzcan al o´ptimo de Pareto. Por desgracia, y tal y como ya se
ha dicho, la bu´squeda de este tipo de soluciones es compleja y en general requiere un uso
intensivo de la red de comunicacio´n. En los u´ltimos an˜os se han desarrollado soluciones de
control predictivo distribuido comunicacionalmente intensas que abordan de el problema de
esta forma [71, 99]. El enfoque por el que se ha optado en la tesis simplifica el problema de
alguna de las maneras siguientes con objeto de ahorrar comunicaciones:
• Reduccio´n del abanico de acciones que cada agente puede ejecutar. Dicha reduccio´n
puede ir encaminada a limitar las perturbaciones que los agentes inducen sobre el resto
del sismema o a disminuir que el nu´mero de opciones a considerar. El precio de esta
medida es expresable en te´rminos de optimalidad de la solucio´n de control, que al
surgir de un universo de opciones ma´s pequen˜o posiblemente ya no sea o´ptima desde
un punto de vista centralizado. No obstante, si el ahorro comunicacional es importante
y la pe´rdida de rendimiento en el control es pequen˜a, se trata de una medida plenamente
justificable.
• Toma colectiva de las decisiones. Au´n en un escenario simplificado de interacciones,
la toma conjunta de decisiones conduce a resultados globalmente favorables para todas
las partes. La propia teor´ıa de los juegos avala este esp´ıritu en situaciones de juegos
repetidos un nu´mero indefinido de veces incluso cuando los jugadores se comportaran
de forma ego´ısta. En este sentido son tambie´n resen˜ables trabajos como el de Axelrod
[8], de los que se deduce que la cooperacio´n es una buena estrategia base mientras que
no se detecten violaciones de este comportamiento por parte del resto de los agentes.
• Separacio´n dina´mica de los agentes en distintas coaliciones con poca interaccio´n entre s´ı
mediante el uso de herramientas de la teor´ıa de los juegos cooperativos. Si se encuentra
que el sistema centralizado puede descomponerse en una serie de subconjuntos con
poca interaccio´n entre s´ı, es posible reducir al mı´nimo la comunicacio´n entre dichos
subconjuntos. Globalmente esto implica un importante ahorro de comunicaciones.
Adema´s del ahorro de comunicaciones, que es el objetivo principal de este trabajo, en la
tesis se ha buscado trasponer resultados del problema del control distribuido al problema de
estimacio´n distribuido, siempre bajo el prisma de la teor´ıa de juegos.
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A.4 Estructura de la presente tesis doctoral
El resto de la tesis esta´ organizado de la siguiente manera:
• Control predictivo distribuido y la teor´ıa de los juegos. En este cap´ıtulo se
estudia en profundidad el estado del arte del control predictivo distribuido, clasificando
los diferentes algoritmos propuestos en funcio´n del nu´mero de comunicaciones empleadas
y del tipo de informacio´n intercambiada por los agentes.
• Control predictivo distribuido para dos agentes basado en la teor´ıa de los
juegos. La interaccio´n entre dos agentes se simplifica mediante un sencillo juego en
forma estrate´gica, que reduce el nu´mero de acciones de control posibles a tres para
cada uno de los agentes. Estas tres opciones consisten en cooperar con el otro agente,
comportarse de forma ego´ısta o acogerse a una alternativa neutral que garantiza la
estabilidad del esquema. Los agentes escogen en todo momento la mejor accio´n desde
el punto de vista del coste global.
• Control predictivo distribuido para N agentes basado en negociacio´n de los
agentes. La explosio´n combinacional impide generalizar el esquema anterior para un
nu´mero cualquiera de agentes. Por ello, se desarrolla un esquema simplificado en el que
cada agente realiza propuestas al resto. Aquellos agentes afectados por la propuesta
responden cuantificando el beneficio o perjucio que la propuesta les causara´ en caso de
ser aceptada. Solo se aceptan aquellas propuestas que disminuyen el coste global del
sistema. En caso de que no haya ningu´n tipo de acuerdo se implementa una accio´n de
control que garantiza la estabilidad del sistema.
• Filtro de Kalman distribuido. Dado que el problema de estimacio´n es el problema
dual al del control, resulta natural aplicar te´cnicas de control distribuido a la estimacio´n
distribuida. En este cap´ıtulo se reduce el problema de estimacio´n de estado a un
problema de programacio´n dina´mica que es distribuido entre los agentes gracias a la
descomposicio´n dual del mismo.
• Aplicacio´n de la teor´ıa de los juegos cooperativos al control y la estimacio´n
de sistemas distribuidos. La teor´ıa de los juegos cooperativos proporciona her-
ramientas matema´ticas muy apropiadas para el ana´lisis de situaciones de conflicto en
las que los agentes pueden llegar a algu´n tipo de acuerdo. Este cap´ıtulo de la tesis
transpone resultados de esta rama de la teor´ıa de juegos al a´mbito del control dis-
tribuido. Gracias a ello se desarrolla un esquema de control para la gestio´n dina´mica
de los enlaces que componen una red y se proporciona un me´todo para evaluar la
importancia relativa de los agentes y enlaces de la red de control.
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• Conclusiones. La tesis finaliza con un cap´ıtulo que analiza las mayores contribu-
ciones de la misma y, adicionalmente, sen˜ala l´ıneas de investigacio´n futuras de control
distribuido.
A.5 Contribuciones al estado del arte
Una vez ubicada la tesis en la interseccio´n entre los campos de control de sistemas distribuidos
y la teor´ıa de los juegos, se repasara´n en este apartado las principales aportaciones al estado
del arte realizadas y se sen˜alara´n tambie´n las publicaciones que se han originado a partir del
presente trabajo.
Normalmente, cuando se abarca un problema distribuido, lo normal es comenzar por un
caso sencillo. Por ese motivo es habitual comenzar estudiando que´ sucede cuando se tienen
a dos agentes interactuando entre s´ı. Este fue el primer paso que se dio en la tesis, fruto del
cual se proporciono´ un esquema de control predictivo distribuido en pocas comunicaciones
basado en la teor´ıa de los juegos. Este esquema fue puesto a prueba para sistemas descritos
externamente mediante funciones de transferencia [51] y para sistemas expresados en espacio
de estados [53, 52]. El esquema de control, adema´s de presentar un rendimiento razonable-
mente alto para los escasos ciclos de comunicacio´n empleados, garantiza la estabilidad del
sistema de control bajo ciertas hiptesis que se vera´n ma´s adelante en la tesis. Adema´s de los
tres art´ıculos citados de congreso, el esquema de control para dos agentes tambie´n ha sido
publicado en una revista internacional [54] y ha participado en una comparativa de esquemas
de control distribuido que se encuentra siendo evaluada en otro art´ıculo de revista [5].
Una vez estudiado el problema para dos agentes, se estudio´ el caso general de un sistema
compuesto por un nmero cualquiera de agentes. Con objeto de evitar la explosio´n combi-
nacional propia de la interaccio´n de un nu´mero indefinido de agentes, se ha desarrollado un
algoritmo sencillo de negociacio´n capaz de proporcionar buenas prestaciones de control con
un nu´mero bajo de comunicaciones. Este trabajo ha sido enviado a [57] y a [58].
Adema´s de estos esquemas originales de control predictivo distribuido, se han realizado
otras contribuciones al estado del arte que gozan de un cara´cter ma´s general, es decir, que
pueden ser utilizadas como complemento a otras te´cnicas de control. En este sentido es
especialmente novedosa la aplicacio´n de herramientas de la teor´ıa de los juegos cooperativos
para la descomposicio´n dina´mica de los agentes de un sistema en diferentes grupos con poca
interaccio´n entre s´ı. Este trabajo ha sido enviado a [56] y [48].
Finalmente, se han realizado tambie´n aportaciones al problema dual del control: la es-
timacio´n. En concreto se ha desarrollado en conjuncio´n con el profesor Anders Rantzer del
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LTH una te´cnica de estimacio´n distribuida basada en la descomposicio´n dual del problema
de estimacio´n. Este trabajo ha sido enviado a [50]. Asimismo se ha empleado tambie´n la
descomposicio´n del sistema en coaliciones para este mismo problema en [48].
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